Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2016.1461 Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection and Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced, Multiple Security Issues 10 June 2016 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Publisher: Symantec Operating System: Windows Red Hat VMware ESX Server Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Existing Account Access Confidential Data -- Existing Account Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2015-8800 CVE-2015-8799 CVE-2015-8798 CVE-2015-8157 Original Bulletin: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=&suid=20160607_00 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection and Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced, Multiple Security Issues SYM16-009 June 7, 2016 Revisions None Severity CVSS2 CVSS2 Vector Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass - Medium 5.2 AV:A/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal - High 7.2 AV:A/AC:L/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent - High 7.1 AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - High 7.0 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:C CVSS3 CVSS3 Vector Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass - Medium 5.5 AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal - High 7.4 AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent - High 7.6 AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - Medium 6.3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H Overview Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection (SES:CSP) and Data Center Security: Server Advanced (SDCS:SA) were susceptible to security issues in the management server and deployed agents which could enable unauthorized elevated access, bypassing security protection on agents, potential unauthorized insertion of arbitrary code on agents. Affected Products Product Version Build Solution(s) Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection (SES:CSP)1.0.x Management Server Update to SES:CSP 1.0 MP5 latest published build Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection for 6.5.0 Management Server Update to SES:CSP 6.5.0 MP1 latest published build Controllers and Devices (SES:CSP) Symantec Critical System Protection (SCSP) 5.2.9 and earlier Management Server Upgrade to 5.2.9 MP6 latest published build Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.0.x Management Server Upgrade to 6.5 MP1 latest published build Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.5.x Management Server Upgrade to 6.5 MP1 latest published build Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.6 Management Server Upgrade to 6.6 MP1 build Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server and 6.6 MP1 Management Server Upgrade to 6.6 MP1 latest published policies Agents (DCS:SA) Details SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server SQL Injection - Management servers were susceptible to potential SQL Injection by an authorized but non-privileged network user. A malicious user with network access to the proper port on the management server could potentially inject arbitrary SQL commands. If successful, the attacker could bypass authentication and potentially get their arbitrary commands to run with the privileges of the application. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal - The Management Server did not properly sanitize user-supplied input. An authorized but lower-privileged management server user could potentially execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. This is not applicable to 5.2.9 and earlier. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent - By leveraging elevated access on the management server, a less-privileged user could potentially deploy specifically-crafted update packages to arbitrary locations on SES:CSP/SDCS:SA deployed agents for possible execution by the agent. This could have resulted in potentially bypassing security protection on agents and resultant arbitrary remote code execution. This is not applicable to 5.2.9 and earlier. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - An authenticated user who can read/write to a specific named pipe could potentially inject arbitrary arguments which could allow bypass of security protection on the agent. Symantec is not aware of exploitation of or adverse customer impact from this issue. Update Information Updates for SES:CSP 1.0.x and 6.5.0 are available through Symantec File Connect. Update information for SES:CSP and SDCS:SA is available through TechNote INFO3743, http://www.symantec.com/docs/INFO3743 Symantec Response and Mitigations/Workarounds Symantec recommends customers upgrade to the latest version. However, if unable to upgrade immediately, there are some workarounds available to mitigate these issues related to SES:CSP/SDCS:SA server and Windows agents. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server SQL Injection Always configure out of the box prevention policy with local network information and apply it to the management server to limit access to local network or just security administrators. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal If a customer has another physical drive available, edit the DCS:SA Server configuration to change the bulk log files directory so the directory resides on a different physical drive than where the DCS:SA Server is installed. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent Symantec recommends upgrading the SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server in order to mitigate this vulnerability on the agent. Always configure out of the box prevention policy with local network information and apply it to the management server and agent to limit access to local network or just security administrators. SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection The latest Symantec Prevention policies contain mitigations for this vulnerability. Symantec recommends that customers upgrade their Prevention policies with the latest policies that are posted on Symantec File Connect. For Detection-only customers Symantec recommends to stop the Utility Service (SISIPSUtil) on the agent. Note that this will impact event viewer functionality on the agent. The updated DCS:SA policy packs published are: DCS:SA 6.6 MP1 SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.6.0-m6.0.0-2016060103.zip SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip SDCSSWorkloadPreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip SDCSSWorkloadPreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m6.0.0-2016060102.zip SDCSSvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip The updated DCS:SA policy packs included in Management Server packaging are: DCS:SA 6.5 MP1 SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m6.0.0-2016053103.zip SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip SDCSSvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.5.0-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip SCSP 5.2.9 MP6 SCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v5.2.9-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip SCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v5.2.9-m5.2.0-2016053101.zip SCSPvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v5.2.9-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip The updated SES:CSP policy packs published are: SES:CSP 1.0 MP1 SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v1.0.0-m1.0.0-2016053002.zip SES:CSP 6.5.0 HF1 SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m6.5.0-2016053112.zip SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v1.0.0-m1.0.0-2016053102.zip Best Practices As part of normal best practices, Symantec strongly recommends the following: Restrict access to administrative or management systems to authorized privileged users. Restrict remote access, if required, to trusted/authorized systems only. Run under the principle of least privilege where possible to limit the impact of potential exploit. Keep all operating systems and applications current with vendor patches. Follow a multi-layered approach to security. At a minimum, run both firewall and anti-malware applications to provide multiple points of detection and protection to both inbound and outbound threats. Deploy network- and host-based intrusion detection systems to monitor network traffic for signs of anomalous or suspicious activity. This may aid in the detection of attacks or malicious activity related to the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Credit Symantec would like to thank Matthias Kaiser and Markus Wulftange with Code White (http://www.code-white.com), for reporting these issues and working very closely with Symantec as they were addressed. References CVE: These issues are candidates for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/cve), which standardizes identifiers for security problems. BID: Symantec Security Focus, http://www.securityfocus.com, has assigned Bugtraq IDs (BIDs) to these issues for inclusion in the Security Focus vulnerability database. CVE BID Description CVE-2015-8157 90889 Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass CVE-2015-8798 90884 Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal CVE-2015-8799 90885 Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent CVE-2015-8800 90886 Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of our products very seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety (OISafety), Symantec supports and follows responsible disclosure guidelines. Please contact secure@symantec.com if you feel you have discovered a security issue in a Symantec product. A member of the Symantec Product Security team will contact you regarding your submission to coordinate any required response. Symantec strongly recommends using encrypted email for reporting vulnerability information to secure@symantec.com. The Symantec Product Security PGP key can be found at the location below. Symantec has developed a Product Vulnerability Response document outlining the process we follow in addressing suspected vulnerabilities in our products. This document is available below. Symantec Vulnerability Response Policy Symantec Product Vulnerability Management PGP Key Symantec Product Vulnerability Management PGP Key Copyright (c) 2016 by Symantec Corp. Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it is not edited in any way unless authorized by Symantec Product Security. Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than electronically requires permission from secure@symantec.com Disclaimer The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. Symantec, Symantec products, Symantec Product Security, and secure@symantec.com are registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or affiliated companies in the United States and other countries. All other registered and unregistered trademarks represented in this document are the sole property of their respective companies/owners. * Signature names may have been updated to comply with an updated IPS Signature naming convention. See http://www.symantec.com/business/support/index?page=content&id=TECH152794&key=54619&actp=LIST for more information. Last modified on: June 7, 2016 - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQIVAwUBV1pENYx+lLeg9Ub1AQj9rw//WNBVAuWcQBhsoy8hRHY6G7QJnCbIqMXi GumdPPE4Isz3hKg68IiMSFpcJxDh5MXaAtFb/Rtw5h+U9j9n2Z/OwXiNnzPybuUn kyURJ60xoiLYg7PUAyzDGb/NCQdEyfxiFNAu25i+EbehXJ+d1KCC5O0AE3iFRr0N QbFj5T4KpcDkUwxpVPrerAai4Vfas8VqTiGtyGXppsVQ10Tsb0PHdohRFcJqukCt 7kxV0NEGlsOQC6xMLc6utgh+rDmKxsQx8fHWkCmMEufJ4HlTP2hHCVkOmhvyKLYf rvMVy2qjY8a5S2t7Xtqh7dfvl52o8iMfciNXnRF9wiJqX0k+efUkT9an5Z/WwfqJ URtHp3qpeyhcXGooboQqrZhcjY3YArWDuzbAinY9z0x9vWzZs/8hWbsz9Lk95umA P2QJ45Ii/ao47kIPO/42nYvMoVt2wKOY+CJrplDKinI/BUlgb7MJwq19gGwC3B31 JzlEHbTA557JAPiIcmR5Qx1IbaXvfEELNgFoUJFMxPeoHJdgufdJsfFIhiekoT/5 4BvNDhpV+99udBgQjQ2XxB23cugSWEZDxdCTIPGpHs3Ni3BUuJkzm/gg1k4K0L8i fheSpm6GJjvEGjUiOiQ74nArdfSurXnwKCL732V9Bai4ZuJMHmDUE+N4TCBOS+ce 0dEJQoOEs9I= =H6WO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----