Published:
04 April 2002
Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2002.167 -- Compaq Security Advisory (SSRT0779) UPDATE #3 Potential Security Vulnerabilities in SNMP 5 April 2002 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS Compaq Tru64 UNIX Compaq Insight Management Suite Compaq Deskpro, Pro Workstation, Armada, Evo Compaq SANworks Vendor: Compaq Impact: Denial of Service Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Access Required: Remote Ref: AL-2002.02 ESB-2002.083 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 TITLE: (SSRT0779) Potential Security Vulnerabilities in SNMP Posted at http://ftp.support.compaq.com/patches/.new/security.shtml NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact. RELEASE DATE: 18 FEBRUARY, 2002 UPDATED: 03 APRIL, 2002 - update Tru64, patch availability 08 MARCH, 2002 - add StorageWorks products, and Compaq/Microcom based products. 05 MARCH, 2002 - update TRU64 Information SEVERITY: MEDIUM SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Global Services Software Security Response Team CROSS REFERENCE: (SSRT0799, CAN-2002-0012, CAN-2002-0013, CERT CA-2002-03) PROBLEM SUMMARY: The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT/cc) has recently issued an advisory regarding numerous potential vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 implementations. These potential vulnerabilities are applicable to SNMPv1 trap handling and SNMPv1 Request handling. The CERT article outlines vulnerabilities that can cause SNMP services to stop functioning and in some cases may enable "unauthorized access," "denial of service attacks" or may cause system instability. IMPACT: Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers: Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS: Compaq Tru64 UNIX: Compaq Insight Management Suite: Compaq Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo: Compaq SANworks Hardware: Compaq StorageWorks Products Compaq/Microcom Products: Compaq's findings to date regarding the SNMPv1 issues are as follows: ________________________________ Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers: The Compaq Himalaya NonStop Kernel prohibits execution of code on the stack or heap by hardware TLB permissions (read/write only), preventing Trojan horse attacks by embedding code within the buffer overflow area. However, process ABENDs can occur. The SNMP agent ABENDs in the c06-snmpv1 buffer-overflow tests. This affects forwarding trap messages and/or sending info responses to SNMP managers. Sub-agents use IPCs to communicate with the SNMP agent, so they cannot be directly attacked. More importantly, sub-agents are confined to information only requests, so they cannot be used to configure/manage their sub-systems. Our investigation an analysis is continuing and further updates will be provided. IPMs to address the ABEND problem of the SNMP are in development and will be released as soon as verification is complete. Availability of these IPMs will be announced in future updates. The exposure to SNMP agent ABENDs can be reduced by running the SNMP agent as a process-pair or by configuring auto-restart in the Persistence Manager. __________________________________ Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS: There is some impact to the SNMP agent provided with Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS. This problem can cause the SNMP agent to ACCVIO and terminate temporarily denying service to SNMP, but in most cases after this occurs Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS will restart the SNMP agent in response to the next SNMP request. There are no known risks of compromising system security due to this problem. The SNMP agent executes from a non-privileged process, which prevents any compromise to system security. Our investigation and analysis has determined the cause of the problem. The updated images for Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS are now in final test. Compaq will provide updates to Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS in the next ECO and also in the next release, Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS V5.3. Contact Compaq's Customer Support Center if an earlier updated is required. __________________ Compaq Tru64 UNIX: UPDATE: 02 April, 2002 There is no known risk of compromising Tru64 UNIX system security due to the recent SNMP attack. The SNMP agent provided with Tru64 UNIX is susceptible to a limited problem - the SNMP agent may stop responding to SNMP requests, or it may incur a segmentation fault, generate a core file, and exit. Either scenario denies SNMP service to SNMP-based network management applications. However, we have not found the attack to cause the system to be unstable, vulnerable to "unauthorized access", or subject to any denial of service other than to the SNMP service. Impacted Tru64 UNIX operating system versions include: Tru64 UNIX 4.0f, 4.0g, 5.0a, 5.1, 5.1a. SOLUTION: Until the Tru64 UNIX fixes are available in the mainstream release patch kits, Compaq is releasing the following Early Release Patch Kit(s) (ERPs) publicly for use by any customer. The Early Release Patch kits use dupatch to install and will not install over any Customer-Specific-Patches (CSPs) which have file intersections with the ERPs. Raise an IPMT case to UNIX Support Engineering if you need a CSP merged with one of the following ERPs. The fixes contained in the Early Release Patch (ERP) kits will be available in the next mainstream patch kit(s) for: - Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8 - Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4 - Tru64 UNIX 5.0A PK4 - Tru64 UNIX 5.1 PK5 - Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK2 --------------------- Early Release Patches --------------------- Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 4.0F with PK7 (BL18) installed ERP Kit Name: DUV40FB18-C0071301-13866-ES-20020401 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0f/ Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 4.0G with PK3 (BL17) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V40GB17-C0012100-13640-ES-20020313 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0g/ Tru64 UNIX 5.0A PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.0A with PK3 (BL17) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V50AB17-C0019600-13593-ES-20020308 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.0a/ Tru64 UNIX 5.1 PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.1 with PK4 (BL18) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V51B18-C0109002-13712-ES-20020318 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1/ Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.1A with PK1 (BL1) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V51AB1-C0014802-13710-ES-20020318 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1a/ MD5 and SHA1 checksums are available in the public patch notice for the ERP kits. You can find information on how to verify MD5 and SHA1 checksums at: http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/whats-new.shtml ________________________________ Compaq Insight Management Suite: (ProLiants running industry standard operating systems including Windows 2000, NetWare, Linux, etc) The Compaq Insight Management Suite utilizes SNMP as a primary communications method. Fixes to the operating systems affected will be provided by the vendors involved. Check http://www.compaq.com/manage/security the most up-to-date information. _______________________________________________ Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo: The Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo(Microsoft operating systems including Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows 98, and Windows 95) Compaq Management Agents for Clients utilizes SNMP as an optional communications method. Fixes to the operating systems affected will be provided by Microsoft. Check www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-006.asp for the most up-to-date information. _____________________________________ Compaq SANworks Management Appliance: The SANworks management appliance is essentially a Compaq server and our recommended configuration does not have it connected directly to the internet. Therefore, it is less exposed than other servers to external SNMP security attacks. However, the appliance is susceptible to SNMP security attacks from inside the firewall that could result in the graceful termination of some storage management applications on the appliance. Compaq will provide a patch to the appliance as soon as possible. _____________________________ COMPAQ STORAGEWORKS PRODUCTS: UPDATE: 08 MARCH, 2002 The following Compaq StorageWorks products have Ethernet connections that may potentially be exposed to the SNMPv1 vulnerability: Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL, 16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated 32 or 64 Port Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64 Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader RESOLUTION: Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL, 16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated 32 or 64 Port: There are currently no known issues related to vulnerability notes VU#854306 or VU#107186 with these products. They have passed all validation tests conducted to date. Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64: This product has been evaluated with a SNMP based test program that attempts to overload the director with SNMP traffic such as GET, Set and Get Next commands. No problems were found in this testing. Additionally, Compaq is in the process of evaluating the details of the SNMP implementation in this product. Any problems identified that are determined to pose a risk to customer operations will be documented and addressed in future maintenance releases. Note that the advisory documented two areas of vulnerability. One area involves Trap handling on the part of SNMP Management components, and the other area involves the processing of GET, Set and Get Next commands on the part of SNMP Agent components. The director implements only the SNMP Agent components, so none of the problems related to Trap handling apply. Also, the SNMP Agent on the director management server is disabled by default. No SNMP messages are processed by the management server unless the systems administrator has explicitly enabled the SNMP Agent. On the director itself, the SNMP Agent is enabled by default, but for read access only. Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router: The potential vulnerability has to do with SNMP Set commands. The only Set command the MDR allows is to set the trap address. Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub: Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation in this product. Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader: Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation in this product. ________________________ COMPAQ/MICROCOM PRODUCTS: UPDATE: MARCH 08, 2002 _________________________________________ Microcom Access Integrator (All Versions) Compaq-Microcom 6000 Series Remote Access Concentrators(All Versions) Both products use SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system management, either through expressWATCH, or third party SNMP clients. These products are normally managed over the LAN by clients using IP ports UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps. The SNMP agents integrated in these products cannot be disabled. Access to the system via the PRI, T1 or analog modules do not present a security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the system requiring a hard reset of one or more of the systems modules, which will result in temporary loss of connectivity to dial in clients. Users will be able to reconnect after the systems has reset. