Operating System:

Published:

06 May 2002

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                 ESB-2002.213 -- CERT Advisory CA-2002-11
                Heap Overflow in Cachefs Daemon (cachefsd)
                                7 May 2002

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:                CacheFS daemon (cachefsd)
Vendor:                 Sun Microsystems
Operating System:       Solaris 2.5.1
                        Solaris 2.6
                        Solaris 7
                        Solaris 8
Platform:               i386
                        SPARC
Impact:                 Root Compromise
Access Required:        Remote

Ref:                    AA-2002.01

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CERT Advisory CA-2002-11 Heap Overflow in Cachefs Daemon (cachefsd)

   Original release date: May 06, 2002
   Last revised:
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8 (SPARC and Intel Architectures)

Overview

   Sun's  NFS/RPC  file  system  cachefs daemon (cachefsd) is shipped and
   installed  by default with Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8 (SPARC and
   Intel  architectures).  A remotely exploitable vulnerability exists in
   cachefsd that could permit a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code
   with  the  privileges of the cachefsd, typically root. The CERT/CC has
   received  credible  reports  of  scanning  and exploitation of Solaris
   systems running cachefsd.

I. Description

   A  remotely  exploitable  heap overflow exists in the cachefsd program
   shipped and installed by default with Sun Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, and 8
   (SPARC   and   Intel  architectures).  Cachefsd  caches  requests  for
   operations on remote file systems mounted via the use of NFS protocol.
   A  remote  attacker  can  send  a  crafted RPC request to the cachefsd
   program to exploit the vulnerability.

   Logs of exploitation attempts may resemble the following:


May 16 22:46:08 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
  
May 16 22:46:21 victim-host last message repeated 7 times
     
May 16 22:46:22 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Bus Error- core dumped

May 16 22:46:24 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
   
May 16 22:46:56 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Bus Error - core dumped
   
May 16 22:46:59 victim-host last message repeated 1 time

May 16 22:47:02 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd:
Segmentation Fault - core dumped
   
May 16 22:47:07 victim-host last message repeated 3 times
   
May 16 22:47:09 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd: 
Hangup

May 16 22:47:11 victim-host inetd[600]: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd: 
Segmentation Fault - core dumped


   According  a  Sun  Alert Notification, failed attempts to exploit this
   vulnerability  may  leave  a core dump file in the root directory. The
   presence  of the core file does not preclude the success of subsequent
   attacks.  Additionally,  if  the  file  /etc/cachefstab exists, it may
   contain unusual entries.

   This issue is also being referenced as CAN-2002-0085:

     http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0085

   The  Australian  Computer  Emergency  Response Team has also issued an
   advisory related to incident activity exploiting cachefsd:

  http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/Advisories/advisory/AA-2002.01.txt

II. Impact

   A  remote  attacker may be able to execute code with the privileges of
   the cachefsd process, typically root.

III. Solution

   Apply a patch from your vendor

   Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.

   If  a  patch  is not available, disable cachefsd in inetd.conf until a
   patch can be applied.

   If  disabling  the  cachefsd  is  not  an option, follow the suggested
   workaround in the Sun Alert Notification.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

   This  appendix  contains  information  provided  by  vendors  for this
   advisory.  As  vendors  report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
   update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
   particular  vendor is not listed below, please check the Vulnerability
   Note (VU#635811) or contact your vendor directly.

IBM

     IBM's AIX operating system, all versions, is not vulnerable.

SGI

     SGI does not ship with SUN cachefsd, so IRIX is not vulnerable.

Sun

     See     the     Sun     Alert     Notification     available     at
     http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert%2F44309.
   _________________________________________________________________

   The CERT/CC acknowledges the eSecurity Online Team for discovering and
   reporting  on this vulnerability and thanks Sun Microsystems for their
   technical assistance.
   _________________________________________________________________

   Feedback  can  be directed to the authors: 
   Jason A. Rafail and Jeffrey S. Havrilla
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-11.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

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          U.S.A.

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   Revision History
      May 06, 2002:  Initial release

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