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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2012.1209
ICSA-12-348-01 - SIEMENS PROCESSSUITE AND INVENSYS INTOUCH
POORLY ENCRYPTED PASSWORD FILE
20 December 2012
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Siemens ProcessSuite
Invensys Wonderware InTouch
Publisher: US-CERT
Operating System: Windows
Impact/Access: Increased Privileges -- Existing Account
Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2012-4693
Original Bulletin:
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-12-348-01.pdf
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ICS-CERT ADVISORY
ICSA-12-348-01 - SIEMENS PROCESSSUITE AND INVENSYS INTOUCH POORLY ENCRYPTED
PASSWORD FILE
December 13, 2012
OVERVIEW
This advisory provides mitigation details for a vulnerability that impacts
Siemens ProcessSuite (a) and Invensys Wonderware InTouch products. Researcher
Seth Bromberger of NCI Security, LLC and independent researcher Slade Griffin
have identified an insecure password storage vulnerability in both Siemens
ProcessSuite and Invensys Wonderware InTouch applications. Siemens states that
ProcessSuite is outdated and cannot be updated to match current security
requirements; Siemens recommends upgrading to a more recent human-machine
interface (HMI). Invensys recommends using Windows integrated security rather
than the InTouch security subsystem but has created a new patch to mitigate
this vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can allow an
attacker to log in to the system as a privileged user and take over the
application.
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Siemens ProcessSuite versions are affected:
* All versions of ProcessSuite.
Please note that according to Siemens, ProcessSuite was phased out in 2005 and
completely discontinued in 2010. Customers using SIMATIC PCS7 / APACS+ OS are
not affected.
The following Invensys Wonderware InTouch versions are affected:
* Wonderware InTouch 2012 R2 and previous.
Wonderware applications that use Windows Integrated security or ArchestrA
security are not affected.
IMPACT
An attacker with read permissions to the password file can decrypt it and
obtain all usernames and passwords, allowing logon as a privileged user and
take over the application.
Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to
each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture,
and product implementation.
BACKGROUND
ProcessSuite is a part of a Distributed Control System APACS+ from Moore
Products Inc., which was acquired by Siemens in 2000. Siemens ProcessSuite is
based on Wonderware InTouch V7.11 and uses similar authentication mechanisms.
Siemens no longer supports ProcessSuite.
ProcessSuite is deployed across several sectors including manufacturing, oil
and gas, chemical, and others. Siemens estimates that these products are used
primarily in the United States and Canada.
InTouch is an HMI created by Invensys Wonderware used for designing, building,
deploying, and maintaining applications for manufacturing and infrastructure
operations.
VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION
VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
INSECURE PASSWORD STORAGE (b)
User management information including passwords is stored in a reversible
format in file Ps_security.ini by the affected software. An attacker with read
permissions to this local file can obtain the passwords, log in as a privileged
user, and potentially affect the availability, integrity, and confidentiality
of the system.
CVE-2012-4693 (c) has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base
score of 4.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P).(d)
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
EXPLOITABILITY
An attacker would need local access to the password file to be able to exploit
this vulnerability.
EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
DIFFICULTY
An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability.
MITIGATION
Systems running ProcessSuite are outdated in many aspects and cannot support
the latest recommended security practices. As this software is discontinued,
Siemens strongly recommends upgrading to a more recent HMI for APACS+. (a)
Further information on migration options to PCS 7 / APACS+ OS along with
technical support can be located at the Siemens APACS Web site. (e)
Invensys recommends using Windows integrated security features or migrating
the HMI and OS to versions currently supported and then install their security
update. (f) Please consult with Wonderware Technical Support (g) for help with
the update.
ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to
protect against this and other cybersecurity risks. for help with the update.
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices
should not directly face the Internet.
* Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
isolate them from the business network.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected
devices.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. (h) ICS-CERT reminds
organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to
taking defensive measures.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01A -
Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies (i), that is
available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page (www.ics-cert.org).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
a. Siemens Security Advisory SSA-370812, http://www.siemens.com/corporate-technology/pool/de/forschungsfelder/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-370812.pdf
b. CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength, http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/326.html
Web site last accessed December 12, 2012.
c. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4693, NIST
uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site will be
active sometime after publication of this advisory.
d. CVSS Calculator, http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=(AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P)
Web site last visited December 12, 2012.
e. Siemens APACS Web site, http://www.apacs2020.com . Web site last visited
December 12, 2012.
f. Invensys Cyber Security Updates, http://iom.invensys.com/EN/Pages/CyberSecurityUpdates.aspx
g. Wonderware Technical Support Contacts, http://global.wonderware.com/EN/Pages/WonderwareTechnicalSupportContacts.aspx
h. CSSP Recommended Practices, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/Recommended_Practices.html
Web site last accessed December 12, 2011.
i. Target Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-TIP-12-146-01A.pdf
Web site last accessed December 12, 2012.
ICS-CERT CONTACT
For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:
Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
For industrial control systems security information and incident
reporting: www.ics-cert.org
ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can
help by answering a short series of questions about this product at the
following URL: https://forms.us-cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/.
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