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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2009.1057
ISC dhclient subnet-mask flag stack overflow
15 July 2009
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: ISC dhclient
Publisher: NetBSD
Operating System: NetBSD
Impact/Access: Root Compromise -- Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2009-0692
Reference: ESB-2009.1053
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NetBSD Security Advisory 2009-010
=================================
Topic: ISC dhclient subnet-mask flag stack overflow
Version: NetBSD-current: affected before June 24, 2009
NetBSD 5.0: affected
NetBSD 4.0.*: affected
NetBSD 4.0: affected
pkgsrc: isc-dhclient package prior to
4.1.0p1, 4.0.1p1, or 3.1.2p1
Severity: Arbitrary Code Execution
Fixed: NetBSD-current: June 24, 2009
NetBSD-5-0 branch: July 14, 2009 20:00 UTC
NetBSD-5 branch: July 14, 2009 20:00 UTC
NetBSD-4-0 branch: July 14, 2009 20:00 UTC
NetBSD-4 branch: July 14, 2009 20:00 UTC
pkgsrc 2009Q2: isc-dhclient-4.1.0p1, 4.0.1p1 and
3.1.2p1 correct the issue
Abstract
========
A stack overflow vulnerability in ISC dhclient allows an attacker
operating a rogue DHCP server to execute arbitrary code with root
privileges on the affected system by supplying a specially crafted
subnet-mask parameter.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2009-0692 and CERT
Vulnerability Note VU#410676.
Technical Details
=================
The script_write_params() function in ISC dhclient version 4.1.0 and
earlier, 4.0.1 and earlier as well as 3.1.2 and earlier fails to
properly verify the subnet-mask parameter while copying it into
the internal state.
This can be exploited to overwrite the stack frame pointer and execute
arbitrary code in the context of the dhclient process. The size of the
injected code is thereby limited to the MTU of the interface dhclient
is listening on.
For more details, please see CVE-2009-0692.
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
As a temporary workaround, disable dhclient(8) from the base OS and
use either the fixed dhclient packages from pkgsrc, or alternatively
the program dhcpcd(8) from the base system.
The following instructions describe how to upgrade your dhclient
binaries by updating your source tree and rebuilding and
installing a new version of dhclient.
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2009-06-24
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2009-06-25 or later.
The following file needs to be updated from the netbsd-current
CVS branch (aka HEAD):
dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install dhclient:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
# cd usr.sbin/dhcp
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd client
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 5.*:
Systems running NetBSD 5.* sources dated from before
2009-07-14 20:00 UTC should be upgraded from NetBSD 5.*
sources dated 2009-07-14 20:00 UTC or later.
The following file needs to be updated from the netbsd-5 or
netbsd-5-0 branches:
dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install dhclient:
# cd src
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
# cd usr.sbin/dhcp
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd client
# make USETOOLS=no install
Alternatively, apply the following patch (with potential offset
differences):
http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/patches/SA2009-010-dhclient.patch
To patch, re-build and re-install SSH:
# cd dist/dhcp/client
# patch -p0 < /path/to/SA2009-010-dhclient.patch
# cd ../../../usr.sbin/dhcp
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd client
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 4.*:
Systems running NetBSD 4.* sources dated from before
2009-07-14 20:00 UTC should be upgraded from NetBSD 4.*
sources dated 2009-07-14 20:00 UTC or later.
The following file needs to be updated from the netbsd-4 or
netbsd-4-0 branches:
dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install dhclient:
# cd src
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P dist/dhcp/client/dhclient.c
# cd usr.sbin/dhcp
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd client
# make USETOOLS=no install
Alternatively, apply the following patch (with potential offset
differences):
http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/patches/SA2009-010-dhclient.patch
To patch, re-build and re-install SSH:
# cd dist/dhcp/client
# patch -p0 < /path/to/SA2009-010-dhclient.patch
# cd ../../../usr.sbin/dhcp
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd client
# make USETOOLS=no install
Thanks To
=========
The Mandriva Linux Engineering Team and for discovering and reporting
the software flaw and Christos Zoulas for providing a fix.
Revision History
================
2009-07-14 Initial release
More Information
================
Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at
http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2009-010.txt.asc
Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.org/ and http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/.
Copyright 2009, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Redistribution permitted only in full, unmodified form.
$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2009-010.txt,v 1.2 2009/07/14 20:40:33 tonnerre Exp $
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