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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2013.0066
ICSA-12-341-01-GE PROFICY HMI/SCADA CIMPLICITY INTEGER OVERFLOW
11 January 2013
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: GE Proficy HMI/SCADA CIMPLICITY
Publisher: US-CERT
Operating System: Windows Server 2003
Windows Server 2008
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Windows XP
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2012-4689
Original Bulletin:
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-12-341-01.pdf
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ICS-CERT ADVISORY
ICSA-12-341-01-GE PROFICY HMI/SCADA CIMPLICITY INTEGER OVERFLOW
January 8, 2013
OVERVIEW
This updated advisory is a follow-up to the original ICS-CERT Advisory
titled ICSA-12-341-01P-GE PROFICY HMI/SCADA CIMPLICITY INTEGER OVERFLOW that
was published December 06, 2012, to the US-CERT secure Portal library.
Researcher Kuang-Chun Hung of Information and Communication Security
Technology Center (ICST) has identified an improper input validation
vulnerability in GE's Intelligent Platforms Proficy HMI/SCADA-Cimplicity.
This vulnerability could lead to a possible denial of service (DoS).
GE has produced an updated product version that ICST has validated. ICST
confirms that the product update resolves the reported vulnerability.
This vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following products and versions are affected:
* Proficy HMI/SCADA - CIMPLICITY: Version 4.01 and greater, and
* Proficy Process Systems with CIMPLICITY.
Note: Proficy HMI/SCADA-CIMPLICITY Versions 4.0 and prior are not affected by
this vulnerability.
IMPACT
If exploited, this vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated remote
attacker to cause the CIMPLICITY built-in Web server to crash or to stop
responding to requests.
Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique
to each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the
impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment,
architecture, and product implementation.
BACKGROUND
According to GE, Proficy HMI/SCADA-CIMPLICITY is a Client/Server based human-
machine interface/supervisory control and data acquisition (HMI/SCADA)
application deployed across multiple industries.
VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION
VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW IMPROPER INPUT VALIDATION VULNERABILITY [a]
A vulnerability exists in the way that the CIMPLICITY built-in Web server
(CimWebServer.exe) processes incoming HTTP traffic because of insufficient
input validation. The CIMPLICITY built-in Web server is not enabled by
default. When enabled, it listens on Port 80 TCP by default.
An attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending malformed HTTP requests
to the listening service. The attack does not require authentication and can
be conducted remotely.
CVE-2012-4689[b] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score
of 7.1 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C).[c]
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
EXPLOITABILITY
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
DIFFICULTY
An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability.
MITIGATION
GE has released a security advisory and patches to address this issue:
http://support.ge-ip.com/support/index?page=kbchannel&id=S:KB15153
Patches for versions of CIMPLICITY prior to Version 8.0 will not be created.
GE recommends customers who are unable to patch or upgrade consider the
recommendations below.
GE has provided the following workaround recommendations that eliminate the
need to use the vulnerable component:
Option 1: Disable the CIMPLICITY built-in Web server if it is not in use.
GlobalView, WebView, and ThinView expose the existing functionality of the
CIMPLICITY HMI application so that it can be viewed via a Web browser.
If this functionality is not required, Web-based access can be disabled by
the following process:
1. Open CIMPLICITY Options.
2. Select the "WebView/ThinView" tab.
a. Uncheck the "Use built-in Web server" option.
b. Uncheck the "Start at boot time" option.
3. Select the "GlobalView" tab (if GlobalView is installed).
a. Uncheck the "Use built-in Web server" option.
b. Uncheck the "Start at boot time" option.
4. Click "OK."
Option 2: Use an alternate Web server to host GlobalView, WebView, or ThinView.
The CIMPLICITY built-in Web server can be replaced with a third-party Web
application server such as Microsoft IIS.
To configure GlobalView, WebView, or ThinView to use IIS:
1. Clear the "Use built-in Web server" check box on the WebView/ThinView and
GlobalView tabs of the CIMPLICITY Options dialog box.
2. Copy the ProwlerClient.jar file from the WebPages directory of your
CIMPLICITY installation to an IIS Web server directory.
3. In the WebView/ThinView or GlobalView tab of CIMPLICITY Options, click on
"Create a Web Page" to create an HTML file for your Web server. Use the
"Browse Page" button to navigate to the directory where you'd like to save
the page.
Important: If you would like to publish the Web page to Microsoft IIS, make
sure you save the Web page to an IIS Web directory. By default, this is
C:\InetPub\wwwroot or a subdirectory, but it could be another location
depending on your IIS configuration. You can save the page by clicking the
"Browse Page" button and navigating to the directory or by saving the file
to another location and copying it to an IIS directory later.
The vulnerable service (CimWebServer.exe) will still run on the system in
the "Option 2" configuration. However, because it is no longer listening on a
port that is processing HTTP traffic, the vulnerability is not exposed.
As with any third-party product, ensure that your IIS Web server is up to date
with the latest security patches and follow any secure configuration
recommendations from the vendor.
ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to
protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices
should not directly face the Internet.
* Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
isolate them from the business network.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected
devices.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.[d] ICS-CERT reminds
organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to
taking defensive measures.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01A-Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategy,[e] that is available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page
(www.ics-cert.org).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
ICS-CERT CONTACT
For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:
Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting:
www.ics-cert.org
ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can
help by answering a short series of questions about this product at the
following URL: https://forms.us- cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/.
DOCUMENT FAQ
What is an ICS-CERT Advisory? An ICS-CERT Advisory is intended to provide
awareness or solicit feedback from critical infrastructure owners and
operators concerning ongoing cyber events or activity with the potential to
impact critical infrastructure computing networks.
May I edit this document to include additional information? This document may
not be edited or modified in any way by recipients nor may any markings be
removed. It may not be posted on public Web sites. All comments or questions
related to this document should be directed to ICS-CERT at
ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov.
When is vulnerability attribution provided to researchers? Attribution for
vulnerability discovery is always provided to the vulnerability reporter
unless the reporter notifies ICS-CERT that they wish to remain anonymous.
ICS-CERT encourages researchers to coordinate vulnerability details before
public release. The public release of vulnerability details prior to the
development of proper mitigations may put industrial control systems and the
public at avoidable risk.
REFERENCES
[a] CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html, Web site last accessed January
08, 2013.
[b] NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4689, NIST
uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site will be
active sometime after publication of this advisory.
[c] CVSS Calculator, http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=
(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C) Web site last visited January 08, 2013.
[d] CSSP Recommended Practices,
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/Recommended_Practices.html,
Web site last accessed January 08, 2013.
[e] Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies,
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS- TIP-12-146-01A.pdf, Web site
last accessed January 08, 2013.
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