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers, or Firewall should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. Compaq has always recommended that the associated engines contained in the CM6000 Series reside on an internal network using a non-routable private addressing scheme. 3. The system should not be managed over the internet or an non secure LAN. ______________________________ Microcom ISPorte (All Versions) Compaq Microcom 4000 concentrator These products make very limited use of the SNMPv1 protocol on the Ethernet portion of their PRI/T1 modules. In the limited number of installations where digital calls are being tunneled to NT servers on the connected LAN, there is a potential for SNMP packets to reach the PRI/T1 card through it's Ethernet port. Access to the system via the analog modem modules do not present security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the PRI/T1 card, resulting in a loss of connectivity for dial in users. A hard reset is the only way to correct these failure, but a hard reset will also disconnect all remaining users. Users will be able to reconnect after the system resets. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. If the system is being used for analog dial in access only, it should not be connected to the LAN via the Ethernet port on the PRI/T1 card. ___________________________ Microcom SNMP HDMS+ System (Version 1.3.1) The great majority of HDMS+ systems installed do not have SNMP capabilities and are therefore not at risk. These systems can be identified by the absence of a 10baseT connector on the rear of the controller card. A limited number of SNMP HDMS+ systems were produced, this product uses SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system management. Management clients can include either expressWATCH, or third party SNMP clients. The product can be managed over the LAN by clients using IP ports UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps, or through a serial RS232 port using SLIP. The SNMP agents integrated in these products cannot be disabled. Access to the system via the analog modem modules do not present security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the systems management controller, which may require a hard reset. The reset of this controller may result in a temporary loss of connectivity for dial in users. Dial in users will be able to reconnect after the system has reset. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers or firewalls should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. The system should not be managed over the internet. 3. The system should not be managed over a non secure LAN. Direct management via a serial RS232 SLIP connection would be recommended. For assistance or clarification on any of the recommendation for Compaq/Microcom products, please call 01-800-652-6672 and from the menu select 2,3,1 then enter routing code 1851 ____________________________________________________________________ NOTE: Many systems operate behind firewalls and would normally implement SNMP blocking for SNMP as standard procedure. Based on SNMP blocking and ingress/egress filtering, the potential Security vulnerability may only be exploited by users who have access to your local security domain, therefore the risk is diminished. SUPPORT: This advisory bulletin will be updated for the various products requiring patches and individual patch notifications will be done through standard "patch notification" procedures for those products. For further information, contact your normal Compaq Support channel. SUBSCRIBE: To subscribe to automatically receive future Security Advisories from the Compaq's Software Security Response Team via electronic mail: http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/mailing-list.shtml REPORT: To report a potential security vulnerability with any Compaq supported product, send email mailto:security-ssrt@compaq.com or mailto:sec-alert@compaq.com Compaq appreciates your cooperation and patience. As always, Compaq urges you to periodically review your system management and security procedures. Compaq will continue to review and enhance the security features of its products and work with our customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their systems. "Compaq is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected Compaq products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. Compaq recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. Compaq does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, Compaq will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin." Copyright 2002 Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. Compaq shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Compaq and the names of Compaq products referenced herein are, either, trademarks and/or service marks or registered trademarks and/or service marks of Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks and/or service marks of their respective owners. