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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2013.0830
   2013-06 Security Bulletin: Secure Access (SSL VPN) and Access Control
        (UAC): Internal and test Certificate Authority Root Servers
                 unintentionally added to Trusted CA list
                               14 June 2013

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Junos Pulse Secure Access Service
                   Junos Pulse Access Control Service
Publisher:         Juniper Networks
Operating System:  Juniper
Impact/Access:     Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2013-3970  

Original Bulletin: 
   http://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=JSA10571

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2013-06 Security Bulletin: Secure Access (SSL VPN) and Access Control (UAC): 
Internal and test Certificate Authority Root Servers unintentionally added to 
Trusted CA list

[JSA10571]

Categories:
UAC Series
SA Series (SSL VPN)
SSL_VPN_(IVE_OS)
SIRT Advisory
MAG Series

Security Advisories ID:
JSA10571

Last Updated:
12 Jun 2013

Version:
2.0


PRODUCT AFFECTED:

Junos Pulse Secure Access Service (SSL VPN) and Junos Pulse Access Control 
Service (UAC)

PROBLEM:

The Junos Pulse Secure Access Service (SSL VPN) and Junos Pulse Access Control 
Service (UAC) software use Trusted Server CA Root Certificate list in order to 
verify the validity of certificates.

Internal and development test Certificate Authority (CA) Root Certificate 
configuration was inadvertently added into release builds posted on our 
download site. If a person was able to gain control of a Certificate Authority 
that the SSL VPN/UAC was configured to trust, they could potentially create a 
certificate for any domain of their choice.

An example of how Trusted Server CAs are used:

A user is browsing through the SSL VPN rewriter to a secure socket website 
(https), the SSL VPN is acting as the https client, and therefore will use its 
list of Certificate Authorities to verify if the backend https server has a 
certificate that is valid. If the certificate is found to be valid the user 
will not see any errors. However, if the certificate validation fails, the 
user would see an error that states that "the site's certificate is not valid, 
would you like to continue?" The problem with having Certificate Authorities 
on the device that you do not trust is that if someone can take control of the 
CA, then they can produce certificates that will appear valid to users.

Please see the Risk Assessment section for an explanation on how an attack 
could take place.

The inadvertent adding of the Root CA Certificates was a mistake made during 
the development testing process. The issue was seen from IVE OS version 7.1r1 
to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8, and UAC OS 4.1r1 to 4.1r5. Note: If you have never 
used IVE OS 7.1r1 to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8 or UAC 4.1r1 to 4.1r5 you would not 
see this issue.

Juniper SIRT is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this vulnerability.

This issue was found during proactive internal security audits.

No other Juniper Networks products or platforms are affected by this issue.

This issue is known as CVE-2013-3970

SOLUTION:

The extra CAs that were accidentally added need to be removed to restore the 
integrity of the CA store.
Software updates to IVE OS and UAC OS have been released to resolve this issue. 
Releases containing the fix include IVE OS 7.1r7 or higher and UAC OS 4.1r6 or 
higher.

- - Solution for IVE OS 7.2rX or UAC OS 4.2rX or higher who once were upgraded 
from an affected release (IVE OS version 7.1r1 to 7.1r5, 7.0r2 to 7.0r8, and 
UAC OS 4.1r1 to 4.1r5)
- -- Note: IVE OS 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, UAC OS 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 who once were upgraded 
from an affected release will need to reset the Trusted CA Server list with 
the reset button on the following admin page:
- --- System --> Configuration --> Certifications --> Trusted Server CAs. The 
"Reset Trusted Server CAs" button is a feature that was added for customers 
who would like a easy way of resetting their Trusted CA Server list back to 
the default list.
- --- Optional: Once you have restored your CA list to the default you can then 
re-add any custom CAs that you've added to your device.

- - Solution for IVE OS 7.1rX or UAC OS 4.1rX:
- -- Please use the following steps described in kb.juniper.net/KB27552 to 
mitigate this issue manually since the reset button is not available in that 
version. Note: The .XML file attachment on this advisory is needed for 
completing the workaround for IVE OS 7.1rX and UAC OS 4.1rX.

KB16765 - "In which releases are vulnerabilities fixed?" describes which 
release vulnerabilities are fixed as per our End of Engineering and End of 
Life support policies.

WORKAROUND:

If you are running any 7.2 or higher release or if you can upgrade to 7.2 you 
can simply use the "Reset Trusted Server CAs" button on the Trusted CA Servers 
page. This is a new feature that was added for customers who would like a easy 
way of resetting their Trusted CA Server list back to the default CAs. This 
feature was first added to 7.2r1. The feature consists of a button on the 
Trusted CA Servers list page, labeled: "Reset Trusted Server CAs". Once you 
have restored your CA list you can then add any custom CAs that you've added 
to your device.

IVE OS 7.1rX and UAC 4.1x customers can use the following steps described in 
kb.juniper.net/kb27552 to mitigate this issue.

IMPLEMENTATION:

RELATED LINKS: 

KB16613: Overview of the Juniper Networks SIRT Monthly Security Bulletin 
Publication Process
KB16765: In which releases are vulnerabilities fixed?
KB16446: Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Juniper's Security 
Advisories.
Report a Vulnerability - How to Contact the Juniper Networks Security Incident 
Response Team
CVE-2013-3970
CVSS SCORE:
4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
RISK LEVEL:
Medium

RISK ASSESSMENT:
If an attacker were able to gain control of a Certificate Authority that an 
IVE is configured to trust, they could potentially create a valid certificate 
for any domain of their choice. This would take a pieced together exploit to 
fully carry out, and therefore is not a simple attack. In combination with 
having access to create the fake certificate, they would also have to be in 
control of the DNS system that their victim was configured to use. If you can 
create a fake certificate for a website and also control the DNS lookup 
information for that website you could potentially spoof a secure website 
(https) to a user. This would allow someone to collect information or data 
from a user's secure session since the user would not be able to tell the 
difference between the real site and the imposter's website.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

ATTACHMENT FILE:
ive-export-system-default-CA-7.4r2.xml 
386K • 1 minute(s) @ 56k, < 1 minute @ broadband

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