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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2001.016 -- FreeBSD-SA-00:77 Several vulnerabilities in procfs [REVISED] 12 January 2001 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: procfs Vendor: FreeBSD Operating System: FreeBSD BSD Impact: Root Compromise Access Required: Local Ref: ESB-2000.400 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:77 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: Several vulnerabilities in procfs [REVISED] Category: core Module: procfs Announced: 2000-12-18 Reissued: 2000-12-29 Affects: FreeBSD 4.x and 3.x prior to the correction date. Corrected: 2000-12-16 (FreeBSD 4.2-STABLE) 2000-12-18 (FreeBSD 3.5.1-STABLE) Credits: Frank van Vliet <email@example.com> Joost Pol <firstname.lastname@example.org> (Problem #1, #2) Esa Etelavuori <email@example.com> (Problem #3) FreeBSD only: NO 0. Revision History v1.0 2000-12-18 Initial release. v1.1 2000-12-29 Note FreeBSD 3.x also vulnerable to problem #1 (local root vulnerability), update 3.x patch, correct typo in mount command. I. Background procfs is the process filesystem, which presents a filesystem interface to the system process table, together with associated data. II. Problem Description There were several problems discovered in the procfs code: 1) Unprivileged local users can gain superuser privileges due to insufficient access control checks on the /proc/<pid>/mem and /proc/<pid>/ctl files, which gives access to a process address space and perform various control operations on the process respectively. The attack proceeds as follows: the attacker can fork() a child process and map the address space of the child in the parent. The child process then exec()s a utility which runs with root or other increased privileges. The parent process incorrectly retains read and write access to the address space of the child process which is now running with increased privileges, and can modify it to execute arbitrary code with those privileges. 2) Unprivileged local users can execute a denial of service against the local machine by mmap()ing a processes own /proc/<pid>/mem file in the procfs filesystem. This will cause the system to enter into an infinite loop in the kernel, effectively causing the system to hang until manually rebooted by an administrator on the system console. 3) Users with superuser privileges on the machine, including users with root privilege in a jail(8) virtual machine, can overflow a buffer in the kernel and bypass access control checks placed on the abilities of the superuser. These include the ability to "break out" of the jail environment (jail is often used as a compartmentalization tool for security purposes), to lower the system securelevel without requiring a reboot, and to introduce new (possibly malicious) code into the kernel on systems where loading of KLDs (kernel loadable modules) has been disabled. III. Impact 1) On vulnerable FreeBSD systems where procfs is mounted, unprivileged local users can obtain root privileges. 2) On vulnerable FreeBSD systems where procfs is mounted, unprivileged local users can cause the system to hang. 3) On vulnerable FreeBSD systems, superusers who can load the procfs filesystem, or on systems where it is already mounted, can bypass access control checks in the kernel which would otherwise limit their abilities. Consequences include the ability to break out of a jail environment, to lower securelevel or to introduce malicious code into the kernel on systems where loading of KLDs has been disabled. For many systems this vulnerability is likely to have minor impact. IV. Workaround To work around problems 1 and 2, perform the following steps as root: Unmount all instances of the procfs filesystem using the umount(8) command: # umount -f -a -t procfs Disable the automatic mounting of all instances of procfs in /etc/fstab: remove or comment out the line(s) of the following form: proc /proc procfs rw 0 0 The linprocfs filesystem, which provides additional interfaces to Linux binaries to emulate the Linux procfs filesystem, is believed not to be vulnerable to the problems described in this advisory and therefore does not need to be unmounted. Note however that some Linux binaries may require the presence of both procfs and linprocfs in order to function correctly. To work around problem 3 is more difficult since it involves the superuser, but the following steps are believed to be sufficient: * Unmount all procfs filesystems which are visible from within jail environments, to prevent a jail root compromise from compromising the entire system. Since jailed users do not have the ability to mount filesystems, a successful jail root compromise in a jail without procfs visible cannot exploit this vulnerability. * Remove the "options PROCFS" line from your kernel configuration file, if present, and compile a new kernel as described in http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html If the running kernel was compiled with "options PROCFS", then any user who has root privileges can mount procfs and exploit vulnerability 3, regardless of system securelevel. If the kernel does not include this option, then an attempt to mount procfs will trigger a load of the procfs.ko KLD module, which is denied at securelevel greater than zero. Since this vulnerability only has meaning (in the case of unjailed root users) on systems which are kept in a securelevel greater than zero, this will always be true, and such systems are not vulnerable to the problem. Note that unmounting procfs may have a negative impact on the operation of the system: under older versions of FreeBSD it is required for some aspects of the ps(1) command, and it may also break use of userland inter-process debuggers such as gdb. Other installed binaries including emulated Linux binaries may require access to procfs for correct operation. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 3.5.1-STABLE or 4.2-STABLE dated after the correction date, or patch your present system source code and rebuild. To patch your present system: download the relevant patch from the below location, and execute the following commands as root: [FreeBSD 3.5.1-RELEASE] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.3.5.1.patch.v1.1 # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.3.5.1.patch.v1.1.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 4.1-RELEASE and FreeBSD 4.1.1-RELEASE] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.4.1.patch # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.4.1.patch.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE] # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.4.2.patch # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:77/procfs.4.2.patch.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # cd /usr/src/sys # patch -p < /path/to/patch If procfs is statically compiled into the kernel (e.g. the kernel configuration file contains the line 'options PROCFS'), then rebuild and reinstall your kernel as described in http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system with the new kernel for the changes to take effect. If procfs is dynamically loaded by KLD (use the kldstat command to verify whether this is the case) and the system securelevel has not been raised, then the system can be patched at run-time without requiring a reboot, by performing the following steps after patching the source as described above: # cd /usr/src/sys/modules/procfs # make all install # umount -f -a -t procfs # kldunload procfs # kldload procfs # mount -a -t procfs - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iQCVAwUBOkyr7FUuHi5z0oilAQFBOgP+NimZ8FVU04GDn3XuzWnRQLsr0fpdQfua cBAq9ND0ksYYerl2CoK4Obk81aWPdq9h+mZqhaxd2c2w3e98WFsRr6Xa9gXKcu4p 5GI08hqu5EKsCjzDFJzHBkHrFlze1dGvEF2696hpwhGXWGT0wLEixOuqEX95KXiO rDcAYveLhlw= =4NIQ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. 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Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/advisories.html If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). Internet Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBOpFDNSh9+71yA2DNAQGh5wQAlyQMct0ophg6cH6tzm02YGSi1gBk0HPl ZfqkZ6jDzG+WaABim0+5/E+z39+ngANZa0c+mv9WrtlUVYzrt969hH+xWnjXJIkb TEirwGiJCVhNA/Vn9HGwmQBN3LOfXmlQJwUKsZzBmk8HTzd3JIzQ8IU2xmrToPdo 1n51rVwwW/M= =QmPw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----