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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2013.1185 Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption 30 August 2013 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Publisher: ICS-CERT Operating System: Network Appliance Impact/Access: Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2013-2782 Original Bulletin: http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-234-01 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Advisory (ICSA-13-234-01) Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption Original release date: August 22, 2013 Legal Notice All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/. OVERVIEW Schneider Electric has self-reported a hard-coded encryption key vulnerability in Schneider Electric's J-Series Radios. Schneider Electric has produced a patch that mitigates this vulnerability and has published a customer security notification.[a] This vulnerability could be exploited remotely. AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio versions running Firmware Versions V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, and V3.6.3 are affected: TBURJR900-00002DH0 TBURJR900-01002DH0 TBURJR900-05002DH0 TBURJR900-06002DH0 TBURJR900-00002EH0 TBURJR900-01002EH0 TBURJR900-05002EH0 TBURJR900-06002EH0. IMPACT In certain cases the affected Trio J-Series radio firmware versions do not correctly generate an advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption key when AES encryption is enabled in the device configuration. An attacker could potentially leverage this situation to gain control of a device or to access a connected device or industrial control system (ICS) network. If a Trio J-Series Radio with V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, or V3.6.3 has AES encryption enabled with a user-defined pass phrase, the AES encryption key is not generated correctly, unless it is part of an upgrade. If the radio had AES encryption enabled at the time of the V3.5.0 or earlier firmware upgrade to the affected versions, and the AES encryption pass phrase was not changed, then the Trio J-Series will continue to properly encrypt the radio traffic. If the radio running firmware V3.5.0 or earlier was upgraded to these affected versions and the AES encryption was changed from disable to enable or had the AES encryption key changed, then the encryption key will not be generated correctly. Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture, and product implementation. BACKGROUND Schneider Electric is a Europe-based company that maintains offices in 190 countries worldwide. Their PLC products are used in a wide variety of automation and control applications across all industrial, infrastructure, and building sectors. These radios are used mostly in Australia and the US, with smaller deployments in Brazil, Europe, and the UK. Sectors most commonly using the affected devices include oil and gas, water and waste water, and mining. VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW Hard-Coded Encryption Key[b] The affected devices may, under some circumstances, not properly generate an encryption key. This could potentially result in an attacker gaining access to the radio communications link traffic and potentially the ICS network. CVE-2013-2782[c] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score of 8.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C).[d] VULNERABILITY DETAILS EXPLOITABILITY This vulnerability could be exploited remotely. EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. DIFFICULTY An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability. MITIGATION The best mitigation for this vulnerability is to install the vendor firmware update from Schneider Electric, which can be accessed from the link below. http://www2.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/support/cybersecurity/cybersecurity.page ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to protect against this and other cybersecurity risks. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices should not directly face the Internet. Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network. When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.[e] ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B-Targeted Cyber Intrusion Mitigation Strategies,[f] that is available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page (http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/). Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents. a. Schneider Electric Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure, http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_File_Id=141141292&p_File_Nam+e=SEVD-2013-143-01.pdf Web site last accessed August 22, 2013. b. CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html, Web site last accessed August 22, 2013. c. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2782 , NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site will be active sometime after publication of this advisory. d. CVSS Calculator, http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C, Web site last accessed August 22, 2013. e. CSSP Recommended Practices, http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices, Web site last accessed August 22, 2011. f. Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B, Web site last accessed August 22, 2013. Contact Information For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at: Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585 International Callers: (208) 526-0900 For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting: http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://forms.us-cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/. Legal For Legal Information pertaining to this document, please consult http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Legal-Disclaimer - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQIVAwUBUiA4SRLndAQH1ShLAQLmHxAArt4TefpnyrG2nKbKStkc5cpLCN9LwEeA apOStrjMRVAJd5pswkgEsHZgUa96rdWRrNWRGth59SHhJQ1ANu6qB/koTqdLludE o/AnJvbftW0p31p9gGW37rGdll5+uhALbNjnaFnyQ3kWE2PcYKs6VZSPrXKdtgar 4RItvxwUxXeQTvQawD48UjVCe3Vk1SPsp1hNAE9A8Bdo5DaXGYQWZFxwhIX/mtuv Q5xnWNQrsyIAcJ6onb9yc9nDDTHw+t9/FBlOsj2aPfj8fVm5HOdp4h7a6Ci1//XX 3yT9b3PC4Iv42K+t+rzNwVGTjGL5x5NJ7Yh+WqjV2RgwH0ZHRpEyWTr1msAM3M00 DWBRmHbPwdAZosSqShHUpuoTIazQB+RIMu5ZEVxn6LycrQVcepN24cWNpxyyOEsx L+CYZJKiD59SXcskIwRzPiP7WEtB424SIPZxXIAPnjWGPwzLAWW7X9mk8euBN6hb rXjGEEHtChUT5T1dqpMh7QNyQ1FDEsULFKtVKjq59xhaAGIu9UUgv3krGaO+O+BC o475hLUPn7s5tmfWHM6EgI5pIShCoZ4H/DrxikslbapCLEUvZT/eUyShBdgvc9Ge JTiGhvb0AtWwqzccoWloGUaasqcTMgpvFnT40HcM5pEuhzDvLUDZpx4kQelZaIf4 2YLxxsXyVRE= =CRqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----