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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2013.1100
Security Bulletin: Risks of Using the Intelligent Platform Management
Interface (IPMI) on the Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated
Management Module II (IMM2) (CVE-2013-4038,CVE-2013-4037, CVE-2013-4031)
12 August 2013
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: IBM Intelligent Platform Management Interface
IBM Integrated Management Module
IBM Integrated Management Module II
Publisher: IBM
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Administrator Compromise -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account
Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2013-4038 CVE-2013-4037 CVE-2013-4031
Original Bulletin:
http://www-947.ibm.com/support/entry/portal/docdisplay?lndocid=MIGR-5093463
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Security Bulletin: Risks of Using the Intelligent Platform Management Interface
(IPMI) on the Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated Management
Module II (IMM2) (CVE-2013-4038,CVE-2013-4037, CVE-2013-4031)
Abstract
Various risks with the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) have
been identified and documented in the IT security community. Because the IMM
and IMM2 provide IPMI access by default, a subset of these identified risks are
applicable to IBM servers that include the IMM and IMM2.
Content
Vulnerability Details:
CVE ID: CVE-2013-4038
Description:
For IMM (but not IMM2), the passwords for user accounts are stored in clear
text in the IMM file system. Users do not have access to the root shell of the
IMM's operating system, however if a user was able to break into the IMM
operating system, he would have visibility to the user passwords. With access
to the account information a malicious user could change the account
credentials of other users or perform actions under the guise of another user.
CVSS Base Score: 4
CVSS Temporal Score: See http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86174 for the
current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N)
CVE ID: CVE-2013-4037
Description:
The RAKP protocol, which is specified by the IPMI standard for authentication,
has flaws. Although the IMMs do not allow the use of null passwords, a hacker
could reverse engineer the RAKP transactions to determine a password. The
authentication process for IPMI requires the management controller to send a
hash of the requested user's password to the client, prior to the client
authenticating. This process is a key part of the IPMI specification. The
password hash can broken using an offline brute force or dictionary attack.
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Temporal Score: See http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86173 for the
current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
CVE ID: CVE-2013-4031
Description:
The IMM and IMM2 are preconfigured with one IPMI user account, which has the
same default login name and password on all affected systems. If a malicious
user gains access to the IPMI interface using this preconfigured account,
he/she would be able to power off or on, or reboot the host server, and to
create or change user accounts possibly preventing legitimate users from
accessing the IMMs.
Additionally, if a user fails to change the default user name and password on
each of the systems that he deploys, the user would have the same login
information for each of the IMMs on those systems.
CVSS Base Score: 10
CVSS Temporal Score: See http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/86172 for the
current score
CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined
CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
Affected products and versions
All IBM servers that include and IMM or IMM2, including but not limited to:
BladeCenter HS22
BladeCenter HS22V
BladeCenter HS23
BladeCenter HS23E
BladeCenter HX5
Flex System x220 Compute Node
Flex System x240 Compute Node
Flex System x440 Compute Node
System x iDataPlex dx360 M2 server
System x iDataPlex dx360 M3
System x iDataPlex dx360 M4
System x3100 M4
System x3200 M3
System x3250 M3
System x3250 M4
System x3400 M2
System x3400 M3
System x3500 M2
System x3500 M3
System x3500 M4
System x3530 M4
System x3550 M2
System x3550 M3
System x3550 M4
System x3620 M3
System x3630 M3
System x3630 M4
System x3650 M2
System x3650 M3
System x3650 M4
System x3690 X5
System x3750 M4
System x3850 X5
System x3950 X5
Remediation:
Change the preconfigured user name and password when the server is
deployed. Doing this will prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to
the IMMs through the preconfigured user account.
If a user is not managing a server using IPMI, the IMMs can be configured
to disallow IPMI network access from the user accounts. This can be
accomplished using the ipmitool utility or a similar utility for managing
and configuring IPMI management controllers. Here is an example of an
ipmitool command to disable the network access for an IPMI user:
ipmitool channel setaccess 1 #user_slot# privilege=15
Replace #user_slot# in the above command with the actual slot number (1
through 12) and repeat for each IMM/IMM2 user that has been configured. The
example above details the command when it is run directly on the server
itself. If the ipmitool command is run remotely over the network, or if a
different utility is used, the command will be different. Consult the
documentation for the utility that you are using to determine the correct
command syntax. Disallowing IPMI network access will remove the ability to
use the weakness present in the IPMI RAKP protocol to discover user account
credentials.
Use strong passwords, at least 16 characters long with a mixture of upper
and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. By using longer,
more complex passwords it makes it more difficult for malicious users to
discover valid user credentials.
Keep the management network separate from the public network. Keeping the
management network separate lessens security exposures by reducing the
number of individuals who can access the IMMs.
Workaround(s) & Mitigation(s):
None
References:
Complete CVSS Guide
On-line Calculator V2
A Penetration Tester's Guide to IPMI and BMCs
IPMI: Freight Train to Hell
Related Information:
IBM Secure Engineering Web Portal
IBM Product Security Incident Response Blog
Acknowledgement
None
Change History
1 August 2013: Original Copy Published
*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will
ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the
Reference section of this Flash.
Note: According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST),
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard
designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency and
priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY
OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT
OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY.
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