AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
                          ESB-98.135 -- CERT VB-98.09
                   Cisco CRM Temporary File Vulnerability
                               17 August 1998


The CERT Coordination Center has released the following advisory concerning
a vulnerability in the way Cisco Resource Manager (CRM) deals with log
and temporary file creation.  This vulnerability may be used by attackers
to gain unauthorised access. This may include administrative access and
the ability to modify device configurations.

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CERT* Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-98.09
August 14, 1998

Topic:  CRM Temporary File Vulnerability
Source: Cisco

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT
Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Cisco.
Cisco urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. Cisco contact
information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if
you have any questions or need further information.

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Field Notice:
CRM Temporary File Vulnerability
For release 09:00 AM US/Pacific, Thursday, August 13, 1998

   * Summary
   *  Who is Affected
   *  Impact
   *  Details
        o  Remote Access Logs (CSCdk13298)
             +  Workarounds for CSCdk13298
        o Database Update Logs (CSCdk13579)
             +  Workaround for CSCdk13579
        o Import Temporary Files (CSCdk14992, CSCdk14993)
             +  Workaround for CSCdk14992/CSCdk14993
        o Planned Software Fixes
        o  Exploitation and Public Announcements
   * Status of This Notice
        o  Distribution
        o  Revision History
   * Cisco Security Procedures

Versions 1.0 and 1.1 of the Cisco Resource Manager (CRM) create log files
and temporary files on the management station which contain potentially
sensitive information. These files are not protected using operating system
mechanisms, and are therefore readable by all users of the system on which
CRM is installed. The information exposed includes the usernames, passwords,
and SNMP community strings used by CRM to gain access to the devices being

Users who have access to the computer on which CRM is installed may gain
access to information which gives them unauthorized access to the managed
routers and switches.  This affects both Solaris and Windows NT systems.

There are workarounds for this problem, and a patch is available for CRM
1.1. There is no patch for CRM 1.0.  Other than to install the patch, the
most effective solution for most installations is simply to deny untrusted
users any access to the computer on which CRM is installed or to its file

Who is Affected
All customers who run Cisco Resource Manager 1.1 or 1.0, and who allow
untrusted users access to the computer on which CRM is run or to its file
systems, are affected by these vulnerabilities.

Users who have direct access to the machine on which CRM is installed, or
who have network access to the files specified  in the "Details" section of
this document, may gain unauthorized access to the managed devices.  The
unauthorized access gained may include administrative access and the ability
to modify device configurations.

Several different unprotected files may contain sensitive information.
Applicable Cisco bug IDs include CSCdk13298, CSCdk14992, CSCdk14993, and

Remote Access Logs (CSCdk13298)
- - - -----------------------------
Cisco Resource Manager is capable of logging a great deal of detailed
information for debugging purposes. Debugging is ordinarily under control of
the administrator. However, a software error in CRM 1.0 and 1.1 causes
debugging to be enabled at all times. The debugging information collected
may include usernames and passwords used to log into managed devices,  SNMP
community strings, and enable passwords.  The files containing this
information are readable by any user of the computer on which CRM is run.

The log files containing the offending data are:

   * /var/adm/CSCOpx/files/schedule/job-id/swim_swd.log (Solaris)
     C:Program FilesCSCOpxfilesschedulejob-idswim_swd.log (Windows NT)

     These files are created by software distribution jobs scheduled with
     "Distribute Images". Each job has its own subdirectory (designated by
     "job-id" above) and its own log file.

   * /tmp/swim_debug.log (Solaris)
     C:Program FilesCSCOpx	empswim_debug.log (Windows NT)

     This file is used for logging debugging information from Software Image
     Manager functions, such as "Import image from File System/Device", Job
     administration and History administration.

Workarounds for CSCdk13298
- - - ----
The simplest and most effective workaround for this vulnerability is to
prevent untrusted users from having access to the computer on which CRM is
being run or to the file systems on which the log files are stored. The file
systems in question should not be shared over a network of any kind.

If the computer on which CRM is being run must be shared, then the files in
question must be protected from access by untrusted users. This may be done
by issuing the following Solaris commands while running as "root" or "bin":

     chmod 700 /var/adm/CSCOpx/files/schedule
     chmod 700 /tmp/swim_debug.log

Note: Each time your system is rebooted, you will need to change the
permissions on /tmp/swim_debug.log.

There is no analogous workaround for Windows NT systems.

Database Update Logs (CSCdk13579)
- - - -------------------------------
The "Local/Remote Import",  "Import from File", "Add Devices",  and "Change
Device Attributes" functions all record debugging information in files
readable to any user of the computer on which CRM is run. This information
may include usernames, login passwords, SNMP community strings, and/or
enable passwords.

The offending information is recorded in a log file named "dbi_debug.log",
which is located in /tmp on Solaris systems and in C:Program
FilesCSCOpx	emp on Windows NT systems.

Workaround for CSCdk13579
- - - ----
The simplest and most effective workaround for this vulnerability is to
prevent untrusted users from having access to the computer on which CRM is
being run or to the file systems on which the log files are stored. The file
systems in question should not be shared over a network of any kind.

