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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2009.0065 -- [Cisco] Cisco IOS and ASA: MD5 Hashes May Allow for Certificate Spoofing 19 January 2009 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Cisco IOS Cisco ASA Publisher: Cisco Systems Operating System: Cisco Impact: Provide Misleading Information Reduced Security Access: Remote/Unauthenticated CVE Names: CVE-2004-2761 Original Bulletin: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=17341 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Response: MD5 Hashes May Allow for Certificate Spoofing Document ID: 109463 Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2009 January 15 1600 UTC (GMT) Cisco Response ============== This is the Cisco response to research done by Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, and Benne de Weger pertaining to MD5 collisions in certificates issued by vulnerable certificate authorities. Cisco has released an IntelliShield activity bulletin detailing the specifics of this issue. This bulletin is available at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=17341 The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and IOS may both serve as certificate authorities and by default use the MD5 hashing algorithm in the digital signatures of certificates issued to end users and devices. The hashing algorithm used in digital certificates on the Cisco ASA cannot be changed; however, the ASA is unlikely to be affected by the attacks described in this research due to the way certificates are generated on the device. Cisco recognizes the weaknesses in MD5 and plans to alter the signature algorithm used in digital certificates and modify the methods utilized in creation of CA and endpoint certificates. This will be addressed by Cisco Bug ID CSCsw88068. The Cisco IOS CA may be vulnerable to the attack described in this research when configured to utilize MD5 hashes in endpoint certificates. This is the default behavior; however, the device can be reconfigured to utilize a more secure hashing algorithm. Cisco plans to change this default behavior and modify the methods utilized in creation of CA and endpoint certificates. This will be addressed by Cisco Bug ID CSCsw90626. As a workaround, an administrator can configure IOS devices running 12.4(15)T and later to use a more secure algorithm with the hash command, as shown in the following example: Router(config)#crypto pki server <NAME> Router(cs-server)#shutdown Certificate server 'shut' event has been queued for processing. Router(cs-server)#hash sha1 Router(cs-server)#no shutdown Certificate server 'no shut' event has been queued for processing. 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Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-January-15 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. 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Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQCVAwUBSXO3kCh9+71yA2DNAQIWZwP+Oe7R3OnVxGA13eewyK5jZ7oxB5oRBP1T aA4lcH8SeBX+JSHcvpeauqPfW3/X+WOyoHDdn/m024Ht004Y3MLSV+rh+PYqyeG1 0hUPHF8nvRKjGT6pBxfZkPIJROyDx7NKVTnariP2tXpOsRAkX0QXOShvGuH3WWza CKOCeadzH7c= =D6ES -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----