IBM SONAS: Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2014.1200
Security Bulletin: IBM SONAS Administrator password can be read by the root
            user from the shell command history (CVE-2014-3045)
                               21 July 2014

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
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Product:           IBM SONAS
Publisher:         IBM
Operating System:  Linux variants
Impact/Access:     Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2014-3045  

Original Bulletin: 
   http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1004815

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Security Bulletin: IBM SONAS Administrator password can be read by the
root user from the shell command history (CVE-2014-3045)

Security Bulletin

Document information
More support for:

Scale Out Network Attached Storage
1.4.3.3

Version:
1.4.3.3

Operating system(s):
Linux

Reference #:
S1004815

Modified date:
2014-07-17

Summary

A fix is available for IBM SONAS, for the security issue that after changing
password of administrative user, the password can be read by the root user
from the shell command history.

Vulnerability Details

CVEID:
CVE-2014-3045

DESCRIPTION:
One of the purposes of chuser command is to modify the password of an
administrative user account in IBM SONAS.

When used with the -p argument, the chuser command records the administrator
password in the shell command history. The shell command history can
subsequently be read by the root user.

CVE-2014-3045
CVSS Base Score: 2.1

Affected Products and Versions

IBM SONAS
The product is affected when running a code releases 1.3.0.0 to 1.4.3.2

Remediation/Fixes

A fix for these issues is in version 1.4.3.3 of IBM SONAS.

Workarounds and Mitigations

Workaround(s) :
1. Modify HISTIGNORE environment variable for root user, so that chuser
command will not be included in shell bash history. You could add this
environment variable to .bashrc file in home directory of root user.

2. After changing password using chuser command, the admin user may get
root user to clear the shell command history of root user, using history
- -c command.

Mitigation(s) : A fix for these issues is in version 1.4.3.3 of IBM
SONAS. Customers running an affected version of IBM SONAS should upgrade
to 1.4.3.3 or a later version, so that the fix gets applied.

References
Complete CVSS Guide
On-line Calculator V2

Related information
IBM Secure Engineering Web Portal
IBM Product Security Incident Response Blog

Acknowledgement

Thanks to Google, for identifying and reporting this issue to IBM.

*The CVSS Environment Score is customer environment specific and will
ultimately impact the Overall CVSS Score. Customers can evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability in their environments by accessing the links in the
Reference section of this Security Bulletin.

Disclaimer

According to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an "industry open standard
designed to convey vulnerability severity and help to determine urgency
and priority of response." IBM PROVIDES THE CVSS SCORES "AS IS" WITHOUT
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. CUSTOMERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSESSING
THE IMPACT OF ANY ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY.

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