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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
CVE-2012-5689: BIND 9 with DNS64 enabled can unexpectedly
terminate when resolving domains in RPZ
25 January 2013
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2012-5689
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CVE-2012-5689: BIND 9 with DNS64 enabled can unexpectedly terminate when
resolving domains in RPZ
ISC has learned of the potential for an error condition to occur
in BIND 9 that can cause a nameserver to terminate with an assertion
failure when processing queries if it has been configured to use
both DNS64 and Response Policy Zones (RPZ).
Document Version: 1.1
Posting date: 23 January 2013
Program Impacted: BIND 9
Versions affected: 9.8.0->9.8.4-P1, 9.9.0->9.9.2-P1
An error condition may occur when a nameserver which is configured
to use DNS64 performs a AAAA lookup for a record with an A record
rewrite rule in a Response Policy Zone (RPZ.) If the RPZ is
unable to provide a AAAA record for the name, but does provide
a rewritten A record, then the DNS64 processing code will attempt
to remap that A record into a AAAA record. Due to a coding
error, this interaction between the RPZ database and the DNS64
remapping code can cause the named process to terminate with an
ISC believes the number of deployed systems that are using RPZ
rewrite rules and also using DNS64 is extremely small; furthermore,
the problem has an easy workaround (see below). However, ISC
policy calls for disclosure of any potential vulnerability in
BIND 9, regardless of how rarely the conditions for such a
vulnerability may occur in production environments. Thus, despite
the CVSS score, we assess the severity as Low, and will integrate
the bug fix into the next beta release of the affected versions.
No security patch release versions are planned, as the workaround
is simple and affords complete protection.
To prevent accidental exposure of those using these features in
combination, future versions of BIND 9 will include code to
prevent any exploitation of this bug, beginning with beta versions
scheduled to be released on January 24, 2013. However, the
suggested workaround is a complete remedy for those who are using
DNS64 in conjunction with RPZ, and is recommended in preference
to running beta code in a production environment.
Only nameservers that are configured to use both DNS64 and
Response Policy Zones, and which are maintaining A rewrite rules
but not AAAA rewrite rules, will be affected by this problem -
in other words, only systems that are using RPZ to rewrite DNS
records into A records, then attempting to remap those same A
records into AAAA via DNS64. Systems that only use RPZ to
generate NXDOMAIN or CNAME or NOERROR/NODATA responses, or to
rewrite other resource record types besides A, will not trigger
CVSS Score: 7.8
CVSS Equation: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
For more information on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and
to obtain your specific environmental score please visit:
If using DNS64 and Response Policy Zones together, make sure the
RPZ contains a AAAA rewrite rule for every A rewrite rule. If
the RPZ provides a AAAA answer without the assistance of DNS64,
the bug is not triggered.
If you are currently running one of the affected versions, you
have the following options:
+ Wait for the release of superseding packages including the fix.
+ Employ the workaround (see above).
ISC would like to thank Pories Ediansyah of Institut Teknologi
Bandung for bringing this defect to our attention.
Document Revision History:
1.0 - Phase 1 - Advance Notification 16 January 2013
1.1 - Phase 2 & Phase 3 - Notification 23 January 2013
2.0 - 24 January 2013 Notification to Phase Four (Public)
See our BIND Security Matrix for a complete listing of Security
Vulnerabilities and versions affected.
Do you still have questions? Questions regarding this advisory
should go to email@example.com
ISC patches only currently supported versions:
When possible we indicate EOL versions affected.
ISC Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:
Details of our current security advisory policy and practice can be
found at: https://www.isc.org/security-vulnerability-disclosure-policy
This Knowledge Base article https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00855 is
the complete and official security advisory document. There is
also a summary article located on our website and linking to here:
Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) is providing this notice on
an "AS IS" basis. No warranty or guarantee of any kind is expressed
in this notice and none should be implied. ISC expressly excludes
and disclaims any warranties regarding this notice or materials
referred to in this notice, including, without limitation, any
implied warranty of merchantability, fitness for a particular
purpose, absence of hidden defects, or of non-infringement. Your
use or reliance on this notice or materials referred to in this
notice is at your own risk. ISC may change this notice at any
time. A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this
document that omits the document URL is an uncontrolled copy.
Uncontrolled copies may lack important information, be out of
date, or contain factual errors.
(c) 2001-2013 Internet Systems Consortium
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