If the computer on which CRM is run must be shared, the  file
"/tmp/dbi_debug.log" or "C:Program FilesCSCOpx	empdbi_debug.log" should
be deleted after any change to device attributes. Note that a window of
vulnerability will exist between the time at which the database update is
performed and the time at which the file is deleted. It may be desirable to
deny access to untrusted users during this window, even though they may be
given access to the system at other times.

Import Temporary Files (CSCdk14992, CSCdk14993)
- - - ---------------------------------------------
The "Local/Remote Import" functions, which are used to load data into the
CRM database from databases maintained by other network management tools,
create temporary files containing usernames, login passwords, community
strings, and enable passwords.  The files are readable to any user of the
computer on which CRM is run. The files exist only for a short time during
the information gathering phase of an import operation, and are
automatically deleted upon successful completion of the operation. However,
should the information gathering phase of the operation fail because of some
system error, the files would not be deleted.

The offending files have names beginning with "DPR_", and are stored in
"/tmp" on Solaris systems and in "C:Program FilesCSCOpx	emp" on Windows
NT systems.

Workaround for CSCdk14992/CSCdk14993
- - - ----
The only effective workaround for CSCdk14992 and CSCdk14993 is to deny
untrusted users access to the system on which CRM is run during any import
operation. Cisco believes that such operations are sufficiently uncommon to
make this a viable option.

Planned Software Fixes
- - - --------------------
Cisco has modified the CRM software to eliminate all of the vulnerabilities
described in this notice. The first regular release containing  the
modifications will be CRM version 2.0, which is tentatively scheduled for
release in early October, 1998. This schedule is subject to change.

Customers who do not wish to wait for CRM version 2.0 may install the CRM
SWIM package version 1.1.1.  The CRM SWIM package version 1.1.1 is a patched
version, identical to the SWIM package in CRM version 1.1, but containing a
fix for bug ID CSCdk13298, which Cisco believes to be the vulnerability most
disruptive to day-to-day system operation.  The other vulnerabilities listed
in this notice are not addressed by the CRM SWIM package 1.1.1.

Customers with service contracts may obtain updates through their usual
channels; those who are registered users of CCO (Cisco's Worldwide Web site)
may download the CRM SWIM package version 1.1.1 update from CCO site at

Customers without service contracts should contact the Cisco TAC for
assistance. The CRM SWIM package 1.1.1 patch (but not the CRM 2.0 upgrade)
will be made available free of charge to all CRM customers, regardless of
service contract status. Please reference the URL of this notice as evidence
of your entitlement to the patch.

There will be no patched version of CRM 1.0. CRM 1.0 customers are eligible
for free upgrades to CRM 1.1 and the CRM SWIM package version  1.1.1.
Customers who wish to continue to use CRM 1.0 are strongly encouraged to
prevent all access by untrusted users to the computers on which they run CRM
or to those computers' file systems.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
Cisco has had no reports of malicious exploitation of the vulnerabilities
listed in this notice.

Cisco knows of no public announcements of these vulnerabilities before the
date of this notice.

Status of This Notice
This is a final field notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy
of all statements in this notice, all the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
this notice unless there is some material change in the facts. Should there
be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this notice.

- - - ----------
This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/770/crmtmp-pub.shtml. In addition to
Worldwide Web posting, the initial version of this notice is being sent to
the following e-mail recipients:

   * cust-security-announce@cisco.com
   * Various internal Cisco mailing lists

Future updates to this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide
Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
URL given above for any updates.

Revision History

 Revision 1.1,      Initial released version
 11:50 AM

Cisco Security Procedures
Please report security issues with Cisco products, and/or sensitive security
intrusion emergencies involving Cisco products, to security-alert@cisco.com.
Reports may be encrypted using PGP; public RSA and DSS keys for
"security-alert@cisco.com" are on the public PGP keyservers.

The alias "security-alert@cisco.com" is used only for reports incoming to
Cisco. Mail sent to the list goes only to a very small group of users within
Cisco. Neither outside users nor unauthorized Cisco employees may subscribe
to "security-alert@cisco.com".

Please do not use "security-alert@cisco.com" for configuration questions,
for security intrusions that you do not consider to be sensitive
emergencies, or for general, non-security-related support requests. We do
not have the capacity to handle such requests through this channel, and will
refer them to the TAC, delaying response to your questions. We advise
contacting the TAC directly with these requests. TAC contact information is
as follows:

   * Voice telephone: +1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
   * Voice telephone: +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
   * Electronic mail: tac@cisco.com

All formal public security notices generated by Cisco are sent to the public
mailing list "cust-security-announce@cisco.com". For information on
subscribing to this mailing list, send a message containing the single line
"info cust-security-announce" to "majordomo@cisco.com". An analogous list,
"cust-security-discuss@cisco.com" is available for public discussion of the
notices and of other Cisco security issues.

This notice is copyright 1998 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the notice,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including
all date and version information.

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If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (FIRST). See http://www.first.org/team-info/.  

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email.
The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact 
the CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key

CERT Contact Information
- - ------------------------
Email    cert@cert.org

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST
                (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for
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Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
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        Software Engineering Institute
        Carnegie Mellon University
        Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890

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This file: ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_bulletins/VB-98.09.Cisco_CRM

Version: 2.6.2


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