Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2015.3099
Multiple vulnerabilities has been fixed in OpenSSH 7.0
11 December 2015
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: OpenSSH
Publisher: OpenSSH
Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Windows
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account
Provide Misleading Information -- Existing Account
Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2015-6565
Reference: ESB-2015.1814
Original Bulletin:
http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.0
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
OpenSSH 7.0 has just been released. It will be available from the
mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes
transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols
that may be enabled at compile-time.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Future deprecation notice
=========================
We plan on retiring more legacy cryptography in the next release
including:
* Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum
is 768 bits)
* Several ciphers will be disabled by default: blowfish-cbc,
cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the rijndael-cbc aliases
for AES.
* MD5-based HMAC algorithms will be disabled by default.
This list reflects our current intentions, but please check the final
release notes for OpenSSH 7.1 when it is released.
Changes since OpenSSH 6.9
=========================
This focus of this release is primarily to deprecate weak, legacy
and/or unsafe cryptography.
Security
- --------
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 6.8 and 6.9 incorrectly set TTYs to be world-
writable. Local attackers may be able to write arbitrary messages
to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences.
Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.
* sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a privilege separation
weakness related to PAM support. Attackers who could successfully
compromise the pre-authentication process for remote code
execution and who had valid credentials on the host could
impersonate other users. Reported by Moritz Jodeit.
* sshd(8): Portable OpenSSH only: Fixed a use-after-free bug
related to PAM support that was reachable by attackers who could
compromise the pre-authentication process for remote code
execution. Also reported by Moritz Jodeit.
* sshd(8): fix circumvention of MaxAuthTries using keyboard-
interactive authentication. By specifying a long, repeating
keyboard-interactive "devices" string, an attacker could request
the same authentication method be tried thousands of times in
a single pass. The LoginGraceTime timeout in sshd(8) and any
authentication failure delays implemented by the authentication
mechanism itself were still applied. Found by Kingcope.
Potentially-incompatible Changes
- --------------------------------
* Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by
default at compile time.
* Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange
is disabled by default at run-time. It may be re-enabled using
the instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
* Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled
by default at run-time. These may be re-enabled using the
instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
* Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
* The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin option has
changed from "yes" to "prohibit-password".
* PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans all
interactive authentication methods, allowing only public-key,
hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously it permitted
keyboard-interactive and password-less authentication if those
were enabled).
New Features
- ------------
* ssh_config(5): add PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes option to control which
public key types are available for user authentication.
* sshd_config(5): add HostKeyAlgorithms option to control which
public key types are offered for host authentications.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): extend Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgorithms,
HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedKeyTypes
options to allow appending to the default set of algorithms
instead of replacing it. Options may now be prefixed with a '+'
to append to the default, e.g. "HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-dss".
* sshd_config(5): PermitRootLogin now accepts an argument of
'prohibit-password' as a less-ambiguous synonym of 'without-
password'.
Bugfixes
- --------
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add compatability workarounds for Cisco and more
PuTTY versions. bz#2424
* Fix some omissions and errors in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.mux
documentation relating to Unix domain socket forwarding;
bz#2421 bz#2422
* ssh(1): Improve the ssh(1) manual page to include a better
description of Unix domain socket forwarding; bz#2423
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots, fixing
failures to load keys when they are present. bz#2427
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): do not ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that wth
empty CKA_ID; bz#2429
* sshd(8): clarify documentation for UseDNS option; bz#2045
Portable OpenSSH
- ----------------
* Check realpath(3) behaviour matches what sftp-server requires and
use a replacement if necessary.
Checksums:
==========
- SHA1 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = a19ff0bad2a67348b1d01a38a9580236120b7099
- SHA256 (openssh-7.0.tar.gz) = 4F6HV/ZqT465f3sMB2vIkXO+wrYtL5hnqzAymfbZ1Jk=
- SHA1 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = d8337c9eab91d360d104f6dd805f8b32089c063c
- SHA256 (openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz) = /VkySToZ9MgRU9gS7k4EK0m707dZqz2TRKvswrwUheU=
Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was recently rotated.
The new key has been signed by the old key to provide continuity. It is
available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc.
Reporting Bugs:
===============
- - Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com
OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and
Ben Lindstrom.
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967
iQIVAwUBVmpEY36ZAP0PgtI9AQJguhAAlquz3pbE7KxKYYooOJPnhfKFeiHCWa7G
+InBOrIywwE0K6/uiW0DU/TcpFCqpO4WIIk9yRqpDuC0AoCC+ZRJ9k7ppfSWBs+x
XJ9DLy8RnVvckDkkSpGxbNRcLQw/YTv2dDLRDHBHobawe3OJ9ejBDPA4+V7cYDak
KCSUl4Jnmf7roNX0Zqqp2b29AEpfrMVUGXQHOFnJkEOUeuT+JXV1R78rYZXgc3la
9Kips5xiflPCTITW+aWXXM9Mc4lSqYp+dH5ZXQVCHHGhlwsNBwRCqJuT/BjvzYc8
SGWWxnPnDVrn7erBSolS5qRe8eMwdattfbyi0qa3xMujlqK8Zm2NCvZ63ulL02cO
98+hGq/s+OV+Vbd2svRjYk8LTcvOXEAP71nawKVluZWD8pHzY/+JcMlgWWo2HDP4
hzJOmBmcsviR3UX88uS0ncOvVGPcLUBTjWtDWs/9N72IxO2E+kxITPqHsn25RBRv
NkgzqM1ZZ0fFReVgwQmGNk6Zk+2y8FqtxLVV7bEH6j47ucig+cklsCRXwLvhILPb
rot0K0lJK2IniZLACBruIEczzS7eEmHEPdPckd3hTVcjtSC8wncAUqBVGdHbHa4b
PeEQ9meRbOEBou2hLBov83P+Enix2Z9pbQxraiqe4EC4mPja6qiNr9YwX3pqSmia
gB6N0Yv7dG0=
=smb9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----