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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2006.0431 -- [UNIX/Linux][Win] GnuPG 1.4.4 release fixes integer overflow vulnerability 27 June 2006 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: GnuPG 1.4.3 and prior GnuPG 1.9.20 and prior Publisher: GnuPG Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX) Windows Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Denial of Service Access: Remote/Unauthenticated CVE Names: CVE-2006-3082 Original Bulletin: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q2/000226.html - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG release: Version 1.4.4 This is maintenance release to fix a recently detected flaw in the handling of user IDs, see the NEWS part below. Updating to this version is recommended. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It is a complete and free replacement of PGP and can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in RFC2440. Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at http://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on: GnuPG 1.4.4 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/ . The list of mirrors can be found at http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html . Note, that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. On the mirrors you should find the following files in the *gnupg* directory: gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2 (2976k) gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2.sig GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and OpenPGP signature. gnupg-1.4.4.tar.gz (4173k) gnupg-1.4.4.tar.gz.sig GnuPG source compressed using GZIP and OpenPGP signature. gnupg-1.4.3-1.4.5.diff.bz2 (405k) A patch file to upgrade a 1.4.3 GnuPG source. Select one of them. To shorten the download time, you probably want to get the BZIP2 compressed file. Please try another mirror if exceptional your mirror is not yet up to date. In the *binary* directory, you should find these files: gnupg-w32cli-1.4.4.exe (1441k) gnupg-w32cli-1.4.4.exe.sig GnuPG compiled for Microsoft Windows and OpenPGP signature. This is a command line only version; the source files are the same as given above. Note, that this is a minimal installer and unless you are just in need for the gpg binary, you are better off using the full featured installer at http://www.gpg4win.org . A new version of Gpg4win, including this version of GnuPG will be available and announced really soon. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the signature of the file gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by that signing key. Make sure that you have the right key, either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key. Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command finger wk ,at' g10code.com or using a keyserver like gpg --recv-key 1CE0C630 The distribution key 1CE0C630 is signed by the well known key 5B0358A2. If you get an key expired message, you should retrieve a fresh copy as the expiration date might have been prolonged. NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION! * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this: sha1sum gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: 3414d67f22973576f31e354f44859bafbccb7eee gnupg-1.4.4.tar.bz2 3d504d7d31e6d9b81bf33a25bec08bc5e6c0fc0c gnupg-1.4.4.tar.gz 5d6d193c22a878a02afee08a7b8733876b344a92 gnupg-1.4.3-1.4.4.diff.bz2 8695eee22ce62aef384665034ee81bd491bee9ed gnupg-w32cli-1.4.4.exe Upgrade Information =================== If you are upgrading from a version prior to 1.0.7, you should run the script tools/convert-from-106 once. Please note also that due to a bug in versions prior to 1.0.6 it may not be possible to downgrade to such versions unless you apply the patch http://www.gnupg.org/developer/gpg-woody-fix.txt . If you have any problems, please see the FAQ and the mailing list archive at http://lists.gnupg.org. Please direct questions to the gnupg-users at gnupg.org mailing list. What's New =========== * User IDs are now capped at 2048 bytes. This avoids a memory allocation attack (see CVE-2006-3082). * Added support for the SHA-224 hash. Like the SHA-384 hash, it is mainly useful when DSS (the US Digital Signature Standard) compatibility is desired. * Added support for the latest update to DSA keys and signatures. This allows for larger keys than 1024 bits and hashes other than SHA-1 and RIPEMD/160. Note that not all OpenPGP implementations can handle these new keys and signatures yet. See "--enable-dsa2" in the manual for more information. Internationalization ==================== GnuPG comes with support for 28 languages. Due to a lot of new and changed strings the translations are not entirely complete. Future Directions ================= GnuPG 1.4.x is the current stable branch and will be kept as the easy to use and build single-executable versions. We plan to backport new features from the development series to 1.4. GnuPG 1.9.x is the new development series of GnuPG. This version merged the code from the Aegypten project and thus it includes the gpg-agent, a smartcard daemon and gpg's S/MIME cousin gpgsm. The design is different to the previous versions and we may not support all ancient systems - thus POSIX compatibility will be an absolute requirement for supported platforms. We are currently in the process of updating the gpg part of 1.9 to the one of this release. IF YOU NEED GNUPG 1.9, IT IS HIGHLY SUGGESTED THAT YOU INSTALL IT IN ADDITION TO GNUPG 1.4! Both versions will peacefully coexist and extend each other. Support ======= Improving GnuPG is costly, but you can help! We are looking for organizations that find GnuPG useful and wish to contribute back. You can contribute by reporting bugs, improve the software, or by donating money. Commercial support contracts for GnuPG are available, and they help finance continued maintenance. g10 Code GmbH, a Duesseldorf based company owned and headed by gpg's principal author, is currently funding GnuPG development. We are always looking for interesting development projects. A service directory has recently been started at: http://www.gnupg.org/service.html Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word or answering questions on the mailing lists. Happy Hacking, The GnuPG Team (David, Werner and the other contributors) - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. 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It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQCVAwUBRKCORSh9+71yA2DNAQJjKQQAjo1QAqXsa6wMPvMGqvDbZhyTeHsPUtjW Y/2ESIIB8yt9kMxJ8CYX6Fdwk1yjpSmVXSTj/Yo4KBx+Kilhq5DgsQ+kSw1W+mXr SAraWB2jgYE87OI7eEeTwdA7YpepX6XUjsFL2M2DuYLGDyMG2VtmApjyKkRdzHDC NuKWLG2NsIE= =sdmo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----