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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2002.335 -- CERT Advisory CA-2002-20 Multiple Vulnerabilities in CDE ToolTalk 11 July 2002 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: ToolTalk RPC database server Vendor: CERT/CC Operating System: UNIX Impact: Root Compromise Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Denial of Service Delete Arbitrary Files Overwrite Arbitrary Files Access Required: Remote Ref: AL-2002.07 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CERT Advisory CA-2002-20 Multiple Vulnerabilities in CDE ToolTalk Original release date: July 10, 2002 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file. Systems Affected * Systems running CDE ToolTalk Overview Two vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server. The first vulnerability could be used by a remote attacker to delete arbitrary files, cause a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code or commands. The second vulnerability could allow a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files with contents of the attacker's choice. I. Description The Common Desktop Environment (CDE) is an integrated graphical user interface that runs on UNIX and Linux operating systems. CDE ToolTalk is a message brokering system that provides an architecture for applications to communicate with each other across hosts and platforms. The ToolTalk RPC database server, rpc.ttdbserverd, manages communication between ToolTalk applications. For more information about CDE, see http://www.opengroup.org/cde/ http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/ This advisory addresses two new vulnerabilities in the CDE ToolTalk RPC database server. These vulnerabilities are summarized below and are described in further detail in their respective vulnerability notes. A list previously documented problems in CDE can be found Appendix B. VU#975403 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file descriptor argument to _TT_ISCLOSE() The ToolTalk RPC database server does not validate the range of an argument passed to the procedure _TT_ISCLOSE(). As a result, certain locations in memory can be overwritten with zeros. For more information, please see VU#975403: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/975403 This vulnerability has been assigned CAN-2002-0677 by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group. VU#299816 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file operations The ToolTalk RPC database server does not ensure that the target of a file write operation is a valid file and not a symbolic link. For more information, please see VU#299816: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/299816 This vulnerability has been assigned CAN-2002-0678 by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group. II. Impact VU#975403 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file descriptor argument to _TT_ISCLOSE() By issuing a specially crafted call to the procedure _TT_ISCLOSE(), a remote attacker could overwrite certain locations in memory with zeros. Using a combination of techniques that include valid ToolTalk RPC requests, an attacker could leverage this vulnerability to delete any file that is accessible by the ToolTalk RPC database server. Since the server typically runs with root privileges, any file on a vulnerable system could be deleted. Overwriting memory or deleting files could cause a denial of service. It may also be possible to execute arbitrary code and commands. VU#299816 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file operations By referencing a specially crafted symbolic link in certain ToolTalk RPC requests, a local attacker could overwrite any file that is accessible by the the ToolTalk RPC database server with contents of the attacker's choice. Since the server typically runs with root privileges, any file on a vulnerable system could be overwritten. Overwriting root-owned files could lead to lead to privilege escalation or cause a denial of service. III. Solution Apply a patch from your vendor Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments. Please contact your vendor directly. Disable vulnerable service Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to disable the ToolTalk RPC database service. As a best practice, the CERT/CC recommends disabling all services that are not explicitly required. On a typical CDE system, it should be possible to disable rpc.ttdbserverd by commenting out the relevant entries in /etc/inetd.conf and if necessary, /etc/rpc, and then by restarting the inetd process. The program number for the ToolTalk RPC database server is 100083. If references to 100083 or rpc.ttdbserverd appear in /etc/inetd.conf or /etc/rpc or in output from the rpcinfo(1M) and ps(1) commands, then the ToolTalk RPC database server may be running. The following example was taken from a system running SunOS 5.8 (Solaris 8): /etc/inetd.conf ... # # Sun ToolTalk Database Server # 100083/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd (line wrapped) ... # rpcinfo -p program vers proto port service ... 100083 1 tcp 32773 ... # ps -ef UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD ... root 355 164 0 19:31:27 ? 0:00 rpc.ttdbserverd ... Before deciding to disable the ToolTalk RPC database server or the RPC portmapper service, carefully consider your network configuration and service requirements. Block access to vulnerable service Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to block access to the ToolTalk RPC database server and possibly the RPC portmapper service from untrusted networks such as the Internet. Use a firewall or other packet-filtering technology to block the appropriate network ports. The ToolTalk RPC database server may be configured to use port 692/tcp or another port as indicated in output from the rpcinfo(1M) command. In the example above, the ToolTalk RPC database server is configured to use port 32773/tcp. The RPC portmapper service typically runs on ports 111/tcp and 111/udp. Keep in mind that blocking ports at a network perimeter does not protect the vulnerable service from attacks that originate from the internal network. Before deciding to block or restrict access to the ToolTalk RPC database server or the RPC portmapper service, carefully consider your network configuration and service requirements. Appendix A. - Vendor Information This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments. Caldera, Inc. Caldera Open UNIX and Caldera UnixWare provide the CDE ttdbserverd daemon, and are vulnerable to these issues. We have prepared fixes for those two operating systems, and will make them available as soon as these issues are made public. SCO OpenServer and Caldera OpenLinux do not provide CDE, and