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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2018.0096.6 K91229003: Side-channel processor vulnerabilities CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753, and CVE-2017-5754 17 September 2018 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: F5 Products Publisher: F5 Networks Operating System: Network Appliance Impact/Access: Access Privileged Data -- Existing Account Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5715 Reference: ASB-2018.0002.4 ESB-2018.0090 ESB-2018.0089 ESB-2018.0046 ESB-2018.0044 ESB-2018.0042 Original Bulletin: https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K91229003 Revision History: September 17 2018: Updated "Security Advisory Status" section April 16 2018: Updated "Security Advisory Status" section April 5 2018: Updated "Security Advisory Status" section February 23 2018: Updated source text January 22 2018: Completed table outlining vulnerability of F5 products to SPECTRE and METLDOWN based on processor type January 9 2018: Initial Release - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- K91229003: Side-channel processor vulnerabilities CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753, and CVE-2017-5754 Security Advisory Original Publication Date: Jan 04, 2018 Updated Date: Sep 13, 2018 Security Advisory Description The following three side-channel attacks were publicly disclosed on January 3, 2018: o CVE-2017-5715 (also known as Spectre Variant 2) Branch target injection Systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and indirect branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis. o CVE-2017-5753 (also known as Spectre Variant 1) Bounds checking bypass Systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis. o CVE-2017-5754 (also known as Meltdown) Rogue data cache load Systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and indirect branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis of the data cache. Impact F5 continues to investigate the impact of the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities on our products. F5 is focused on providing patched releases as soon as we have fully tested and verified fixes. F5 will update this article with the most current information as soon as it is confirmed. BIG-IP First and foremost, there is no exposure on BIG-IP products by way of the data plane. All exposure is limited to the control plane (also known as the management plane). Furthermore, on the control plane, the vulnerabilities are exploitable only by four authorized, authenticated account roles: Administrator, Resource Administrator, Manager, and iRules Manager. You must be authorized to access the system in one of these roles to even attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities. All three vulnerabilities require an attacker who can provide and run binary code of their choosing on the BIG-IP platform. These conditions severely restrict the exposure risk of BIG-IP products. For single-tenancy products, such as a standalone BIG-IP appliance, the risk is limited to a local, authorized user using one of the vulnerabilities to read information from memory that they would not normally be able to access, exceeding their privileges. Effectively, the risk in a single-tenancy situation is that a user may be able to access kernel-space memory, instead of being limited to their own user-space. For multi-tenancy environments, such as cloud, VE, and Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP), the same local risk applies as with single-tenancy environments - local kernel memory access. Additionally, the risk of attacks across guests exists, or attacks against the hypervisor/host. In cloud and VE environments, preventing these new attacks falls on the hypervisor/host platform, outside the scope of F5's ability to support or patch. Please contact your cloud provider or hypervisor vendor to ensure their platforms or products are protected against Spectre and Meltdown. For vCMP environments, F5 believes that while the Spectre Variant 1 and Meltdown attacks do offer a theoretical possibility of guest-to-guest or guest-to-host attacks, these would be very difficult to successfully conduct in the BIG-IP environment. The primary risk in the vCMP environment comes from Spectre Variant 2, but this risk exists only when vCMP guests are configured to use a single core. If the vCMP guests are configured to use two or more cores, the Spectre Variant 2 vulnerability is eliminated. F5 is working with our hardware component vendors to determine the scope of vulnerabilities across our various generations of hardware platforms. All of the information we currently have from our vendors is represented in this Security Advisory. We are working to obtain the remaining information from our vendors and will update the security advisory as we receive new information regarding our hardware platforms. We are also testing the fixes produced by the Linux community. We are conducting an extensive test campaign to characterize the impact of the fixes on system performance and stability to ensure, as best we can, a good experience for our customers. We do not want to rush the process and release fixes without a full understanding of any potential issues. Given the limited exposure, as detailed above, the complexity of the fixes, and the potential issues that we and others have seen, we believe a detailed approach is warranted and that rushing a fix could result in an impact to system stability or unacceptable performance costs. We will update this article with details of our fixes as they become available. To determine which vulnerabilities affect each platform and the processor type each platform uses, refer to the following table. Note: In the following table, only one entry is shown for platform models that may have several variants. For example, BIG-IP 11000, BIG-IP 11050, BIG-IP 11050F, and BIG-IP 11050N are all vulnerable and included in the table as "BIG-IP 110x0". Some platforms may have