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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2013.1185
Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption
30 August 2013
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio
Publisher: ICS-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2013-2782
Original Bulletin:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-234-01
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Advisory (ICSA-13-234-01)
Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption
Original release date: August 22, 2013
Legal Notice
All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service,
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more
information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
OVERVIEW
Schneider Electric has self-reported a hard-coded encryption key vulnerability
in Schneider Electric's J-Series Radios. Schneider Electric has produced a
patch that mitigates this vulnerability and has published a customer security
notification.[a]
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio versions running Firmware
Versions V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, and V3.6.3 are affected:
TBURJR900-00002DH0
TBURJR900-01002DH0
TBURJR900-05002DH0
TBURJR900-06002DH0
TBURJR900-00002EH0
TBURJR900-01002EH0
TBURJR900-05002EH0
TBURJR900-06002EH0.
IMPACT
In certain cases the affected Trio J-Series radio firmware versions do not
correctly generate an advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption key when
AES encryption is enabled in the device configuration. An attacker could
potentially leverage this situation to gain control of a device or to access
a connected device or industrial control system (ICS) network.
If a Trio J-Series Radio with V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, or V3.6.3 has AES
encryption enabled with a user-defined pass phrase, the AES encryption key is
not generated correctly, unless it is part of an upgrade.
If the radio had AES encryption enabled at the time of the V3.5.0 or earlier
firmware upgrade to the affected versions, and the AES encryption pass phrase
was not changed, then the Trio J-Series will continue to properly encrypt the
radio traffic.
If the radio running firmware V3.5.0 or earlier was upgraded to these affected
versions and the AES encryption was changed from disable to enable or had the
AES encryption key changed, then the encryption key will not be generated
correctly.
Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to
each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture,
and product implementation.
BACKGROUND
Schneider Electric is a Europe-based company that maintains offices in 190
countries worldwide. Their PLC products are used in a wide variety of
automation and control applications across all industrial, infrastructure,
and building sectors.
These radios are used mostly in Australia and the US, with smaller deployments
in Brazil, Europe, and the UK. Sectors most commonly using the affected devices
include oil and gas, water and waste water, and mining.
VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION
VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
Hard-Coded Encryption Key[b]
The affected devices may, under some circumstances, not properly generate an
encryption key. This could potentially result in an attacker gaining access to
the radio communications link traffic and potentially the ICS network.
CVE-2013-2782[c] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score
of 8.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C).[d]
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
EXPLOITABILITY
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
DIFFICULTY
An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability.
MITIGATION
The best mitigation for this vulnerability is to install the vendor firmware
update from Schneider Electric, which can be accessed from the link below.
http://www2.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/support/cybersecurity/cybersecurity.page
ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to
protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices
should not directly face the Internet.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
isolate them from the business network.
When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected
devices.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.[e] ICS-CERT reminds
organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to
taking defensive measures.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B-Targeted Cyber Intrusion Mitigation Strategies,[f] that is
available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page
(http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
a. Schneider Electric Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure,
http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_File_Id=141141292&p_File_Nam+e=SEVD-2013-143-01.pdf
Web site last accessed August 22, 2013.
b. CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key,
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html, Web site last accessed
August 22, 2013.
c. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2782 ,
NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site
will be active sometime after publication of this advisory.
d. CVSS Calculator,
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C,
Web site last accessed August 22, 2013.
e. CSSP Recommended Practices,
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices, Web site last
accessed August 22, 2011.
f. Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies,
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B, Web site last
accessed August 22, 2013.
Contact Information
For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:
Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
International Callers: (208) 526-0900
For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov
ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can
help by answering a short series of questions about this product at the
following URL: https://forms.us-cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/.
Legal
For Legal Information pertaining to this document, please consult
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Legal-Disclaimer
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