are therefore not vulnerable. Compaq Computer Corporation SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard Company and Hewlett-Packard Company HP Services Software Security Response Team CROSS REFERENCE: SSRT2251 At this time Compaq does have solutions in final testing and will publish HP Tru64 UNIX security bulletin (SSRT2251) with patch information as soon as testing has completed and kits are available from the support ftp web site. A recommended workaround however is to disable rpc.ttdbserver until solutions are available. This should only create a potential problem for public software packages applications that use the RPC-based ToolTalk database server. This step should be evaluated against the risks identified, your security measures environment, and potential impact of other products that may use the ToolTalk database server. To disable rpc.ttdbserverd: + Comment out the following line in /etc/inetd.conf: rpc.ttdbserverd stream tcp swait root /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd (line wrapped) + Force inetd to re-read the configuration file by executing the inetd -h command. Note: The internet daemon should kill the currently running rpc.ttdbserver. If not, manually kill any existing rpc.ttdbserverd process. Cray, Inc. Cray, Inc. does include ToolTalk within the CrayTools product. However, rpc.ttdbserverd is not turned on or used by any Cray provided application. Since a site may have turned this on for their own use, they can always remove the binary /opt/ctl/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd if they are concerned. Fujitsu Fujitsu's UXP/V operating system is affected by the vulnerability reported in VU#975403 [or VU#299816] because UXP/V does not support any CDE functionalties. Hewlett-Packard Company HP9000 Series 700/800 running HP-UX releases 10.10, 10.20, 11.00, and 11.11 are vulnerable. Until patches are available, install the appropriate file to replace rpc.ttdbserver. Download rpc.ttdbserver.tar.gz from the ftp site. This file is temporary and will be deleted when patches are available from the standard HP web sites, including itrc.hp.com. System: hprc.external.hp.com (22.214.171.124) Login: ttdb1 Password: ttdb1 FTP Access: ftp://ttdb1:email@example.com/ ftp://ttdb1:firstname.lastname@example.org/ File: rpc.ttdbserver.tar.gz MD5: da1be3aaf70d0e2393bd9a03feaf4b1d An HP security bulletin will be released with more information. IBM Corporation The CDE desktop product shipped with AIX is vulnerable to both the issues detailed above in the advisory. This affects AIX releases 4.3.3 and 5.1.0 An efix package will be available shortly from the IBM software ftp site. The efix packages can be downloaded from ftp.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security. This directory contains a README file that gives further details on the efix packages. The following APARs will be available in the near future: AIX 4.3.3: IY32368 AIX 5.1.0: IY32370 SGI SGI acknowledges the ToolTalk vulnerabilities reported by CERT and is currently investigating. No further information is available at this time. For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available for all vulnerable and supported IRIX operating systems. Until SGI has more definitive information to provide, customers are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods including the wiretap mailing list on http://www.sgi.com/support/security/. Sun Microsystems, Inc. The Solaris RPC-based ToolTalk database server, rpc.ttdbserver, is vulnerable to the two vulnerabilities [VU#975403 VU#299816] described in this advisory in all currently supported versions of Solaris: Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, 8, and 9 Patches are being generated for all of the above releases. Sun will publish a Sun Security Bulletin and a Sun Alert for this issue. The Sun Alert will be available from: http://sunsolve.sun.com The patches will be available from: http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch Sun Security Bulletins are available from: http://sunsolve.sun.com/security Xi Graphics Xi Graphics deXtop CDE v2.1 is vulnerable to this attack. When announced, the update and accompanying text file will be: ftp://ftp.xig.com/pub/updates/dextop/2.1/DEX2100.016.tar. gz (line wrapped) ftp://ftp.xig.com/pub/updates/dextop/2.1/DEX2100.016.txt Most sites do not need to use the ToolTalk server daemon. Xi Graphics Security recommends that non-essential services are never enabled. To disable the ToolTalk server on your system, edit /etc/inetd.conf and comment out, or remove, the 'rpc.ttdbserver' line. Then, either restart inetd, or reboot your machine. Appendix B. - References * http://www.opengroup.org/cde/ * http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/ * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-01.html * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-27.html * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/595507 * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/860296 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-11.html * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-11.html * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-02.html _________________________________________________________________ The CERT Coordination Center thanks the reporters, Iván Arce and Ricardo Quesada of CORE SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, for their assistance and cooperation in producing this document. _________________________________________________________________ Author: Art Manion ______________________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-20.html ______________________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: email@example.com Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. ______________________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. _________________________________________________________________ Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History July 10, 2002: Initial release - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.8 iQCVAwUBPSzfNKCVPMXQI2HJAQGb3AP9Fh4bIxXmwBxxhlcJc+OCvbwWAcOYhO4X ymhM/lO/3MvlBof2iANKGAgC0+DNGg+NTHuvpFnfCDdyUR6teiPfxBxJZWTLrPGQ bWmYzgs3A+K1Tl+b0wMbLm0BuizzCyoKegTUQ8Qygt4kWQ26NEMMoeE/XCtID0LX L5PLJReDnJY= =sjVU - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to email@example.com and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. 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Internet Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBPS17Gih9+71yA2DNAQHd8gP9FJCYM8m5wTwcT4CcK8h18+2u3q5C5hLg BxjjoNb9E5U72wab0p5qWyhntBj9ktotwocWdPAXcAxM9WZjQWm6jMMMKtzFN/PG 2P3U7km5/UhLyoL7Ry9J38M3jrVlyO02O4ghN085Z/fqHsLUrlxfugANBJ9PNKFh ZUi2OeN56Fc= =91XQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----