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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2009.0489 -- [Solaris]
Third-party Applications Using GSS-API: Execute Arbitrary Code
8 June 2009
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Third-party Applications Using GSS-API
Publisher: Sun Microsystems
Operating System: Solaris
Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
Ref: ESB-2007.0027
Original Bulletin:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/printfriendly.do?assetkey=1-66-259368-1
Revision History: June 8 2009: Resolution added
May 20 2009: Initial Release
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Solution Type: Sun Alert
Solution 201294 : Third-party Applications Using GSS-API May Be
Vulnerable to Compromise
Previously Published As: 102772
Bug ID: 6510866
Product
Solaris 9 Operating System
Solaris 10 Operating System
Solaris 8 Operating System
Date of Workaround Release: 14-May-2009
Date of Resolved Release: 05-Jun-2009
SA Document Body
Third-party Applications Using GSS-API May Be Vulnerable to Compromise
1. Impact
Third-party applications which utilize GSS-API and thus link to the
Generic Security Services library libgss(3LIB), may allow an
unauthenticated user (local or remote depending on the application)
the ability to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
application.
Note: Exploitation of this vulnerability is believed to be difficult.
No exploit code is known to exist at this time.
This issue is referenced in the following documents:
MITKRB5-SA-2006-003 - MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2006-003 at:
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2006-003-mechg
lue.txt
CVE-2006-6144 at
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2006-6144
CERT VU#831452 at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/831452
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 8 without patch 109223-11
* Solaris 9 without patch 112908-35
* Solaris 10 without patch 141719-01
x86 Platform
* Solaris 8 without patch 109224-11
* Solaris 9 without patch 115168-20
* Solaris 10 without patch 141720-01
Notes:
1. Solaris 8 entered EOSL Phase 2 on 1 April 2009. Entitlement to
patches developed on or after 1 April 2009 requires the purchase
of the Solaris 8 Vintage Patch Service. See note in section 5
for more details.
2. This issue only affects applications which link against the
Generic Security Services library libgss(3LIB).
3. No applications shipped by Sun, including kadmind(1M), are
affected by this issue.
To determine if an application is linked against libgss(3LIB) the
following command can be run:
$ ldd application | grep libgss || echo "application not affected"
If output similar to the following is seen:
libgss.so.1 => /usr/lib/libgss.so.1
then the application links to libgss(3LIB) and may be affected by this
issue.
A comprehensive test to check if an application links with a library
such as libgss(3LIB) requires the use of pldd(1) against the running
application since ldd(1) does not list any shared objects explicitly
attached using dlopen(3C). For example:
$ pldd <procces ID of application> | grep libgss
/usr/lib/libgss.so.1
3. Symptoms
There are no reliable symptoms that would indicate this issue has been
exploited to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges on a
system.
4. Workaround
There is no workaround for this issue. Please see the Resolution
section below.
5. Resolution
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 8 with patch 109223-11 or later
* Solaris 9 with patch 112908-35 or later
* Solaris 10 with patch 141719-01 or later
x86 Platform
* Solaris 8 with patch 109224-11 or later
* Solaris 9 with patch 115168-20 or later
* Solaris 10 with patch 141720-01 or later
Note: The READMEs of Solaris 8 patches developed on or after 1 April
2009 are available to all customers. However, Solaris 8 entered EOSL
Phase 2 on April 1, 2009 and thus entitlement for these patches,
including those that fix security vulnerabilities, requires the
purchase of the Solaris 8 Vintage Patch Service. More information
about the Solaris 8 Vintage Patch Service is available at:
http://www.sun.com/service/eosl/Solaris8.html
For more information on Security Sun Alerts, see Technical
Instruction ID 213557.
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
agreements.
Copyright 2000-2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved
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