AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                 ESB-2002.260 -- CERT Advisory CA-2002-15
               Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in ISC BIND 9
                                5 June 2002


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:                ISC BIND 9
Vendor:                 Internet Software Consortium (ISC)
Impact:                 Denial of Service
Access Required:        Remote

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------


CERT Advisory CA-2002-15 Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in ISC BIND 9

   Original release date: June 04, 2002
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Domain Name System (DNS) servers running ISC BIND 9 prior to 9.2.1
       Because  the  normal  operation  of  most services on the Internet
       depends  on  the  proper  operation of DNS servers, other services
       could be affected if this vulnerability is exploited.


   A  denial-of-service vulnerability exists in version 9 of the Internet
   Software  Consortium's  (ISC)  Berkeley  Internet  Name  Domain (BIND)
   server.  ISC  BIND  versions 8 and 4 are not affected. Exploiting this
   vulnerability will cause the BIND server to shut down.

I. Description

   BIND  is  an  implementation  of  the Domain Name System (DNS) that is
   maintained  by  the  ISC.  A vulnerability exists in version 9 of BIND
   that  allows  remote  attackers to shut down BIND servers. An attacker
   can  cause  the  shutdown by sending a specific DNS packet designed to
   trigger  an  internal  consistency  check. However, this vulnerability
   will  not allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or write data to
   arbitrary locations in memory.

   The  internal consistency check that triggers the shutdown occurs when
   the  rdataset  parameter  to  the  dns_message_findtype()  function in
   message.c  is  not  NULL as expected. The condition causes the code to
   assert an error message and call abort() to shut down the BIND server.
   It  is  also possible to accidentally trigger this vulnerability using
   common   queries   found  in  routine  operation,  especially  queries
   originating from SMTP servers.

   A   vulnerability  note  describing  this  problem  can  be  found  at
   http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/739123.    This    vulnerability   note
   includes  a  list  of  vendors  that  have  been  contacted about this

   This vulnerability is also being referenced as CAN-2002-0400:


II. Impact

   Exploitation of this vulnerability will cause the BIND server to abort
   and  shut  down.  As  a  result, the BIND server will not be available
   unless it is restarted.

III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

   The  ISC  has released BIND version 9.2.1. The CERT/CC recommends that
   users  of  BIND  9  apply a patch from their vendor or upgrade to BIND

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

   This  appendix  contains  information  provided  by  vendors  for this
   advisory.  As  vendors  report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
   update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
   particular  vendor  is  not  listed  below, we have not received their


     The version of BIND that ships in Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server does
     not contain this vulnerability.


     Wind  River  Systems, Inc. does not include BIND 9 with any version
     of BSD/OS.


     SCO  OpenServer  from Caldera does not ship BIND9, and is therefore
     not vulnerable.
     Caldera  Open  UNIX  does  ship  BIND9,  and  is vulnerable. We are
     Caldera  OpenLinux  does  not  ship  BIND9,  and  is  therefore not

Compaq Computer Corporation

     HP Alpha Server Products:
     HP Tru64 UNIX:
     Tru64  UNIX  is  not  vulnerable to this reported problem. HP Tru64
     UNIX ships with BIND 8.2.2-p5
     TCP/IP for HP OpenVms:
     TCP/IP   for   HP  OpenVms  is  not  vulnerable  to  this  reported
     problem.The  current  versions  of  TCP/IP for HP OpenVMS ship BIND
     HP NonStop Server:
     "HP  NonStop  Himalaya  is  not  vulnerable  to  this problem.  The
     'named' function of Domain Name Server (T6021) which is implemented
     for  HP  NonStop Himalaya is based on BIND 4.8.  NonStop DNS is the
     only Himalaya software product that includes 'named'."


     Cray, Inc. is not vulnerable since the BIND distributed with Unicos
     and Unicos/mk is not based on BIND 9.


     Guardian  Digital  does  not ship BIND 9 in any versions of EnGarde
     Secure  Linux,  therefore  we are not vulnerable. All versions were
     shipped with BIND 8.

F5 Networks, Inc.

     F5  Networks' products do not include BIND 9, and are therefore not
     affected by this vulnerability.


