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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT Security Bulletin ASB-2012.0137 New versions of Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird, and SeaMonkey fix multiple vulnerabilities. 11 October 2012 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Firefox Thunderbird SeaMonkey Operating System: Windows UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX) Mobile Device Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction Cross-site Scripting -- Remote with User Interaction Denial of Service -- Remote with User Interaction Provide Misleading Information -- Remote with User Interaction Unauthorised Access -- Remote with User Interaction Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2012-4188 CVE-2012-4187 CVE-2012-4186 CVE-2012-4185 CVE-2012-4184 CVE-2012-4183 CVE-2012-4182 CVE-2012-4181 CVE-2012-4180 CVE-2012-4179 CVE-2012-3995 CVE-2012-3994 CVE-2012-3993 CVE-2012-3992 CVE-2012-3991 CVE-2012-3990 CVE-2012-3989 CVE-2012-3988 CVE-2012-3987 CVE-2012-3986 CVE-2012-3985 CVE-2012-3984 CVE-2012-3983 CVE-2012-3982 Member content until: Saturday, November 10 2012 OVERVIEW Multiple vulnerabilities have been fixed in Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird and in SeaMonkey. [1] IMPACT The vendor has provided the following details about the vulnerabilities: "Mozilla developers identified and fixed several memory safety bugs in the browser engine used in Firefox and other Mozilla-based products. Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption under certain circumstances, and we presume that with enough effort at least some of these could be exploited to run arbitrary code." MFSA 2012-74 [2] "Security researcher David Bloom of Cue discovered that <select> elements are always-on-top chromeless windows and that navigation away from a page with an active <select> menu does not remove this window. When another menu is opened programmatically on a new page, the original <select> menu can be retained and arbitrary HTML content within it rendered, allowing an attacker to cover arbitrary portions of the new page through absolute positioning/scrolling, leading to spoofing attacks. Security researcher Jordi Chancel found a variation that would allow for click-jacking attacks was well." MFSA 2012-75 [3] "Security researcher Collin Jackson reported a violation of the HTML5 specifications for document.domain behavior. Specified behavior requires pages to only have access to windows in a new document.domain but the observed violation allowed pages to retain access to windows from the page's initial origin in addition to the new document.domain. This could potentially lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks." MFSA 2012-76 [4] "Mozilla developer Johnny Stenback discovered that several methods of a feature used for testing (DOMWindowUtils) are not protected by existing security checks, allowing these methods to be called through script by web pages. This was addressed by adding the existing security checks to these methods." MFSA 2012-77 [5] "Security researcher Warren He reported that when a page is transitioned into Reader Mode in Firefox for Android, the resulting page has chrome privileges and its content is not thoroughly sanitized. A successful attack requires user enabling of reader mode for a malicious page, which could then perform an attack similar to cross-site scripting (XSS) to gain the privileges allowed to Firefox on an Android device. This has been fixed by changing the Reader Mode page into an unprivileged page. Note: This vulnerability only affects Firefox for Android." MFSA 2012-78 [6] "Security researcher Soroush Dalili reported that a combination of invoking full screen mode and navigating backwards in history could, in some circumstances, cause a hang or crash due to a timing dependent use-after-free pointer reference. This crash may be potentially exploitable." MFSA 2012-79 [7] "Mozilla community member Ms2ger reported a crash due to an invalid cast when using the instanceof operator on certain types of JavaScript objects. This can lead to a potentially exploitable crash." MFSA 2012-80 [8] "Mozilla community member Alice White reported that when the GetProperty function is invoked through JSAPI, security checking can be bypassed when getting cross-origin properties. This potentially allowed for arbitrary code execution." MFSA 2012-81 [9] "Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported that the location property can be accessed by binary plugins through top.location and top can be shadowed by Object.defineProperty as well. This can allow for possible cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks through plugins." MFSA 2012-82 [10] "Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported