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AUSCERT Security Bulletin
ASB-2012.0137
New versions of Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird, and SeaMonkey
fix multiple vulnerabilities.
11 October 2012
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Firefox
Thunderbird
SeaMonkey
Operating System: Windows
UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Mobile Device
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction
Cross-site Scripting -- Remote with User Interaction
Denial of Service -- Remote with User Interaction
Provide Misleading Information -- Remote with User Interaction
Unauthorised Access -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2012-4188 CVE-2012-4187 CVE-2012-4186
CVE-2012-4185 CVE-2012-4184 CVE-2012-4183
CVE-2012-4182 CVE-2012-4181 CVE-2012-4180
CVE-2012-4179 CVE-2012-3995 CVE-2012-3994
CVE-2012-3993 CVE-2012-3992 CVE-2012-3991
CVE-2012-3990 CVE-2012-3989 CVE-2012-3988
CVE-2012-3987 CVE-2012-3986 CVE-2012-3985
CVE-2012-3984 CVE-2012-3983 CVE-2012-3982
Member content until: Saturday, November 10 2012
OVERVIEW
Multiple vulnerabilities have been fixed in Mozilla Firefox,
Thunderbird and in SeaMonkey. [1]
IMPACT
The vendor has provided the following details about the vulnerabilities:
"Mozilla developers identified and fixed several memory safety bugs in
the browser engine used in Firefox and other Mozilla-based products.
Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption under certain
circumstances, and we presume that with enough effort at least some of
these could be exploited to run arbitrary code." MFSA 2012-74 [2]
"Security researcher David Bloom of Cue discovered that <select>
elements are always-on-top chromeless windows and that navigation away
from a page with an active <select> menu does not remove this window.
When another menu is opened programmatically on a new page, the original
<select> menu can be retained and arbitrary HTML content within it
rendered, allowing an attacker to cover arbitrary portions of the new
page through absolute positioning/scrolling, leading to spoofing attacks.
Security researcher Jordi Chancel found a variation that would allow for
click-jacking attacks was well." MFSA 2012-75 [3]
"Security researcher Collin Jackson reported a violation of the HTML5
specifications for document.domain behavior. Specified behavior
requires pages to only have access to windows in a new document.domain
but the observed violation allowed pages to retain access to windows
from the page's initial origin in addition to the new document.domain.
This could potentially lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks."
MFSA 2012-76 [4]
"Mozilla developer Johnny Stenback discovered that several methods of a
feature used for testing (DOMWindowUtils) are not protected by existing
security checks, allowing these methods to be called through script by
web pages. This was addressed by adding the existing security checks to
these methods." MFSA 2012-77 [5]
"Security researcher Warren He reported that when a page is
transitioned into Reader Mode in Firefox for Android, the resulting
page has chrome privileges and its content is not thoroughly sanitized.
A successful attack requires user enabling of reader mode for a
malicious page, which could then perform an attack similar to
cross-site scripting (XSS) to gain the privileges allowed to Firefox on
an Android device. This has been fixed by changing the Reader Mode page
into an unprivileged page.
Note: This vulnerability only affects Firefox for Android."
MFSA 2012-78 [6]
"Security researcher Soroush Dalili reported that a combination of
invoking full screen mode and navigating backwards in history could, in
some circumstances, cause a hang or crash due to a timing dependent
use-after-free pointer reference. This crash may be potentially
exploitable." MFSA 2012-79 [7]
"Mozilla community member Ms2ger reported a crash due to an invalid cast
when using the instanceof operator on certain types of JavaScript
objects. This can lead to a potentially exploitable crash."
MFSA 2012-80 [8]
"Mozilla community member Alice White reported that when the GetProperty
function is invoked through JSAPI, security checking can be bypassed
when getting cross-origin properties. This potentially allowed for
arbitrary code execution." MFSA 2012-81 [9]
"Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported that the location property
can be accessed by binary plugins through top.location and top can be
shadowed by Object.defineProperty as well. This can allow for possible
cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks through plugins." MFSA 2012-82 [10]
"Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported that when InstallTrigger
fails, it throws an error wrapped in a Chrome Object Wrapper (COW) that
fails to specify exposed properties. These can then be added to the
resulting object by an attacker, allowing access to chrome privileged
functions through script.
While investigating this issue, Mozilla security researcher moz_bug_r_a4
found that COW did not disallow accessing of properties from a standard
prototype in some situations, even when the original issue had been
fixed.
These issues could allow for a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack or
arbitrary code execution." MFSA 2012-83 [11]
"Security researcher Mariusz Mlynski reported an issue with spoofing of
the location property. In this issue, writes to location.hash can be
used in concert with scripted history navigation to cause a specific
website to be loaded into the history object. The baseURI can then be
changed to this stored site, allowing an attacker to inject a script or
intercept posted data posted to a location specified with a relative
path." MFSA 2012-84 [12]
"Security researcher Abhishek Arya (Inferno) of the Google Chrome
Security Team discovered a series of use-after-free, buffer overflow,
and out of bounds read issues using the Address Sanitizer tool in
shipped software. These issues are potentially exploitable, allowing
for remote code execution. We would also like to thank Abhishek for
reporting two additional use-after-free flaws introduced during Firefox
16 development and fixed before general release." MFSA 2012-85 [13]
"Security researcher Atte Kettunen from OUSPG reported several heap
memory corruption issues found using the Address Sanitizer tool. These
issues are potentially exploitable, allowing for remote code
execution." MFSA 2012-86 [14]
"Security researcher miaubiz used the Address Sanitizer tool to
discover a use-after-free in the IME State Manager code. This could
lead to a potentially exploitable crash." MFSA 2012-87 [15]
MITIGATION
Users of the affected versions should upgrade to current versions:
- Firefox: 16 or Firefox ESR 10.0.8
- Thunderbird: 16 or Thunderbird ESR 10.0.8
- SeaMonkey: 2.13
REFERENCES
[1] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/
[2] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-74
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-74.html
[3] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-75
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-75.html
[4] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-76
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-76.html
[5] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-77
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-77.html
[6] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-78
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-78.html
[7] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-79
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-79.html
[8] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-80
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-80.html
[9] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-81
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-81.html
[10] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-82
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-82.html
[11] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-83
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-83.html
[12] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-84
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-84.html
[13] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-85
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-85.html
[14] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-86
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-86.html
[15] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-87
https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2012/mfsa2012-87.html
AusCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained
in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the information
described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The decision to
follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is
the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in
accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT
takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or
acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin.
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
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