Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2008.0769 -- [AIX]
AIX named DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability
27 January 2009
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: BIND
Publisher: IBM
Operating System: AIX 6.1, 5.3 and 5.2
Impact: Provide Misleading Information
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2008-1447
Ref: AL-2008.0080
Revision History: January 27 2009: Fixed BIND8 port issue,
Added BIND4 fix,
Fixed BIND8 randomisation issue
August 4 2008: Initial Release
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
IBM SECURITY ADVISORY
First Issued: Fri Aug 1 08:07:10 CDT 2008
Updated: Thu Aug 7 15:03:31 CDT 2008
Fixed BIND8 port issue
Added BIND4 fix
Updated: Mon Jan 26 12:44:03 CST 2009
Fixed BIND8 randomization issue. Please note new APAR numbers
and affected levels below. The new apars affect BIND8 only.
===============================================================================
VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
VULNERABILITY: AIX named DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability
PLATFORMS: AIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.1
SOLUTION: Apply the fix or workaround as described below.
THREAT: A remote attacker may inject arbitrary DNS entries
into AIX DNS servers running BIND.
CERT VU Number: VU#800113
CVE Number: CVE-2008-1447
Reboot required? NO
Workarounds? NO
Protected by FPM? NO
Protected by SED? NO
===============================================================================
DETAILED INFORMATION
I. OVERVIEW
AIX 'named' is an implementation of BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain)
providing server functionality for the Domain Name System (DNS) Protocol.
AIX currently ships and supports three versions of BIND: 4, 8, and 9.
II. DESCRIPTION
DNS cache poisoning vulnerabilities exist in the AIX implementation of
BIND. A remote attacker may inject arbitrary hostnames and/or domain
entries into AIX DNS servers and poisoning its cache by spoofing
responses from authoritative name servers.
The following commands are vulnerable:
/usr/sbin/named4
/usr/sbin/named8
/usr/sbin/named9
III. IMPACT
The successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows a remote
attacker to inject and poison the DNS cache of a resolver allowing for
open-ended malicious activity such as phishing, man-in-the-middle
attacks, scams, XSS, or worse.
IV. PLATFORM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
To determine if your system is vulnerable, execute the following
command:
lslpp -L bos.net.tcp.server
The following fileset levels are vulnerable:
AIX Fileset Lower Level Upper Level
---------------------------------------------------
bos.net.tcp.server 5.2.0.0 5.2.0.110
bos.net.tcp.server 5.3.0.60 5.3.0.70
bos.net.tcp.server 5.3.7.0 5.3.7.6
bos.net.tcp.server 5.3.8.0 5.3.8.4
bos.net.tcp.server 6.1.0.0 6.1.0.6
bos.net.tcp.server 6.1.1.0 6.1.1.3
V. SOLUTIONS
A. APARS
IBM has assigned the following APARs to this problem:
AIX Level APAR number Availability
----------------------------------------------------
5.2.0 IZ42034 5/20/2009
5.3.0 IZ42035 4/29/2009
5.3.7 IZ40776 4/29/2009
5.3.8 IZ42037 4/29/2009
5.3.9 IZ42064 4/29/2009
6.1.0 IZ42066 6/03/2009
6.1.1 IZ42123 6/03/2009
6.1.2 IZ42126 6/03/2009
Subscribe to the APARs here:
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42034
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42035
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ40776
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42037
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42064
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42066
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42123
http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ42126
By subscribing, you will receive periodic email alerting you
to the status of the APAR, and a link to download the fix once
it becomes available.
B. FIXES
Fixes are now available for BIND versions 8 and 9. The fixes
can be downloaded from:
http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_fix.tar
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_fix.tar
The links above are to a tar file containing this signed
advisory, fix packages, and PGP signatures for each package.
The fixes below include prerequisite checking. This will
enforce the correct mapping between the fixes and AIX
Technology Levels.