that when InstallTrigger fails, it throws an error wrapped in a Chrome Object Wrapper (COW) that fails to specify exposed properties. These can then be added to the resulting object by an attacker, allowing access to chrome privileged functions through script. While investigating this issue, Mozilla security researcher moz_bug_r_a4 found that COW did not disallow accessing of properties from a standard prototype in some situations, even when the original issue had been fixed. These issues could allow for a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack or arbitrary code execution." MFSA 2012-83 [11] "Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported an issue with spoofing of the location property. In this issue, writes to location.hash can be used in concert with scripted history navigation to cause a specific website to be loaded into the history object. The baseURI can then be changed to this stored site, allowing an attacker to inject a script or intercept posted data posted to a location specified with a relative path." MFSA 2012-84 [12] "Security researcher Abhishek Arya (Inferno) of the Google Chrome Security Team discovered a series of use-after-free, buffer overflow, and out of bounds read issues using the Address Sanitizer tool in shipped software. These issues are potentially exploitable, allowing for remote code execution. We would also like to thank Abhishek for reporting two additional use-after-free flaws introduced during Firefox 16 development and fixed before general release." MFSA 2012-85 [13] "Security researcher Atte Kettunen from OUSPG reported several heap memory corruption issues found using the Address Sanitizer tool. These issues are potentially exploitable, allowing for remote code execution." MFSA 2012-86 [14] "Security researcher miaubiz used the Address Sanitizer tool to discover a use-after-free in the IME State Manager code. This could lead to a potentially exploitable crash." MFSA 2012-87 [15] MITIGATION Users of the affected versions should upgrade to current versions: - Firefox: 16 or Firefox ESR 10.0.8 - Thunderbird: 16 or Thunderbird ESR 10.0.8 - SeaMonkey: 2.13 REFERENCES [1] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/ [2] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-74 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-74.html [3] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-75 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-75.html [4] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-76 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-76.html [5] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-77 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-77.html [6] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-78 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-78.html [7] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-79 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-79.html [8] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-80 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-80.html [9] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-81 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-81.html [10] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-82 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-82.html [11] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-83 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-83.html [12] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-84 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-84.html [13] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-85 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-85.html [14] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-86 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-86.html [15] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-87 https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-87.html AusCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQIVAwUBUHYtcu4yVqjM2NGpAQL2lg/+Os232Q368QyWD+kEj/3pNBgjKoN8RYVr tOzMv59qJIhpc9/PfXcRy75jtVeU/usfBj3QOp7ceR4wA2l3GwGUgyhREEvbYhda wTvdPTnvRIeerenCgdB+CazqQHwiaCTvd76LXCEjRM3Ar3debc0gmgoDE+HkACrN b9E8EOEplfcezMQ8FJlIwEgl3tbdcsxXN5EK5HwJi5LpZKk3G5+jpqjUllkItIem QDpOvrK3b0F1wEdjiffWMGKMXd766+OsLPOnpK9zM9Ffq4Y7ItIR+zfv6K00GnQi HhtYBfdd4c1kp8r+eQGYQHVjLStGwkQzhXd6L8pq+xUh5O19tqolZkSjSpjHl2UA NBr/oS1bRwz4ywlcKHjHpx8AOM8SaTUoDoAekQl1J/DrpXOnRXv+fJ7WERtEM/IT pv5AZtkoOrQGX5GSjEEHs9XxPgUaAN3uyEHfHGmlvn6ihHBQvnk/8sJhgL1/0fzt A9hmTjE4x0ia5CQ5Yo1GyIlgWVy5Z/jGQpJ3j1d1SeBwg4E5kjqPUQicdVG0flGB Notm9v2gtCKmTeHBt0W2ong7nh6d/NJ65TAYo1Kfek1chcTFYGUbuFubm3XWpLVl 2+v/Zui2Y4Uvfjv6iBvecaFW4O/HU6h7eygqZgBqPw45rl3a+BAKhw/jXB1Sui7A gly4zb5lL4E= =v7K9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----