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.0.1 iQA/AwUBPKvKLjnTu2ckvbFuEQIvUgCg1CoJe3iEge4LRw1ZcViAV+jMJ1sAoMmX ZplSH0HnvCqvr1h8aXJqqyj3 =PfBm - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 TITLE: (SSRT0779) Potential Security Vulnerabilities in SNMP Posted at http://ftp.support.compaq.com/patches/.new/security.shtml NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact. RELEASE DATE: 18 FEBRUARY, 2002 UPDATED: 03 APRIL, 2002 - update Tru64, patch availability 08 MARCH, 2002 - add StorageWorks products, and Compaq/Microcom based products. 05 MARCH, 2002 - update TRU64 Information SEVERITY: MEDIUM SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Global Services Software Security Response Team CROSS REFERENCE: (SSRT0799, CAN-2002-0012, CAN-2002-0013, CERT CA-2002-03) PROBLEM SUMMARY: The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT/cc) has recently issued an advisory regarding numerous potential vulnerabilities in SNMPv1 implementations. These potential vulnerabilities are applicable to SNMPv1 trap handling and SNMPv1 Request handling. The CERT article outlines vulnerabilities that can cause SNMP services to stop functioning and in some cases may enable "unauthorized access," "denial of service attacks" or may cause system instability. IMPACT: Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers: Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS: Compaq Tru64 UNIX: Compaq Insight Management Suite: Compaq Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo: Compaq SANworks Hardware: Compaq StorageWorks Products Compaq/Microcom Products: Compaq's findings to date regarding the SNMPv1 issues are as follows: ________________________________ Compaq NonStop Himalaya Servers: The Compaq Himalaya NonStop Kernel prohibits execution of code on the stack or heap by hardware TLB permissions (read/write only), preventing Trojan horse attacks by embedding code within the buffer overflow area. However, process ABENDs can occur. The SNMP agent ABENDs in the c06-snmpv1 buffer-overflow tests. This affects forwarding trap messages and/or sending info responses to SNMP managers. Sub-agents use IPCs to communicate with the SNMP agent, so they cannot be directly attacked. More importantly, sub-agents are confined to information only requests, so they cannot be used to configure/manage their sub-systems. Our investigation an analysis is continuing and further updates will be provided. IPMs to address the ABEND problem of the SNMP are in development and will be released as soon as verification is complete. Availability of these IPMs will be announced in future updates. The exposure to SNMP agent ABENDs can be reduced by running the SNMP agent as a process-pair or by configuring auto-restart in the Persistence Manager. __________________________________ Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS: There is some impact to the SNMP agent provided with Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS. This problem can cause the SNMP agent to ACCVIO and terminate temporarily denying service to SNMP, but in most cases after this occurs Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS will restart the SNMP agent in response to the next SNMP request. There are no known risks of compromising system security due to this problem. The SNMP agent executes from a non-privileged process, which prevents any compromise to system security. Our investigation and analysis has determined the cause of the problem. The updated images for Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS are now in final test. Compaq will provide updates to Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS in the next ECO and also in the next release, Compaq TCP/IP Services for OpenVMS V5.3. Contact Compaq's Customer Support Center if an earlier updated is required. __________________ Compaq Tru64 UNIX: UPDATE: 02 April, 2002 There is no known risk of compromising Tru64 UNIX system security due to the recent SNMP attack. The SNMP agent provided with Tru64 UNIX is susceptible to a limited problem - the SNMP agent may stop responding to SNMP requests, or it may incur a segmentation fault, generate a core file, and exit. Either scenario denies SNMP service to SNMP-based network management applications. However, we have not found the attack to cause the system to be unstable, vulnerable to "unauthorized access", or subject to any denial of service other than to the SNMP service. Impacted Tru64 UNIX operating system versions include: Tru64 UNIX 4.0f, 4.0g, 5.0a, 5.1, 5.1a. SOLUTION: Until the Tru64 UNIX fixes are available in the mainstream release patch kits, Compaq is releasing the following Early Release Patch Kit(s) (ERPs) publicly for use by any customer. The Early Release Patch kits use dupatch to install and will not install over any Customer-Specific-Patches (CSPs) which have file intersections with the ERPs. Raise an IPMT case to UNIX Support Engineering if you need a CSP merged with one of the following ERPs. The fixes contained in the Early Release Patch (ERP) kits will be available in the next mainstream patch kit(s) for: - Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8 - Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4 - Tru64 UNIX 5.0A PK4 - Tru64 UNIX 5.1 PK5 - Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK2 --------------------- Early Release Patches --------------------- Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 4.0F with PK7 (BL18) installed ERP Kit Name: DUV40FB18-C0071301-13866-ES-20020401 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0f/ Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 4.0G with PK3 (BL17) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V40GB17-C0012100-13640-ES-20020313 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v4.0g/ Tru64 UNIX 5.0A PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.0A with PK3 (BL17) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V50AB17-C0019600-13593-ES-20020308 