AIX Level Fix
----------------------------------------------------
5.2.0 TL10 IZ42034_10.090126.epkg.Z
5.3.0 TL6 IZ42035_06.090126.epkg.Z
5.3.7 IZ40776_07.090126.epkg.Z
5.3.8 IZ42037_08.090126.epkg.Z
5.3.9 IZ42064_09.090126.epkg.Z
6.1.0 IZ42066_00.090126.epkg.Z
6.1.1 IZ42123_01.090126.epkg.Z
6.1.2 IZ42126_02.090126.epkg.Z
To extract the fixes from the tar file:
tar xvf bind_fix.tar
cd bind_fix
Verify you have retrieved the fixes intact:
The checksums below were generated using the "sum", "cksum",
"csum -h MD5" (md5sum), and "csum -h SHA1" (sha1sum) commands
and are as follows:
sum filename
------------------------------------
11189 3566 IZ40776_07.090126.epkg.Z
36867 3828 IZ42034_10.090126.epkg.Z
02339 3570 IZ42035_06.090126.epkg.Z
07619 3562 IZ42037_08.090126.epkg.Z
63643 359 IZ42064_09.090126.epkg.Z
51973 4014 IZ42066_00.090126.epkg.Z
58787 4011 IZ42123_01.090126.epkg.Z
19769 414 IZ42126_02.090126.epkg.Z
cksum filename
-------------------------------------------
2760853926 3651087 IZ40776_07.090126.epkg.Z
1898703940 3919146 IZ42034_10.090126.epkg.Z
166011661 3654897 IZ42035_06.090126.epkg.Z
3281169500 3647355 IZ42037_08.090126.epkg.Z
3692435386 366629 IZ42064_09.090126.epkg.Z
3282357594 4109783 IZ42066_00.090126.epkg.Z
1695605488 4106275 IZ42123_01.090126.epkg.Z
3618412964 423716 IZ42126_02.090126.epkg.Z
csum -h MD5 (md5sum) filename
----------------------------------------------------------
7333a60e5dc2a29dc2e32e3ef0bc8634 IZ40776_07.090126.epkg.Z
2428020799e522d3e3379f7e638fd754 IZ42034_10.090126.epkg.Z
9abc5c90c3b0068287cd5f059daecfbc IZ42035_06.090126.epkg.Z
cf567a4ac3fa62eaa493dbff57e20451 IZ42037_08.090126.epkg.Z
a7175242ad215fcabc7305128807c5be IZ42064_09.090126.epkg.Z
203e078730d54406e40c9bca09984461 IZ42066_00.090126.epkg.Z
92e76bf3463ca1c4668341ed70e267a8 IZ42123_01.090126.epkg.Z
c93ac8a392c9c4fd0aa41d296397d373 IZ42126_02.090126.epkg.Z
csum -h SHA1 (sha1sum) filename
------------------------------------------------------------------
16846e46abaf6b7d1d28b81b3b38004180240318 IZ40776_07.090126.epkg.Z
71a591e98e7e8054b737d82024fdb58926ab4513 IZ42034_10.090126.epkg.Z
db65364a69f76229b09a0d65b5b9c5ddcefa8267 IZ42035_06.090126.epkg.Z
2e37ba77d70e5a2c41e0c591bad144d50c07b345 IZ42037_08.090126.epkg.Z
f34a273265042b93af959719c1e4d11071f8fb08 IZ42064_09.090126.epkg.Z
2b6e1f7b2c7560ab33bd53b42b4a3e5695fd81de IZ42066_00.090126.epkg.Z
92e5f3aee381493169f7a45eafd065fa96fcecc2 IZ42123_01.090126.epkg.Z
b8356f6df469ed2dd7ecace7df245a5b4847d023 IZ42126_02.090126.epkg.Z
To verify the sums, use the text of this advisory as input to
csum, md5sum, or sha1sum. For example:
csum -h SHA1 -i Advisory.asc
md5sum -c Advisory.asc
sha1sum -c Advisory.asc
These sums should match exactly. The PGP signatures in the tar
file and on this advisory can also be used to verify the
integrity of the fixes. If the sums or signatures cannot be
confirmed, contact IBM AIX Security and describe the
discrepancy at the following address:
security-alert@austin.ibm.com
C. INTERIM FIX INSTALLATION
IMPORTANT: If possible, it is recommended that a mksysb backup
of the system be created. Verify it is both bootable and
readable before proceeding.
Interim fixes have had limited functional and regression
testing but not the full regression testing that takes place
for Service Packs; thus, IBM does not warrant the fully
correct functionality of an interim fix.
Interim fix management documentation can be found at:
http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/sas/f/aix.efixmgmt/home.html
To preview an interim fix installation:
emgr -e ipkg_name -p # where ipkg_name is the name of the
# interim fix package being previewed.
To install an interim fix package:
emgr -e ipkg_name -X # where ipkg_name is the name of the
# interim fix package being installed.
IMPORTANT: The fix will not take affect until any running BIND
servers have been stopped and restarted with the following
commands:
stopsrc -s named
startsrc -s named
VI. WORKAROUNDS
There are no workarounds available other than disabling the
server.
VII. OBTAINING FIXES
AIX security related fixes can be downloaded from:
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security
AIX fixes can be downloaded from:
http://www.ibm.com/eserver/support/fixes/fixcentral/main/pseries/aix
NOTE: Affected customers are urged to upgrade to the latest
applicable Technology Level and Service Pack.
VIII. CONTACT INFORMATION
If you would like to receive AIX Security Advisories via email,
please visit:
http://www.ibm.com/systems/support
and click on the "My notifications" link.
To view previously issued advisories, please visit:
http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/subscriptions/pqvcmjd
Comments regarding the content of this announcement can be
directed to:
security-alert@austin.ibm.com
To obtain the PGP public key that can be used to communicate
securely with the AIX Security Team you can either:
A. Download the key from our web page:
http://www.ibm.com/systems/resources/systems_p_os_aix_security_pgpkey.txt
B. Download the key from a PGP Public Key Server. The key ID is:
0xADA6EB4D
Please contact your local IBM AIX support center for any
assistance.
eServer is a trademark of International Business Machines
Corporation. IBM, AIX and pSeries are registered trademarks of
International Business Machines Corporation. All other trademarks
are property of their respective holders.
IX. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Dan Kaminsky is credited for identifying this common flaw in DNS
implementations. I)ruid and hdm released code that was useful in
hardening the AIX implementation.
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980
If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in
any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT
Incident Reporting Form at:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967
iQCVAwUBSX57gSh9+71yA2DNAQJ9IwP/T2ucNtcN1UPOQc9M8VJAy/iaGIMTJ6kQ
23TCAeoa1UB3xdTO7Sun8pGtVvnJMHsBPCh9hO0gOYmNYEO4TLYfcdqWUFRhHQD0
4quYOqVjCnl8JQib3faHgnxauqBhvArldzs6TaoqxdteQDbfUyG4/tek2RQp/t7X
53FSnvtmDWE=
=8pI1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----