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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2012.0699
Symantec System Recovery 2011 and Backup Exec System
Recovery 2010 DLL Loading
25 July 2012
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Backup Exec System Recovery 2010
Symantec System Recovery 2011
Publisher: Symantec
Operating System: Windows
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction
Modify Arbitrary Files -- Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2012-0305
Original Bulletin:
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&suid=20120720_01
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Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec System Recovery
2011 and Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 DLL Loading
SYM12-012
July 20, 2012
Revision History
None
Severity
CVSS2 Base Score Impact Exploitability CVSS2 Vector
DLL Loading Remote Code Execution - Medium
5.39 6.44 5.548 AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Overview
Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 and Symantec System Recovery 2011 are
susceptible to potential dll loading due to improper path restrictions in
system file directories. Successful exploitation could result in an attacker
being able to execute arbitrary code with logged-in user permissions.
Affected Products
Product Build Solution(s)
Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 All Upgrade to Backup Exec System
Recovery 2010 SP5
Symantec System Recovery 2011 All Upgrade to Symantec System
Recovery 2011 SP2
Details
Symantec was notified of potential dll loading due to improper path
restrictions in file directories installed with Backup Exec System Recovery
2010 and Symantec System Recovery 2011. The Granular Restore Option directory
and the Recovery Point Browser directory do not properly restrict the loading
of external libraries. An unauthorized local user with access to the system
could potentially insert a specifically-crafted file in one of the susceptible
directory. An attacker with access to the network would then need to entice an
authorized user to load a specifically formatted file from an alternate file
location or network share. Successful exploitation could allow unauthorized
arbitrary code to be executed with logged-on user permissions.
Symantec Response
Symantec product engineers verified that the vulnerability exists in the
versions of Backup Exec System Recovery and Symantec System Recovery indicated
above. Additionally, Symantec engineers reviewed related functionality to
further enhance overall product security.
Symantec has determined that one of the affected files indentified as a vector
for the issue reported in the Granular Restore Library, "imapi.dll" is not a
file that Symantec ships and installs with either Backup Exec System Recovery
2010 or Symantec System Recovery 2011. The Symantec products make use of the
imapi.dll version installed with the underlying operating system.
NOTE: Symantec research determined that the presence of an older version of
the imapi.dll could potentially be leveraged in this type of attack on the
Granular Restore Library. Microsoft upgraded the original imapi.dll to imapiv2
with shipping versions of Windows Vista and Windows 7. Microsoft released
Microsoft Hotfix 932716, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/932716, to upgrade
imapi to imapiv2 for Windows XP SP2/SP3 and Windows Server 2003.
Customers should ensure that they upgrade to the Backup Exec System Recovery
2010 SP5 or Symantec System Recovery 2011 SP2 updates indicated above.
Customers should also ensure Microsoft Hotfix 932716 has been successfully
applied on their operating system.
Symantec knows of no exploitation of or adverse customer impact from this
issue.
Update Information
Customers may obtain Backup Exec System Recovery 2010 SP5 or Symantec System
Recovery 2011 SP2 through their normal support/download locations.
Best Practices
As a part of normal best practices, Symantec strongly recommends:
Restrict access to administration or management systems to privileged
users.
Restrict remote access, if required, to trusted/authorized systems only.
Run under the principle of least privilege where possible to limit the
impact of exploit by threats.
Keep all operating systems and applications updated with the latest vendor
patches.
Follow a multi-layered approach to security. Run both firewall and
anti-malware applications, at a minimum, to provide multiple points of
detection and protection to both inbound and outbound threats.
Deploy network and host-based intrusion detection systems to monitor
network traffic for signs of anomalous or suspicious activity. This may
aid in detection of attacks or malicious activity related to exploitation
of latent vulnerabilities
Credit
Symantec credits Nenad Stojanovski, for identifying this and working with us
while Symantec resolved the issue.
Reference
BID: Security Focus, http://www.securityfocus.com, has assigned a Bugtraq IDs
(BIDs) to the issue for inclusion in the Security Focus vulnerability database.
CVE: The issue is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list
(http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems.
CVE BID Description
CVE-2012-0305 BID 54594 dll loading command execution
Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of our products very
seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety
(OISafety), Symantec supports and follows responsible disclosure guidelines.
Please contact secure@symantec.com if you feel you have discovered a security
issue in a Symantec product. A member of the Symantec Product Security team
will contact you regarding your submission to coordinate any required response.
Symantec strongly recommends using encrypted email for reporting vulnerability
information to secure@symantec.com. The Symantec Product Security PGP key can
be found at the location below.
Symantec has developed a Product Vulnerability Response document outlining the
process we follow in addressing suspected vulnerabilities in our products. This
document is available below.
Copyright (c) by Symantec Corp.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it
is not edited in any way unless authorized by Symantec Product Security.
Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than
electronically requires permission from secure@symantec.com
Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of
publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information
constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties
with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts
any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage
arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.
Symantec, Symantec products, Symantec Product Security, and secure@symantec.com
are registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or affiliated companies in the
United States and other countries. All other registered and unregistered
trademarks represented in this document are the sole property of their
respective companies/owners.
* Signature names may have been updated to comply with an updated IPS Signature
naming convention. See
http://www.symantec.com/business/support/index?page=content&id=TECH152794&key=54619&actp=LIST
for more information.
Last modified on: July 20, 2012
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