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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2009.1592
Improper environment sanitization in rtld(1)
4 December 2009
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: rtld
Publisher: FreeBSD
Operating System: FreeBSD
Impact/Access: Root Compromise -- Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2009-4147 CVE-2009-4146
Reference: ASB-2009.1148
Original Bulletin:
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:16.rtld.asc
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FreeBSD-SA-09:16.rtld Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Improper environment sanitization in rtld(1)
Category: core
Module: rtld
Announced: 2009-12-03
Affects: FreeBSD 7.0 and later.
Corrected: 2009-12-01 02:59:22 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.0-STABLE)
2009-12-03 09:18:40 UTC (RELENG_8_0, 8.0-RELEASE-p1)
2009-12-01 03:00:16 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.2-STABLE)
2009-12-03 09:18:40 UTC (RELENG_7_2, 7.2-RELEASE-p5)
2009-12-03 09:18:40 UTC (RELENG_7_1, 7.1-RELEASE-p9)
CVE Name: CVE-2009-4146, CVE-2009-4147
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The run-time link-editor, rtld, links dynamic executable with their
needed libraries at run-time. It also allows users to explicitly
load libraries via various LD_ environmental variables.
II. Problem Description
When running setuid programs rtld will normally remove potentially
dangerous environment variables. Due to recent changes in FreeBSD
environment variable handling code, a corrupt environment may
result in attempts to unset environment variables failing.
III. Impact
An unprivileged user who can execute programs on a system can gain
the privileges of any setuid program which he can run. On most
systems configurations, this will allow a local attacker to execute
code as the root user.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users,
where all the untrusted local users are jailed superusers, and/or where
untrusted users cannot execute arbitrary code (e.g., due to use of read
only and noexec mount options) are not affected.
Note that "untrusted local users" include users with the ability to
upload and execute web scripts (CGI, PHP, Python, Perl etc.), as they
may be able to exploit this issue.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or 8-STABLE,
or to the RELENG_8_0, RELENG_7_2, or RELENG_7_1 security branch dated
after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.1, 7.2,
and 8.0 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 7.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:16/rtld7.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:16/rtld7.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 8.0]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:16/rtld.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-09:16/rtld.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/libexec/rtld-elf
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
NOTE: On the amd64 platform, the above procedure will not update the
ld-elf32.so.1 (i386 compatibility) run-time link-editor (rtld). On
amd64 systems where the i386 rtld are installed, the operating system
should instead be recompiled as described in
<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
CVS:
Branch Revision
Path
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_7
src/libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c 1.124.2.7
RELENG_7_2
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.23.2.8
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.11.2.9
src/libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c 1.124.2.4.2.2
RELENG_7_1
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.13.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.9.2.13
src/libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c 1.124.2.3.2.2
RELENG_8
src/libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c 1.139.2.4
RELENG_8_0
src/UPDATING 1.632.2.7.2.4
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.6.2.4
src/libexec/rtld-elf/rtld.c 1.139.2.2.2.2
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Subversion:
Branch/path Revision
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/7/ r199981
releng/7.2/ r200054
releng/7.1/ r200054
stable/8/ r199980
releng/8.0/ r200054
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4146
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4147
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-09:16.rtld.asc
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