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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2013.1234
         TYPO3-CORE-SA-2013-003: Incomplete Access Management and
             Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in TYPO3 Core
                             9 September 2013

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           TYPO3
Publisher:         TYPO3
Operating System:  UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
                   Windows
Impact/Access:     Modify Arbitrary Files   -- Existing Account
                   Create Arbitrary Files   -- Existing Account
                   Access Confidential Data -- Existing Account
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade

Original Bulletin: 
   http://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-core/typo3-core-sa-2013-003/

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TYPO3-CORE-SA-2013-003: Incomplete Access Management and Remote Code Execution 
Vulnerability in TYPO3 Core

September 04, 2013

Category: TYPO3 Core 
Author: Helmut Hummel
Keywords: Incomplete Access Management, Remote Code Execution

It has been discovered that TYPO3 Core has Incomplete Access Management and is 
vulnerable to Remote Code Execution

Component Type: TYPO3 Core

Vulnerability Types: Cross-Site Scripting, Remote Code Execution

Overall Severity: Critical

Release Date: September 4, 2013

 
Vulnerable subcomponent: File handling / File Abstraction Layer
Vulnerability Type: Incomplete Access Management

Affected Versions: All versions from 6.0.0 up to the development branch of 6.2

Severity: Medium

Suggested CVSS v2.0: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C (What's that?)

CVE: None assigned yet.

Problem Description: TYPO3 comes with the possibility to restrict editors to 
certain file actions (copy, delete, move etc.) and to restrict these actions 
to be performed in certain locations (file mounts). This permission handling 
was only partly implemented with the introduction of the File Abstraction 
Layer (FAL). The file action permissions that can be set in backend user and 
group records were not respected and users could break out of file mounts by 
crafting URLs. Thus, unprivileged users could create or read arbitrary files 
within or outside the document root.

Solution: Update to the TYPO3 version 6.0.9, 6.1.4 or the latest development 
version! It is important to clear all caches (clear cache all in the backend 
or deleting the complete typo3temp/Cache directory) for the changes to take 
effect after the TYPO3 source files have been updated!

Notes: Administrators are advised to set file permissions for backend users or 
groups by using user TS Config instead of using the file permission check 
boxes in the user or group records. This allows more fine grained control for 
single file action permissions.

Example for setting default permissions for users or groups in User TSConfig:

permissions.file.default {
 addFile = 0
 readFile = 1
 writeFile = 1
 copyFile = 1
 moveFile = 1
 renameFile = 0
 unzipFile = 0
 deleteFile = 0 
 addFolder = 1
 readFolder = 1
 writeFolder = 1
 copyFolder = 1
 moveFolder = 0
 renameFolder = 0
 deleteFolder = 1
 recursivedeleteFolder = 1
 } 

Example setting permissions for storage with ID 1 (overriding default 
settings):

permissions.file.storage.1 {
 addFile = 1
 readFile = 1
 writeFile = 1
 copyFile = 1
 moveFile = 1
 renameFile = 0
 unzipFile = 0
 deleteFile = 0 
 addFolder = 1
 readFolder = 1
 writeFolder = 1
 copyFolder = 1
 moveFolder = 0
 renameFolder = 0
 deleteFolder = 1
 recursivedeleteFolder = 1
 } 

Credits: Credits go to Sebastian Nerz who discovered and reported the issues, 
Steffen Ritter and Helmut Hummel for creating the fixes and Anja Leichsenring, 
Susanne Moog, Michiel Roos, Sascha Egerer and Ernesto Baschny for testing.

 
Vulnerable subcomponent: File Abstraction Layer
Vulnerability Type: Remote Code Execution

Affected Versions: All versions from 6.0.0 up to the development branch of 6.2

Severity: Critical

Suggested CVSS v2.0: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:O/RC:C (What's that?)

CVE: none assigned yet

Problem Description: The check for denied file extensions implemented in the 
File Abstraction Layer as mentioned in advisory TYPO3-CORE-SA-2013-002 was 
incomplete. It was still possible for editors to rename files to have denied 
file extensions by inserting special characters that were removed at a later 
point. This (again) allowed authenticated editors to forge php files with 
arbitrary code, which can then be executed in web server's context.

Solution: Update to the TYPO3 version 6.0.9, 6.1.4 or the latest development 
version!

Credits: Credits go to Sascha Egerer who discovered and reported the issue. 

 
General Advice: Follow the recommendations that are given in the TYPO3 
Security Guide. Please subscribe to the typo3-announce mailing list.

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