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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2000.234 -- FreeBSD-SA-00:40 mopd port allows remote root compromise 30 August 2000 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: mopd Vendor: FreeBSD Ports Collection Operating System: FreeBSD Linux Unix Platform: N/A Impact: Root Compromise Access Required: Remote - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:40 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: mopd port allows remote root compromise Category: ports Module: mopd Announced: 2000-08-28 Credits: Matt Power <mhpower@MIT.EDU>, OpenBSD Affects: Ports collection prior to the correction date. Corrected: 2000-08-09 Vendor status: Contacted FreeBSD only: NO I. Background mopd is used for netbooting older DEC machines such as VAXen and DECstations. II. Problem Description The mopd port contains several remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. An attacker exploiting these can execute arbitrary code on the local machine as root. The mopd port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which contains over 3700 third-party applications in a ready-to-install format. The ports collections shipped with FreeBSD 3.5-RELEASE and 4.1-RELEASE contain this problem, since it was discovered after the releases. FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security audit of the most security-critical ports. III. Impact Remote users can execute arbitrary code on the local machine as root. If you have not chosen to install the mopd port/package, then your system is not vulnerable to this problem. IV. Workaround One of the following: 1) Deinstall the mopd port/package, if you have installed it. 2) Restrict access to the mopd port using a perimeter firewall, or ipfw(8)/ipf(8) on the local machine. Note that users who pass these access restrictions may still exploit the vulnerability. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the mopd port. 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the correction date, obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/net/mopd-1.2b.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/net/mopd-1.2b.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/net/mopd-1.2b.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/net/mopd-1.2b.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/net/mopd-1.2b.tgz NOTE: Be sure to check the file creation date on the package, because the version number of the software has not changed. 3) download a new port skeleton for the mopd port from: http://www.freebsd.org/ports/ and use it to rebuild the port. 4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOaqy6FUuHi5z0oilAQG14gQAn9RVxulK3pIyHi3aQ5j9p0OnlOoP9Wg2 yKEPARafL+WXHS1oJ+5ZGdhUG2rZjU1QktS0xTy5PXSo0mcX91jLJ7ASwg6K5w2e rpZMBRHZVFy3HltzFxwygZGGbENIbZNzZ9Qd9Luq/OPPxZzb/9NsHnUovk5/lyIE yCAt/USxiDs= =tlfC - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to use any or all of this information is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be done so in accordance with site policies and procedures. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the original authors to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/advisories.html If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). Internet Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBOcd26yh9+71yA2DNAQE6/wP+PysYfkFVwwig+sz5KinjOO0VmTh03Nxe yJeRmrkJkEbbYpzIsTeR4DWG78bXQ5lhY6XT5FZH5v8sO6bvyKknVZoz1ZB+SLA4 XXUzDyN73lSPdrPw2WknMvmqWm/Hfpvh6tQvZLF7ZcSg4dpIt9qO0FKnkelbdnB6 xB7a9ktbyO0= =IbKQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----