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.0a/ Tru64 UNIX 5.1 PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.1 with PK4 (BL18) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V51B18-C0109002-13712-ES-20020318 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1/ Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PREREQUISITE: Tru64 UNIX 5.1A with PK1 (BL1) installed ERP Kit Name: T64V51AB1-C0014802-13710-ES-20020318 Kit Location: http://ftp1.support.compaq.com/public/unix/v5.1a/ MD5 and SHA1 checksums are available in the public patch notice for the ERP kits. You can find information on how to verify MD5 and SHA1 checksums at: http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/whats-new.shtml ________________________________ Compaq Insight Management Suite: (ProLiants running industry standard operating systems including Windows 2000, NetWare, Linux, etc) The Compaq Insight Management Suite utilizes SNMP as a primary communications method. Fixes to the operating systems affected will be provided by the vendors involved. Check http://www.compaq.com/manage/security the most up-to-date information. _______________________________________________ Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo: The Deskpro, Professional Workstation, Armada, Evo(Microsoft operating systems including Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows 98, and Windows 95) Compaq Management Agents for Clients utilizes SNMP as an optional communications method. Fixes to the operating systems affected will be provided by Microsoft. Check www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-006.asp for the most up-to-date information. _____________________________________ Compaq SANworks Management Appliance: The SANworks management appliance is essentially a Compaq server and our recommended configuration does not have it connected directly to the internet. Therefore, it is less exposed than other servers to external SNMP security attacks. However, the appliance is susceptible to SNMP security attacks from inside the firewall that could result in the graceful termination of some storage management applications on the appliance. Compaq will provide a patch to the appliance as soon as possible. _____________________________ COMPAQ STORAGEWORKS PRODUCTS: UPDATE: 08 MARCH, 2002 The following Compaq StorageWorks products have Ethernet connections that may potentially be exposed to the SNMPv1 vulnerability: Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL, 16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated 32 or 64 Port Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64 Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader RESOLUTION: Compaq StorageWorks SAN Switch 8, 8-EL, 16, 16-EL, 2/16, Integrated 32 or 64 Port: There are currently no known issues related to vulnerability notes VU#854306 or VU#107186 with these products. They have passed all validation tests conducted to date. Compaq StorageWorks SAN Director 64: This product has been evaluated with a SNMP based test program that attempts to overload the director with SNMP traffic such as GET, Set and Get Next commands. No problems were found in this testing. Additionally, Compaq is in the process of evaluating the details of the SNMP implementation in this product. Any problems identified that are determined to pose a risk to customer operations will be documented and addressed in future maintenance releases. Note that the advisory documented two areas of vulnerability. One area involves Trap handling on the part of SNMP Management components, and the other area involves the processing of GET, Set and Get Next commands on the part of SNMP Agent components. The director implements only the SNMP Agent components, so none of the problems related to Trap handling apply. Also, the SNMP Agent on the director management server is disabled by default. No SNMP messages are processed by the management server unless the systems administrator has explicitly enabled the SNMP Agent. On the director itself, the SNMP Agent is enabled by default, but for read access only. Compaq StorageWorks Modular Data Router: The potential vulnerability has to do with SNMP Set commands. The only Set command the MDR allows is to set the trap address. Compaq StorageWorks 12 Port Fibre Channel Managed Hub: Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation in this product. Compaq StorageWorks 20/40 GB 8 Cassette AutoLoader: Compaq is in the process of evaluating the SNMP implementation in this product. ________________________ COMPAQ/MICROCOM PRODUCTS: UPDATE: MARCH 08, 2002 _________________________________________ Microcom Access Integrator (All Versions) Compaq-Microcom 6000 Series Remote Access Concentrators(All Versions) Both products use SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system management, either through expressWATCH, or third party SNMP clients. These products are normally managed over the LAN by clients using IP ports UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps. The SNMP agents integrated in these products cannot be disabled. Access to the system via the PRI, T1 or analog modules do not present a security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the system requiring a hard reset of one or more of the systems modules, which will result in temporary loss of connectivity to dial in clients. Users will be able to reconnect after the systems has reset. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers, or Firewall should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. Compaq has always recommended that the associated engines contained in the CM6000 Series reside on an internal network using a non-routable private addressing scheme. 