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             ESB-2001.225 -- NetBSD Security Advisory 2001-008
             Processes can gain "Supervisor" privileges on sh3
                                31 May 2001


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:                sh3
Vendor:                 NetBSD
Operating System:       NetBSD on the sh3 platform only
Impact:                 Root Compromise
Access Required:        Existing Account

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                 NetBSD Security Advisory 2001-008

Topic:		Processes can gain "Supervisor" privileges on sh3.
Version:	All versions of NetBSD, on the sh3 platform only.
Severity:	Local users may execute code with supervisor privileges.
Fixed:		NetBSD-current:    May 16, 2001
		NetBSD-1.5 branch: May 27, 2001


Missing validation of user-supplied arguments to a system call can
allow user applications on the sh3 platform to execute code with
supervisor privileges, bypassing normal system protections.

This problem is only present on the sh3 platform, which includes the
dreamcast, evbsh3, hpcsh and mmeye ports.

Technical Details

The Hitachi Super-H architecture includes the Status Register, a
processor register which provides status information such as the
true/false condition bit, and which also controls properties among
which is the processor mode (either user mode or privileged mode).
The only component of NetBSD executing in privileged mode is the
kernel; user processes are restricted to user mode and thus cannot
execute privileged processor instructions or access related resources.

As a part of the protection model, the contents of the Status Register
can be modified only when executing in privileged mode.

While reviewing code in NetBSD, it was discovered that the NetBSD
"sigreturn" system call did not do validation of user-supplied Status
Register contents; it was also discovered that the
"process_write_regs" kernel routine, which is used by the procfs and
ptrace(2) facilities, did not do appropriate validation of
user-supplied Status Register contents; in short, it's possible for a
user process to construct and pass an execution context which makes it
resume in privileged mode.

Solutions and Workarounds

Systems running NetBSD/evbsh3, NetBSD/dreamcast, NetBSD/hpcsh or
NetBSD/mmeye are vulnerable.  Although the NetBSD Project has not
distributed binary releases for these ports yet, binary snapshots
of development versions are known to be in use.

Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before May 16, 2001 should
be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated May 16, 2001 or later.

Systems running NetBSD-release-1-5 dated from before May 27, 2001
should be upgraded to NetBSD-release-1-5 dated May 27, 2001 or later.

The following patches to /sys/arch/sh3/include/psl.h,
/sys/arch/sh3/sh3/compat_13_machdep.c and /sys/arch/sh3/sh3/sh3_machdep.c
should be applied before building a new kernel.  This patch can
be applied (with offset differences) to NetBSD-1.5 or NetBSD-current
kernel sources using the patch(1) command.

Index: include/psl.h
RCS file: /cvsroot/syssrc/sys/arch/sh3/include/psl.h,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -r1.1 -r1.2
- - --- include/psl.h	1999/09/13 10:31:21	1.1
+++ include/psl.h	2001/05/16 12:42:38	1.2
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@
 #define	PSL_MBO		0x00000000	/* must be one bits */
 #define	PSL_MBZ		0x8ffffc0c	/* must be zero bits */
- - -#define PSL_USERSET    0
+#define PSL_USERSET	0
 #ifdef _KERNEL
 #include <machine/intr.h>
Index: sh3/compat_13_machdep.c
RCS file: /cvsroot/syssrc/sys/arch/sh3/sh3/compat_13_machdep.c,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -r1.2 -r1.3
- - --- sh3/compat_13_machdep.c	2000/12/22 22:58:55	1.2
+++ sh3/compat_13_machdep.c	2001/05/16 12:42:38	1.3
@@ -71,16 +71,9 @@
 	/* Restore register context. */
 	tf = p->p_md.md_regs;
- - -	/*
- - -	 * Check for security violations.  If we're returning to
- - -	 * protected mode, the CPU will validate the segment registers
- - -	 * automatically and generate a trap on violations.  We handle
- - -	 * the trap, rather than doing all of the checking here.
- - -	 */
- - -#ifdef TODO
+	/* Check for security violations.  */
 	if (((context.sc_ssr ^ tf->tf_ssr) & PSL_USERSTATIC) != 0)
 		return (EINVAL);
- - -#endif
 	tf->tf_ssr = context.sc_ssr;
Index: sh3/sh3_machdep.c
RCS file: /cvsroot/syssrc/sys/arch/sh3/sh3/sh3_machdep.c,v
retrieving revision 1.12
retrieving revision 1.13
diff -u -r1.12 -r1.13
- - --- sh3/sh3_machdep.c	2001/04/24 04:31:09	1.12
+++ sh3/sh3_machdep.c	2001/05/16 12:42:38	1.13
@@ -350,21 +350,13 @@
 	/* Restore signal context. */
 	tf = p->p_md.md_regs;
- - -	{
- - -		/*
- - -		 * Check for security violations.  If we're returning to
- - -		 * protected mode, the CPU will validate the segment registers
- - -		 * automatically and generate a trap on violations.  We handle
- - -		 * the trap, rather than doing all of the checking here.
- - -		 */
- - -#ifdef TODO
- - -	  if (((context.sc_ssr ^ tf->tf_ssr) & PSL_USERSTATIC) != 0) {
- - -	    return (EINVAL);
- - -	  }
- - -#endif
- - -	  tf->tf_ssr = context.sc_ssr;
- - -	}
+	/* Check for security violations. */
+	if (((context.sc_ssr ^ tf->tf_ssr) & PSL_USERSTATIC) != 0)
+		return (EINVAL);
+	tf->tf_ssr = context.sc_ssr;
 	tf->tf_r0 = context.sc_r0;
 	tf->tf_r1 = context.sc_r1;
 	tf->tf_r2 = context.sc_r2;

Thanks To

Klaus Klein for detecting and resolving this problem.

Revision History

	2001-05-29	Initial Release

More Information

An up-to-date PGP signed copy of this release will be maintained at

Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.

Copyright 2001, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.

$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2001-008.txt,v 1.6 2001/05/29 05:58:42 lukem Exp $
Version: GnuPG v1.0.5 (NetBSD)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org


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