-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2009.1135
            AIX named DNS BIND dynamic update denial of service
                               6 August 2009

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           BIND 9
Publisher:         IBM
Operating System:  AIX
Impact/Access:     Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2009-0696  

Reference:         ASB-2009.1033

Original Bulletin: 
   http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_advisory.asc

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

IBM SECURITY ADVISORY

First Issued: Wed Aug  5 09:40:52 CDT 2009

The most recent version of this document is available here:

http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_advisory.asc
or
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_advisory.asc

                           VULNERABILITY SUMMARY

VULNERABILITY:   AIX named DNS BIND dynamic update denial of service

PLATFORMS:       AIX 5.3, 6.1

SOLUTION:        Apply the fix as described below.

THREAT:          A remote user can create a denial of service on AIX
                 DNS servers running BIND.

CERT VU Number:  VU#725188
CVE Number:      CVE-2009-0696

Reboot required?    NO
Workarounds?        NO
Protected by FPM?   NO
Protected by SED?   NO

                           DETAILED INFORMATION

I. DESCRIPTION

    AIX 'named' is an implementation of BIND (Berkeley Internet Name
    Domain) providing server functionality for the Domain Name System
    (DNS) Protocol.  AIX currently ships and supports three versions
    of BIND: 4, 8, and 9.

    There is an error in the handling of dynamic update messages in
    BIND 9.  A crafted update packet from a remote user can cause a
    master server to assert and exit.  Please see the following for
    more information:

    https://www.isc.org/node/474
    
    The successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows a remote,
    unauthenticated user to make a master DNS server assert and exit.

    The following command is vulnerable: 

        /usr/sbin/named9

II. PLATFORM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

    To determine if your system is vulnerable, execute the following
    command:

    lslpp -L bos.net.tcp.server

    The following fileset levels are vulnerable:

    AIX Fileset           Lower Level       Upper Level
    ---------------------------------------------------
    bos.net.tcp.server    5.3.7.0           5.3.7.7
    bos.net.tcp.server    5.3.8.0           5.3.8.5
    bos.net.tcp.server    5.3.9.0           5.3.9.1
    bos.net.tcp.server    5.3.10.0          5.3.10.0
    bos.net.tcp.server    6.1.0.0           6.1.0.8
    bos.net.tcp.server    6.1.1.0           6.1.1.5
    bos.net.tcp.server    6.1.2.0           6.1.2.2
    bos.net.tcp.server    6.1.3.0           6.1.3.0

III. SOLUTIONS

    A. APARS

        IBM has assigned the following APARs to this problem:

        AIX Level           APAR number        Availability
        ----------------------------------------------------
        5.3.7               IZ56311            11/11/2009
        5.3.8               IZ56312            11/11/2009
        5.3.9               IZ56313            11/11/2009
        5.3.10              IZ56314            11/11/2009
        6.1.0               IZ56315            9/23/2009
        6.1.1               IZ56316            9/23/2009
        6.1.2               IZ56317            9/23/2009
        6.1.3               IZ56318            9/23/2009

        Subscribe to the APARs here:

        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56311
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56312
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56313
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56314
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56315
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56316
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56317
        http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=isg1IZ56318

        By subscribing, you will receive periodic email alerting you
        to the status of the APAR, and a link to download the fix once
        it becomes available.

    B. FIXES

        Fixes are now available.  The fixes can be downloaded from:

        http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_fix.tar
        ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/bind_fix.tar

        The links above are to a tar file containing this signed
        advisory, fix packages, and PGP signatures for each package.

        AIX Level         Fix
        ----------------------------------------------------
        5.3.7             IZ56311_07.090804.epkg.Z
        5.3.8             IZ56312_08.090804.epkg.Z
        5.3.9             IZ56313_09.090804.epkg.Z
        5.3.10            IZ56314_10.090804.epkg.Z
        6.1.0             IZ56315_00.090804.epkg.Z
        6.1.1             IZ56316_01.090804.epkg.Z
        6.1.2             IZ56317_02.090804.epkg.Z
        6.1.3             IZ56318_03.090804.epkg.Z

        To extract the fixes from the tar file:

        tar xvf bind_fix.tar
        cd bind_fix

        Verify you have retrieved the fixes intact:

