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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2012.0699 Symantec System Recovery 2011 and Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 DLL Loading 25 July 2012 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 Symantec System Recovery 2011 Publisher: Symantec Operating System: Windows Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction Modify Arbitrary Files -- Existing Account Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2012-0305 Original Bulletin: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&suid=20120720_01 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec System Recovery 2011 and Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 DLL Loading SYM12-012 July 20, 2012 Revision History None Severity CVSS2 Base Score Impact Exploitability CVSS2 Vector DLL Loading Remote Code Execution - Medium 5.39 6.44 5.548 AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P Overview Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 and Symantec System Recovery 2011 are susceptible to potential dll loading due to improper path restrictions in system file directories. Successful exploitation could result in an attacker being able to execute arbitrary code with logged-in user permissions. Affected Products Product Build Solution(s) Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 All Upgrade to Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 SP5 Symantec System Recovery 2011 All Upgrade to Symantec System Recovery 2011 SP2 Details Symantec was notified of potential dll loading due to improper path restrictions in file directories installed with Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 and Symantec System Recovery 2011. The Granular Restore Option directory and the Recovery Point Browser directory do not properly restrict the loading of external libraries. An unauthorized local user with access to the system could potentially insert a specifically-crafted file in one of the susceptible directory. An attacker with access to the network would then need to entice an authorized user to load a specifically formatted file from an alternate file location or network share. Successful exploitation could allow unauthorized arbitrary code to be executed with logged-on user permissions. Symantec Response Symantec product engineers verified that the vulnerability exists in the versions of Backup Exec System Recovery and Symantec System Recovery indicated above. Additionally, Symantec engineers reviewed related functionality to further enhance overall product security. Symantec has determined that one of the affected files indentified as a vector for the issue reported in the Granular Restore Library, "imapi.dll" is not a file that Symantec ships and installs with either Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 or Symantec System Recovery 2011. The Symantec products make use of the imapi.dll version installed with the underlying operating system. NOTE: Symantec research determined that the presence of an older version of the imapi.dll could potentially be leveraged in this type of attack on the Granular Restore Library. Microsoft upgraded the original imapi.dll to imapiv2 with shipping versions of Windows Vista and Windows 7. Microsoft released Microsoft Hotfix 932716, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/932716, to upgrade imapi to imapiv2 for Windows XP SP2/SP3 and Windows Server 2003. Customers should ensure that they upgrade to the Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 SP5 or Symantec System Recovery 2011 SP2 updates indicated above. Customers should also ensure Microsoft Hotfix 932716 has been successfully applied on their operating system. Symantec knows of no exploitation of or adverse customer impact from this issue. Update Information Customers may obtain Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 SP5 or Symantec System Recovery 2011 SP2 through their normal support/download locations. Best Practices As a part of normal best practices, Symantec strongly recommends: Restrict access to administration or management systems to privileged users. Restrict remote access, if required, to trusted/authorized systems only. Run under the principle of least privilege where possible to limit the impact of exploit by threats. Keep all operating systems and applications updated with the latest vendor patches. Follow a multi-layered approach to security. Run both firewall and anti-malware applications, at a minimum, to provide multiple points of detection and protection to both inbound and outbound threats. Deploy network and host-based intrusion detection systems to monitor network traffic for signs of anomalous or suspicious activity. This may aid in detection of attacks or malicious activity related to exploitation of latent vulnerabilities Credit Symantec credits Nenad Stojanovski, for identifying this and working with us while Symantec resolved the issue. Reference BID: Security Focus, http://www.securityfocus.com, has assigned a Bugtraq IDs (BIDs) to the issue for inclusion in the Security Focus vulnerability database. CVE: The issue is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. CVE BID Description CVE-2012-0305 BID 54594 dll loading command execution Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of our products very seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety (OISafety), Symantec supports and follows responsible disclosure guidelines. Please contact secure@symantec.com if you feel you have discovered a security issue in a Symantec product. A member of the Symantec Product Security team will contact you regarding your submission to coordinate any required response. Symantec strongly recommends using encrypted email for reporting vulnerability information to secure@symantec.com. The Symantec Product Security PGP key can be found at the location below. Symantec has developed a Product Vulnerability Response document outlining the process we follow in addressing suspected vulnerabilities in our products. This document is available below. Copyright (c) by Symantec Corp. Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it is not edited in any way unless authorized by Symantec Product Security. Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than electronically requires permission from secure@symantec.com Disclaimer The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. Symantec, Symantec products, Symantec Product Security, and secure@symantec.com are registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or affiliated companies in the United States and other countries. All other registered and unregistered trademarks represented in this document are the sole property of their respective companies/owners. * Signature names may have been updated to comply with an updated IPS Signature naming convention. See http://www.symantec.com/business/support/index?page=content&id=TECH152794&key=54619&actp=LIST for more information. Last modified on: July 20, 2012 - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). 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