     The FreeBSD base system does not ship with ISC BIND 9. However, ISC
     BIND  9  is  available  in  the  FreeBSD  Ports  Collection.  It is
     currently at version 9.2.1 and is therefore unaffected.

Hewlett-Packard Company

     HP is Vulnerable, Solution investigation continuing..


     After  analysis  of the affected component, IBM has determined that
     the AIX bind deamon is not vulnerable to the attack as described in
     the CERT advisory.

Internet Software Consortium

     This  vulnerability  was found through routine bug analysis. BIND 9
     is  designed  to exit when it detects an internal consistency error
     to reduce the impact of bugs in the server. ISC strongly reccomends
     that  all BIND 9 users upgrade immediately to 9.2.1. BIND 9.2.1 can
     be found at http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind9.html.


     Mandrake  Linux  8.x  ships with BIND9 and as such updated packages
     will be available as early as possible.

Microsoft Corporation

     Microsoft  has  reviewed  the  information and can confirm that our
     products are not affected by this vulnerability.

NEC Corporation

     sent on June 3, 2002
     [Server Products]
     * EWS/UP 48 Series operating system
        - is NOT vulnerable.


     NetBSD has not included Bind 9 in the base system of any release or
     -current development branch.
     Bind  9  is  available  from the 3rd party software system, pkgsrc.
     Users  who  have  installed  net/bind9  or net/bind9-current should
     update  to  a  fixed version. pkgsrc/security/audit-packages can be
     used to keep up to date with these types of issues.

Network Appliance

     All  NetApp  products  do  not  contain any BIND code, so no NetApp
     product is vulnerable to this problem.

Nortel Networks Limited

     Nortel  Networks  is  reviewing  its  portfolio to determine if any
     products  are  affected by the vulnerability noted in CERT Advisory
     CA-2002-15. A definitive statement will be issued shortly.

Red Hat

     Red  Hat distributed BIND 9 in Red Hat Linux versions 7.1, 7.2, and
     7.3.  We  are  currently working on producing errata packages, when
     complete these will be available along with our advisory at the URL
     below.   At the same time users of the Red Hat Network will be able
     to update their systems using the 'up2date' tool.

Silicon Graphics, Inc.

     IRIX does not ship with BIND9 and is not vulnerable.

Sun Microsystems

     Sun  does  not ship BIND 9 with any version of Solaris at this time
     and is therefore not affected by this issue.

SuSE, Inc.

     We  are  affected  by  the  bind9  DoS  issue  as  well. All of our
     currently  supported SuSE Linux products come with a bind9 package.
     We  will  release  an  announcement for the issue, coordinated with
     your timeframe and not before we see your official announcement.

Unisphere Networks, Inc.

     The  Unisphere  Networks  ERX  family  of  edge  routers  does  not
     implement  a  DNS  server  or  named  daemon  within the Unison OS.
     Additionally,  the  DNS client found on the ERX is not based on the
     ISC BIND code. Unisphere Networks has no reason to expect a similar
     problem exists in the DNS client implementation found on the ERX.

   The  CERT  Coordination Center thanks the Internet Software Consortium
   for notifying us about this vulnerability.

   Author: Ian A. Finlay

   This document is available from:

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert@cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890

   CERT/CC   personnel   answer  the  hotline  08:00-17:00  EST(GMT-5)  /
   EDT(GMT-4)  Monday  through  Friday;  they are on call for emergencies
   during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

   We  strongly  urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
   Our public PGP key is available from

   If  you  prefer  to  use  DES,  please  call the CERT hotline for more

Getting security information

   CERT  publications  and  other security information are available from
   our web site

   To  subscribe  to  the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
   send  email  to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your

   subscribe cert-advisory

   *  "CERT"  and  "CERT  Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.

   Any  material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering  Institute  is  furnished  on  an  "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied  as  to  any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
   fitness  for  a  particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
   results  obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
   does  not  make  any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
   patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.

   Revision History
June 04, 2002:  Initial release

Version: PGP 6.5.8


- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content.  The decision to use any or all of this information is
the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be done so in
accordance with site policies and procedures.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the original authors to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:


If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or
your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:	(07) 3365 7031
Telephone:	(07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
		AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
		which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
		On call after hours for member emergencies.

Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: noconv
Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key