        The checksums below were generated using the "csum -h SHA1"
        (sha1sum) commands and are as follows:

        csum -h SHA1 (sha1sum)                    filename
        ------------------------------------------------------------------
        3cd61d918a55f1ca90ccf177afb63bff3448eb84  IZ56311_07.090804.epkg.Z
        01b6e1853a7dab425d439215f4a57bd281e7429c  IZ56312_08.090804.epkg.Z
        486b25f723071d474670a09d36109719b2ff0438  IZ56313_09.090804.epkg.Z
        7c5e0bcb37697ae2f8ebf53cce1ea9af51856659  IZ56314_10.090804.epkg.Z
        8841942df04ff441ae5bd79e140b203d8c2000be  IZ56315_00.090804.epkg.Z
        a1ca4ca9b7c9e1d8bbe68c75eebae56b0b8d4953  IZ56316_01.090804.epkg.Z
        57dda1a9ed719fc36f8f09e34b93940f188a6482  IZ56317_02.090804.epkg.Z
        3710d457c0304e99b1b3ed70fd120b6247cc45c2  IZ56318_03.090804.epkg.Z

        To verify the sums, use the text of this advisory as input to
        csum or sha1sum. For example:

        csum -h SHA1 -i Advisory.asc
        sha1sum -c Advisory.asc

        These sums should match exactly. The PGP signatures in the tar
        file and on this advisory can also be used to verify the
        integrity of the fixes.  If the sums or signatures cannot be
        confirmed, contact IBM AIX Security and describe the
        discrepancy at the following address:

            security-alert@austin.ibm.com

     C. INTERIM FIX INSTALLATION

        IMPORTANT: If possible, it is recommended that a mksysb backup
        of the system be created.  Verify it is both bootable and
        readable before proceeding.

        Interim fixes have had limited functional and regression
        testing but not the full regression testing that takes place
        for Service Packs; thus, IBM does not warrant the fully
        correct functionality of an interim fix.

        Interim fix management documentation can be found at:

        http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/sas/f/aix.efixmgmt/home.html

        To preview an interim fix installation:

        emgr -e ipkg_name -p         # where ipkg_name is the name of the  
                                     # interim fix package being previewed.

        To install an interim fix package:

        emgr -e ipkg_name -X         # where ipkg_name is the name of the  
                                     # interim fix package being installed.

        IMPORTANT: The fix will not take affect until any running BIND
        servers have been stopped and restarted with the following
        commands:
 
            stopsrc -s named
            startsrc -s named


IV. WORKAROUNDS

    There are no workarounds.

V. OBTAINING FIXES

    AIX security fixes can be downloaded from:

        http://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security
        or
        ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security

    AIX fixes can be downloaded from:

        http://www.ibm.com/eserver/support/fixes/fixcentral/main/pseries/aix

    NOTE: Affected customers are urged to upgrade to the latest
    applicable Technology Level and Service Pack.

VI. CONTACT INFORMATION

    If you would like to receive AIX Security Advisories via email,
    please visit:
 
        http://www.ibm.com/systems/support
 
    and click on the "My notifications" link.
 
    To view previously issued advisories, please visit:
 
        http://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/set2/subscriptions/pqvcmjd
 
    Comments regarding the content of this announcement can be
    directed to:

        security-alert@austin.ibm.com
 
    To obtain the PGP public key that can be used to communicate
    securely with the AIX Security Team you can either:
 
        A. Download the key from our web page:
 
  http://www.ibm.com/systems/resources/systems_p_os_aix_security_pgpkey.txt
 
        B. Download the key from a PGP Public Key Server. The key ID is:
 
            0xADA6EB4D
 
    Please contact your local IBM AIX support center for any
    assistance.
 
    eServer is a trademark of International Business Machines
    Corporation.  IBM, AIX and pSeries are registered trademarks of
    International Business Machines Corporation.  All other trademarks
    are property of their respective holders.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

    This vulnerability was reported by Matthias Urlichs, Tom Daly, and
    Internet Systems Consortium.

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (AIX)

iD8DBQFKeaWfP9Qud62m600RAs9KAJwMwujmkWOxKi8ORk2BED4OVQJd1gCeL3Cr
vtuSdf6205YFeI/2qtQlPhI=
=4muv
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980

If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in 
any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT 
Incident Reporting Form at:

        http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967

iD8DBQFKehp3NVH5XJJInbgRAhiSAJ0TXIlQKP8zL9nveC2II+A+8H58zACcCcN/
UB3/vIXMOxraiJy9BY6R3C8=
=Q7zi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----