3. The system should not be managed over the internet or an non secure LAN. ______________________________ Microcom ISPorte (All Versions) Compaq Microcom 4000 concentrator These products make very limited use of the SNMPv1 protocol on the Ethernet portion of their PRI/T1 modules. In the limited number of installations where digital calls are being tunneled to NT servers on the connected LAN, there is a potential for SNMP packets to reach the PRI/T1 card through it's Ethernet port. Access to the system via the analog modem modules do not present security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the PRI/T1 card, resulting in a loss of connectivity for dial in users. A hard reset is the only way to correct these failure, but a hard reset will also disconnect all remaining users. Users will be able to reconnect after the system resets. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. If the system is being used for analog dial in access only, it should not be connected to the LAN via the Ethernet port on the PRI/T1 card. ___________________________ Microcom SNMP HDMS+ System (Version 1.3.1) The great majority of HDMS+ systems installed do not have SNMP capabilities and are therefore not at risk. These systems can be identified by the absence of a 10baseT connector on the rear of the controller card. A limited number of SNMP HDMS+ systems were produced, this product uses SNMPv1 protocol as the transport for system management. Management clients can include either expressWATCH, or third party SNMP clients. The product can be managed over the LAN by clients using IP ports UDP 161 for SNMP and UDP 162 for SNMP Traps, or through a serial RS232 port using SLIP. The SNMP agents integrated in these products cannot be disabled. Access to the system via the analog modem modules do not present security risk related to SNMPv1. Incursions may result in instability of the systems management controller, which may require a hard reset. The reset of this controller may result in a temporary loss of connectivity for dial in users. Dial in users will be able to reconnect after the system has reset. RECOMMENDATIONS: Compaq recommends the following precautions in accordance with good general networking administration practices. 1. Apply perimeter filtering to SNMP traffic. Upstream internet routers or firewalls should be configured to filter UDP ports 161 and 162. 2. The system should not be managed over the internet. 3. The system should not be managed over a non secure LAN. Direct management via a serial RS232 SLIP connection would be recommended. For assistance or clarification on any of the recommendation for Compaq/Microcom products, please call 01-800-652-6672 and from the menu select 2,3,1 then enter routing code 1851 ____________________________________________________________________ NOTE: Many systems operate behind firewalls and would normally implement SNMP blocking for SNMP as standard procedure. Based on SNMP blocking and ingress/egress filtering, the potential Security vulnerability may only be exploited by users who have access to your local security domain, therefore the risk is diminished. SUPPORT: This advisory bulletin will be updated for the various products requiring patches and individual patch notifications will be done through standard "patch notification" procedures for those products. For further information, contact your normal Compaq Support channel. SUBSCRIBE: To subscribe to automatically receive future Security Advisories from the Compaq's Software Security Response Team via electronic mail: http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/mailing-list.shtml REPORT: To report a potential security vulnerability with any Compaq supported product, send email mailto:security-ssrt@compaq.com or mailto:sec-alert@compaq.com Compaq appreciates your cooperation and patience. As always, Compaq urges you to periodically review your system management and security procedures. Compaq will continue to review and enhance the security features of its products and work with our customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their systems. "Compaq is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected Compaq products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. Compaq recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. Compaq does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, Compaq will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin." Copyright 2002 Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. Compaq shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Compaq and the names of Compaq products referenced herein are, either, trademarks and/or service marks or registered trademarks and/or service marks of Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks and/or service marks of their respective owners. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.0.1 iQA/AwUBPKvKLjnTu2ckvbFuEQIvUgCg1CoJe3iEge4LRw1ZcViAV+jMJ1sAoMmX ZplSH0HnvCqvr1h8aXJqqyj3 =PfBm - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to use any or all of this information is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be done so in accordance with site policies and procedures. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the original authors to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/advisories.html If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBPK3H2ih9+71yA2DNAQHo4AP+IMgOy0pdzWWR/cQ8ZvxEg5TzXQKBtAVX N0UyfJiWbCuwf9Plq9BaryA2oyaExKbu5Y1lRRjGwwbJV03PYExUKHtadWf9T9kh 5ETZrjftKudLEgwfiGU1JGnjzWl4ngEhPZv3mR+phLQU0LLuiK5ofagUDKjIbAgk L+xS1G6k790= =Sdiu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----