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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                        ESB-2008.0637 -- [Solaris]
Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in the FreeType2 library for Printer Font
Binary (PFB) or TrueType Font (TTF) format font files may lead to a Denial
           of Service (DoS) or allow Execution of Arbitrary Code
                              15 August 2008

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:              FreeType2
Publisher:            Sun Microsystems
Operating System:     Solaris
Impact:               Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
                      Denial of Service
Access:               Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names:            CVE-2008-1808 CVE-2008-1807 CVE-2008-1806

Ref:                  ESB-2008.0599

Original Bulletin:  
  http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/printfriendly.do?assetkey=1-66-239006-1

Revision History:     August 15 2008: Patches Released
                      June   20 2008: Initial Release

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   Solution Type: Sun Alert
   Solution  239006 :   Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in the
   FreeType2 library for Printer Font Binary (PFB) or TrueType Font (TTF)
   format font files may lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) or allow
   Execution of Arbitrary Code          
   Bug ID: 6714118

   Product
   Solaris 8 Operating System
   Solaris 9 Operating System
   Solaris 10 Operating System
   OpenSolaris

   Date of Workaround Release: 18-Jun-2008

   Date of Resolved Release: 12-Aug-2008

   SA Document Body
   Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in the FreeType2 library for
   Printer Font Binary (PFB) or TrueType Font (TTF) format font files
   may lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) or allow Execution of Arbitrary
   Code

   1. Impact
   Multiple security vulnerabilities exist in the FreeType 2 library in
   Solaris when parsing Printer Font Binary (PFB) or TrueType Font (TTF)
   format font files. These vulnerabilites may allow a local unprivileged
   user to either cause an application using FreeType 2 as a font service
   to crash or to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
   application. The ability to crash an application is a type of Denial
   of service (DoS).
   These issues are described in the following documents:

   http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?i
   d=715
   http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?i
   d=716
   http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?i
   d=717
   CVE-2008-1806 at
   http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1806
   CVE-2008-1807 at
   http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1807
   CVE-2008-1808 at
   http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1808

   2. Contributing Factors
   These issues can occur in the following releases:
   SPARC Platform
     * Solaris 8 without patch 124420-04
     * Solaris 9 without patch 116105-09
     * Solaris 10 without patch 119812-06
     * OpenSolaris based upon builds snv_01 through snv_92

   x86 Platform
     * Solaris 8 without patch 124421-04
     * Solaris 9 without patch 116106-08
     * Solaris 10 without patch 119813-08
     * OpenSolaris based upon builds snv_01 through snv_92

   Notes:
   1. Only OpenSolaris installations including the affected binary
   "/usr/lib/libfreetype.so.6" are impacted by this issue.
   2. OpenSolaris distributions may include additional bug fixes above
   and beyond the base build from which it was derived.  The base build
   can be derived as follows:
   $ uname -a
   SunOS osolsys 5.11 snv_86 i86pc i386 i86pc

   3. Applications are impacted only if they link to the FreeType 2
   library (libfreetype). A partial test to check if an application links
   with a library such as libfreetype is to use ldd(1):

   $ ldd /usr/bin/fc-cache | grep libfreetype
   libfreetype.so.6 =>   /usr/sfw/lib/libfreetype.so.6

   4. A comprehensive test to check if an application links with a
   library such as libfreetype requires the use of pldd(1) against the
   running application since ldd(1) does not list any shared objects
   explicitly attached using dlopen(3C). For example:

   $ pldd `pgrep fc-cache` | grep libfreetype
   /usr/sfw/lib/libfreetype.so.6

   3. Symptoms
   There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate that these
   issues have been exploited to execute arbitrary code.
   4. Workaround
   The Xorg(1) X server is a privileged application available in
   OpenSolaris, Solaris 10, and Solaris 9 (x86 systems only) which links
   to the libfreetype library.  In order to prevent these issues from
   being exploited against the Xorg(1) X server to execute arbitrary
   commands with the privileges of the Xorg(1) X server, the setuid(2)
   bit on x86 systems and the setgid(2) bit on SPARC systems can be
   removed. For example:
   # chmod 0755 /usr/X11/bin/Xorg

   On x86 systems running Solaris 10 Update 4 or later:
   # chmod 0755 /usr/X11/bin/i386/Xorg /usr/X11/bin/amd64/Xorg

   Similar chmod(1) commands can be applied on any setuid(2) or setgid(2)
   application that links to the Free Type library (libfreetype).
   Note 1: Removing the setuid(2) bit or the setgid(2) bit from the Xorg
   binary will disable the following:
     * The ability to start the Xorg(1) server from the command line for
       non-root users on Solaris 10.
     * The ability of Xorg(1) to open Unix domain sockets and named pipe
       transports in the protected "/tmp/.X11-*" directories.

   These features will still be available to Xorg when started via a
   display manager such as dtlogin(1), gdm(1), or xdm(1).
   Note 2: There is no workaround to prevent these issues from being
   exploited to cause a Denial of Service to the X Server.
   Note 3: Local users on the console of a system using an X display
   manager and Sun Ray users may still be able to exploit these
   vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges
   even if the setuid(2) and setgid(2) permissions have been removed from
   the Xorg(1) binary.

   5. Resolution
   These issues are addressed in the following releases:
   SPARC Platform
     * Solaris 8 with patch 124420-04 or later
     * Solaris 9 with patch 116105-09 or later
     * Solaris 10 with patch 119812-06 or later
     * OpenSolaris based upon build snv_93 or later

   x86 Platform
     * Solaris 8 with patch 124421-04 or later
     * Solaris 9 with patch 116106-08 or later
     * Solaris 10 with patch 119813-08 or later
     * OpenSolaris based upon build snv_93 or later

   For more information on Security Sun Alerts, see Technical
   Instruction ID 213557.

   This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
   basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
   third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
   or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
   warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
   AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
   NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
   YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
   INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
   OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
   This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
   information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
   your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
   such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
   notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
   agreements.
   Copyright 2000-2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
   Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved
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