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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2012.0691
HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
20 July 2012
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent
Publisher: Zero Day Initiative
Operating System: Windows
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Mitigation
Original Bulletin:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-126/
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-127/
Comment: This bulletin contains two (2) Zero Day Initiative security
advisories.
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
ZDI-12-126 : (0 day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaCIFS.dll
Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-126
July 18, 2012
- - -- CVE ID:
- - -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
- - -- Affected Vendors:
Hewlett-Packard
- - -- Affected Products:
Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks
- - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12455.
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:
http://www.tippingpoint.com
- - -- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent.
Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by
default on TCP port 9111. When processing CIFS archives the process does
not properly validate the size of the archive name and proceeds to copy the
string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited to
execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service.
- - -- Vendor Response:
Hewlett-Packard states:
The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an
application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the
nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to
restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients
and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP
StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with
it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with
firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native
Windows Firewall, as described in
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and
numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles.
- - -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory released
- - -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* AbdulAziz Hariri
- - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/thezdi
- -----
ZDI-12-127 : (0Day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaFTP.dll Remote
Code Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-127
July 18, 2012
- - -- CVE ID:
- - -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
- - -- Affected Vendors:
Hewlett-Packard
- - -- Affected Products:
Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks
- - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 11980.
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:
http://www.tippingpoint.com
- - -- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent.
Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by
default on TCP port 9111. When processing FTP archives the process does not
properly validate the size of the root path specified and proceeds to copy
the string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited
to execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service.
- - -- Vendor Response:
Hewlett-Packard states:
The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an
application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the
nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to
restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients
and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP
StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with
it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with
firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native
Windows Firewall, as described in
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and
numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles.
- - -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory release
- - -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* AbdulAziz Hariri
- - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/thezdi
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
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===========================================================================
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The University of Queensland
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