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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2007.0075 -- [UNIX/Linux] Multiple vulnerabilities in Samba 6 February 2007 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Samba 3.0.6 to 3.0.23d Publisher: Samba Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX) Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Denial of Service Access: Existing Account CVE Names: CVE-2007-0454 CVE-2007-0453 CVE-2007-0452 Original Bulletin: http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0454.html http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0453.html http://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-0452.html Comment: Note that this bulletin contains three Samba advisories. Patches mentioned in these advisories are available on Samba's website at: http://www.samba.org/samba/security - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ========================================================== == == Subject: Potential Denial of Service bug in smbd == CVE ID#: CVE-2007-0452 == == Versions: Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d (inclusive) == == Summary: A logic error in the deferred open code == can lead to an infinite loop in smbd == ========================================================== =========== Description =========== Internally Samba's file server daemon, smbd, implements support for deferred file open calls in an attempt to serve client requests that would otherwise fail due to a share mode violation. When renaming a file under certain circumstances it is possible that the request is never removed from the deferred open queue. smbd will then become stuck is a loop trying to service the open request. This bug may allow an authenticated user to exhaust resources such as memory and CPU on the server by opening multiple CIFS sessions, each of which will normally spawn a new smbd process, and sending each connection into an infinite loop. ================== Patch Availability ================== A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this email. This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24 release. Patches are also available from at the Samba Security page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security). ========== Workaround ========== The bug is believed to be exploitable only by an authenticated user. The server's exposure can be alleviated by disabling any suspect or hostile user accounts. ======= Credits ======= This vulnerability was found during internal regression testing by Samba developers. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ========================================================== - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFxzBfIR7qMdg1EfYRAgpMAKCBiRQFeyl598Bf2V7WPxOEVZjQRQCgtQh7 ualQZpxcejQhlaYVxbKVpqg= =V048 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ========================================================== == == Subject: Buffer overrun in NSS host lookup Winbind == library on Solaris == CVE ID#: CVE-2007-0453 == == Versions: Samba 3.0.21 - 3.0.23d (inclusive) running on == Sun Solaris == == Summary: A potential overrun in the gethostbyname() == and getipnodebyname() in the nss_winbind.so.1 == library on Solaris can potentially allow == for code execution. == ========================================================== =========== Description =========== NOTE: This security advisory only affects Sun Solaris systems running Samba's winbindd daemon and configured to make use of the nss_winbind.so.1 library for gethostbyname() and getipnodebyname() name resolution queries. For example, ## /etc/nsswitch.conf ... ipnodes: files winbind hosts: files winbind The buffer overrun is caused by copying a string passed into the NSS interface into a static buffer prior to sending the request to the winbindd daemon. ================== Patch Availability ================== A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this email. This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24 release. Patches are also available from at the Samba Security page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security). ========== Workaround ========== An unpatched Solaris server may be protected by removing the 'winbind' entry from the hosts and ipnodes services in /etc/nsswitch.conf. ======= Credits ======= This vulnerability was reported (including a proposed patch) to Samba developers by Olivier Gay <ouah@ouah.org>. Much thanks to Olivier for his cooperation and patience in the announcement of this defect. The time line is as follows: * Dec 15, 2006: Defect first reported to the security@samba.org email alias. * Dec 21, 2006: Initial developer response by Andrew Tridgell confirming the issue. * Jan 29, 2007: Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list * Feb 5, 2007: Public issue of security advisory. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ========================================================== - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFxzAOIR7qMdg1EfYRAgUoAKCq+KSsNDdpUnToyFtNoMDckMKLHACfet2h uQ+KAyjI8jTU6nAZHY3v+vI= =f1TQ - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ========================================================== == == Subject: Format string bug in afsacl.so VFS plugin. == CVE ID#: CVE-2007-0454 == == Versions: The AFS ACL mapping VFS plugin distributed == in Samba 3.0.6 - 3.0.23d (inclusive) == == Summary: The name of a file on the server's share == is used as the format string when setting == an NT security descriptor through the == afsacl.so VFS plugin. == ========================================================== =========== Description =========== NOTE: This security advisory only impacts Samba servers that share AFS file systems to CIFS clients and which have been explicitly instructed in smb.conf to load the afsacl.so VFS module. The source defect results in the name of a file stored on disk being used as the format string in a call to snprintf(). This bug becomes exploitable only when a user is able to write to a share which utilizes Samba's afsacl.so library for setting Windows NT access control lists on files residing on an AFS file system. ================== Patch Availability ================== A patch against Samba 3.0.23d has been attached to this email. This fix has be incorporated into the Samba 3.0.24 release. Patches are also available from at the Samba Security page (http://www.samba.org/samba/security). ========== Workaround ========== An unpatched server may be protected by removing all references to the afsacl.so VFS module from shares in smb.conf. ======= Credits ======= This vulnerability was reported (including a proposed patch) to Samba developers by <zybadawg333@hushmail.com>. Much thanks to zybadawg333 for the cooperation and patience in the announcement of this defect. The time line is as follows: * Jan 8, 2007: Defect first reported to the security@samba.org email alias. * Jan 8, 2007: Initial developer response by Jeremy Allison confirming the issue. * Jan 29, 2007: Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list * Feb 5, 2007: Public issue of security advisory. ========================================================== == Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. == The Samba Team ========================================================== - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFxzBuIR7qMdg1EfYRAo60AJ0XPkH0pkfsmxIAVF1HxgqFl3qyXQCgzAg/ VdQre1squwORUgRaNA2F3rU= =93rK - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQCVAwUBRcf9Qih9+71yA2DNAQJ/dAP/WfiVo+IPN9UGzstBCFCC2D2ziDxDrVz/ A6xaokxMJyFl8TXNK39ziVN7X7EparUJZj8s3cUdphFRiuhag5NMay3b/3rollZf +1Tq2oM2OZL2ohamTOF/JeJce7ShCUlfIt6frKFWg//590S9DLVk9aIolgSUp5+U xji3E3VJ6CI= =0bWR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----