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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                       ESB-2007.0075 -- [UNIX/Linux]
                     Multiple vulnerabilities in Samba
                              6 February 2007

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:              Samba 3.0.6 to 3.0.23d
Publisher:            Samba
Operating System:     UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Impact:               Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
                      Denial of Service
Access:               Existing Account
CVE Names:            CVE-2007-0454 CVE-2007-0453 CVE-2007-0452

Original Bulletin:
  http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0454.html
  http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0453.html
  http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0452.html

Comment: Note that this bulletin contains three Samba advisories.
         
         Patches mentioned in these advisories are available on Samba's
         website at:
         
             http://www.samba.org/samba/security

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==========================================================
==
== Subject:     Potential Denial of Service bug in smbd
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2007-0452
==
== Versions:    Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d (inclusive)
==
== Summary:     A logic error in the deferred open code
== 		can lead to an infinite loop in smbd
==
==========================================================

===========
Description
===========

Internally Samba's file server daemon, smbd, implements
support for deferred file open calls in an attempt to serve
client requests that would otherwise fail due to a share mode
violation.  When renaming a file under certain circumstances
it is possible that the request is never removed from the deferred
open queue.  smbd will then become stuck is a loop trying to
service the open request.

This bug may allow an authenticated user to exhaust resources
such as memory and CPU on the server by opening multiple CIFS
sessions, each of which will normally spawn a new smbd process,
and sending each connection into an infinite loop.


==================
Patch Availability
==================

A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this
email.  This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24
release.  Patches are also available from at the Samba Security
page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security).


==========
Workaround
==========

The bug is believed to be exploitable only by an authenticated
user.  The server's exposure can be alleviated by disabling
any suspect or hostile user accounts.


=======
Credits
=======

This vulnerability was found during internal regression
testing by Samba developers.


==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================

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==========================================================
==
== Subject:     Buffer overrun in NSS host lookup Winbind
==		library on Solaris
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2007-0453
==
== Versions:    Samba 3.0.21 - 3.0.23d (inclusive) running on
==		Sun Solaris
==
== Summary:     A potential overrun in the gethostbyname()
==		and getipnodebyname() in the nss_winbind.so.1
==		library on Solaris can potentially allow
==		for code execution.
==
==========================================================

===========
Description
===========

NOTE: This security advisory only affects Sun Solaris
systems running Samba's winbindd daemon and configured to
make use of the nss_winbind.so.1 library for gethostbyname()
and getipnodebyname() name resolution queries.  For example,

	## /etc/nsswitch.conf
	...
	ipnodes: files winbind
	hosts: files winbind

The buffer overrun is caused by copying a string passed
into the NSS interface into a static buffer prior to sending
the request to the winbindd daemon.


==================
Patch Availability
==================

A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this
email.  This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24
release.  Patches are also available from at the Samba Security
page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security).

==========
Workaround
==========

An unpatched Solaris server may be protected by removing
the 'winbind' entry from the hosts and ipnodes services in
/etc/nsswitch.conf.


=======
Credits
=======

This vulnerability was reported (including a proposed patch)
to Samba developers by Olivier Gay <ouah@ouah.org>.   Much thanks
to Olivier for his cooperation and patience in the announcement
of this defect.  The time line is as follows:

* Dec 15, 2006: Defect first reported to the security@samba.org
  email alias.
* Dec 21, 2006: Initial developer response by Andrew Tridgell
  confirming the issue.
* Jan 29, 2007: Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list
* Feb 5, 2007: Public issue of security advisory.


==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================

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==========================================================
==
== Subject:     Format string bug in afsacl.so VFS plugin.
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2007-0454
==
== Versions:    The AFS ACL mapping VFS plugin distributed
==		in Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d (inclusive)
==
== Summary:     The name of a file on the server's share
==		is used as the format string when setting
==		an NT security descriptor through the
==		afsacl.so VFS plugin.
==
==========================================================

===========
Description
===========

NOTE: This security advisory only impacts Samba servers
that share AFS file systems to CIFS clients and which have
been explicitly instructed in smb.conf to load the afsacl.so
VFS module.

The source defect results in the name of a file stored on
disk being used as the format string in a call to snprintf().
This bug becomes exploitable only when a user is able
to write to a share which utilizes Samba's afsacl.so library
for setting Windows NT access control lists on files residing
on an AFS file system.


==================
Patch Availability
==================

A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this
email.  This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24
release.  Patches are also available from at the Samba Security
page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security).


==========
Workaround
==========

An unpatched server may be protected by removing all
references to the afsacl.so VFS module from shares in
smb.conf.


=======
Credits
=======

This vulnerability was reported (including a proposed patch)
to Samba developers by <zybadawg333@hushmail.com>.  Much thanks
to zybadawg333 for the cooperation and patience in the
announcement of this defect.  The time line is as follows:

* Jan 8, 2007: Defect first reported to the security@samba.org
  email alias.
* Jan 8, 2007: Initial developer response by Jeremy Allison
  confirming the issue.
* Jan 29, 2007: Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list
* Feb 5, 2007: Public issue of security advisory.


==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================

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