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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
2013-06 Security Bulletin: Secure Access (SSL VPN) and Access Control
(UAC): Internal and test Certificate Authority Root Servers
unintentionally added to Trusted CA list
14 June 2013
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Product: Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
Junos Pulse Access Control Service
Publisher: Juniper Networks
Operating System: Juniper
Impact/Access: Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2013-3970
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2013-06 Security Bulletin: Secure Access (SSL VPN) and Access Control (UAC):
Internal and test Certificate Authority Root Servers unintentionally added to
Trusted CA list
SA Series (SSL VPN)
Security Advisories ID:
12 Jun 2013
Junos Pulse Secure Access Service (SSL VPN) and Junos Pulse Access Control
The Junos Pulse Secure Access Service (SSL VPN) and Junos Pulse Access Control
Service (UAC) software use Trusted Server CA Root Certificate list in order to
verify the validity of certificates.
Internal and development test Certificate Authority (CA) Root Certificate
configuration was inadvertently added into release builds posted on our
download site. If a person was able to gain control of a Certificate Authority
that the SSL VPN/UAC was configured to trust, they could potentially create a
certificate for any domain of their choice.
An example of how Trusted Server CAs are used:
A user is browsing through the SSL VPN rewriter to a secure socket website
(https), the SSL VPN is acting as the https client, and therefore will use its
list of Certificate Authorities to verify if the backend https server has a
certificate that is valid. If the certificate is found to be valid the user
will not see any errors. However, if the certificate validation fails, the
user would see an error that states that "the site's certificate is not valid,
would you like to continue?" The problem with having Certificate Authorities
on the device that you do not trust is that if someone can take control of the
CA, then they can produce certificates that will appear valid to users.
Please see the Risk Assessment section for an explanation on how an attack
could take place.
The inadvertent adding of the Root CA Certificates was a mistake made during
the development testing process. The issue was seen from IVE OS version 7.1r1
to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8, and UAC OS 4.1r1 to 4.1r5. Note: If you have never
used IVE OS 7.1r1 to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8 or UAC 4.1r1 to 4.1r5 you would not
see this issue.
Juniper SIRT is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this vulnerability.
This issue was found during proactive internal security audits.
No other Juniper Networks products or platforms are affected by this issue.
This issue is known as CVE-2013-3970
The extra CAs that were accidentally added need to be removed to restore the
integrity of the CA store.
Software updates to IVE OS and UAC OS have been released to resolve this issue.
Releases containing the fix include IVE OS 7.1r7 or higher and UAC OS 4.1r6 or
- - Solution for IVE OS 7.2rX or UAC OS 4.2rX or higher who once were upgraded
from an affected release (IVE OS version 7.1r1 to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8, and
UAC OS 4.1r1 to 4.1r5)
- -- Note: IVE OS 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, UAC OS 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 who once were upgraded
from an affected release will need to reset the Trusted CA Server list with
the reset button on the following admin page:
- --- System --> Configuration --> Certifications --> Trusted Server CAs. The
"Reset Trusted Server CAs" button is a feature that was added for customers
who would like a easy way of resetting their Trusted CA Server list back to
the default list.
- --- Optional: Once you have restored your CA list to the default you can then
re-add any custom CAs that you've added to your device.
- - Solution for IVE OS 7.1rX or UAC OS 4.1rX:
- -- Please use the following steps described in kb.juniper.net/KB27552 to
mitigate this issue manually since the reset button is not available in that
version. Note: The .XML file attachment on this advisory is needed for
completing the workaround for IVE OS 7.1rX and UAC OS 4.1rX.
KB16765 - "In which releases are vulnerabilities fixed?" describes which
release vulnerabilities are fixed as per our End of Engineering and End of
Life support policies.
If you are running any 7.2 or higher release or if you can upgrade to 7.2 you
can simply use the "Reset Trusted Server CAs" button on the Trusted CA Servers
page. This is a new feature that was added for customers who would like a easy
way of resetting their Trusted CA Server list back to the default CAs. This
feature was first added to 7.2r1. The feature consists of a button on the
Trusted CA Servers list page, labeled: "Reset Trusted Server CAs". Once you
have restored your CA list you can then add any custom CAs that you've added
to your device.
IVE OS 7.1rX and UAC 4.1x customers can use the following steps described in
kb.juniper.net/kb27552 to mitigate this issue.
KB16613: Overview of the Juniper Networks SIRT Monthly Security Bulletin
KB16765: In which releases are vulnerabilities fixed?
KB16446: Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Juniper's Security
Report a Vulnerability - How to Contact the Juniper Networks Security Incident
If an attacker were able to gain control of a Certificate Authority that an
IVE is configured to trust, they could potentially create a valid certificate
for any domain of their choice. This would take a pieced together exploit to
fully carry out, and therefore is not a simple attack. In combination with
having access to create the fake certificate, they would also have to be in
control of the DNS system that their victim was configured to use. If you can
create a fake certificate for a website and also control the DNS lookup
information for that website you could potentially spoof a secure website
(https) to a user. This would allow someone to collect information or data
from a user's secure session since the user would not be able to tell the
difference between the real site and the imposter's website.
386K Ã¢Â€Â¢ 1 minute(s) @ 56k, < 1 minute @ broadband
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