multiple vendor processors, such as the iSeries platforms, which have one or more Intel core processors and may have a vulnerable ARM processor in one or more subsystems. F5 does not believe that ARM processors in these subsystems are accessible to attackers, unless some other code-execution vulnerability is present, but the information is being provided out of an abundance of caution. +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ | |Processor|Vulnerable to |Vulnerable to |Vulnerable to | |Model |type |CVE-2017-5753 |CVE-2017-5715 |CVE-2017-5754 | | | |Spectre Variant 1 |Spectre Variant 2 |Meltdown | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B21x0|Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B2250|Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B4100|AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B4200|AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B43x0|Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |VIPRION B44x0|Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 800 |Intel |Y** |N |Y** | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 1600 |Intel |Y** |N |Y** | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 3600 |Intel |Y** |N |Y** | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 3900 |Intel |Y** |N |Y** | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 2xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 4xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 5xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 7xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 10xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 12xx0 |Intel |Y |Y |Y | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP i2x00 |Intel, |Y |Y |Y | | |ARM | | | | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP i4x00 |Intel, |Y |Y |Y | | |ARM | | | | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP i5x00 |Intel, |Y |Y |Y | | |ARM | | | | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP i7x00 |Intel, |Y |Y |Y | | |ARM | | | | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP i10x00|Intel, |Y |Y |Y | | |ARM | | | | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 6400 |AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 6900 |AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 89x0 |AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ |BIG-IP 110x0 |AMD |Y |Y** |N | +-------------+---------+------------------+------------------+---------------+ ** Intel and AMD have not responded to requests for information relating to the specific processors used in these platforms. Therefore, based on their public statements and in the interests of security, F5 will proceed as if these platforms are vulnerable. Note: Platform models that have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) will not be evaluated. For more information, refer to K4309: F5 platform lifecycle support policy. BIG-IQ and Enterprise Manager Systems with microprocessors that use speculative execution and indirect branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access by way of a side-channel analysis. To determine which vulnerabilities affect each platform and the processor type each platform uses, refer to the following table. +----------+---------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------+ | |Processor|Vulnerable to |Vulnerable to |Vulnerable to | |Model |type |CVE-2017-5753 |CVE-2017-5715 |CVE-2017-5754 | | | |Spectre Variant 1 |Spectre Variant 2 |Meltdown | +----------+---------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |BIG-IQ |Intel |Y |Y |Y | |7000 | | | | | +----------+---------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |Enterprise| | | | | |Manager |Intel |Y** |N |Y** | |4000 | | | | | +----------+---------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------+ ** Intel has not responded to requests for information relating to the specific processors used in these platforms. Therefore, based on their public statements and in the interests of security, F5 will proceed as if these platforms are vulnerable. Note: Platform models that have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) will not be evaluated. For more information, refer to K4309: F5 platform lifecycle support policy. Traffix Systems with microprocessors that use speculative execution and indirect branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access by way of a side-channel analysis. LineRate Systems with microprocessors that use speculative execution and indirect branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access by way of a side-channel analysis. For products with None in the Versions known to be vulnerable column in the following table, there is no impact. Security Advisory Status F5 Product Development has assigned IDs 698651, 701445, 701447, 704490, and 704483 (BIG-IP); 702233, 702236, and 702237 (BIG-IQ); 702353, 702354, and 702355 (Enterprise Manager); 702355, 702377, and 702378 (iWorkflow); CPF-24782, CPF-24783, and CPF-24784 (Traffix); LRS-65859, LRS-65860, and LRS-65861 (LineRate) to this vulnerability. Additionally, BIG-IP iHealth may list Heuristic H91229003 on the Diagnostics > Identified > Medium page. To determine if your product and version have been evaluated for this vulnerability, refer to the Applies to (see versions) box. To determine if your release is known to be vulnerable, the components or features that are affected by the vulnerability, and for information about releases or hotfixes that address the vulnerability, refer to the following table. +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | |Versions |Fixes | | |Vulnerable| |Product |Branch|known to |introduced|Severity |CVSSv3 score^1 |component | | | |be |in | | |or feature| | | |vulnerable| | | | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ |BIG-IP (LTM, |13.x |13.0.0 - |13.1.0.4^2| | | | |AAM, AFM, | |13.1.0 |13.0.1^2 | | | | |Analytics, APM,+------+----------+----------+Medium | | | |ASM, DNS, Edge |12.x |12.1.0 - |12.1.3.3^2|(CVE-2017-5715)| | | |Gateway, | |12.1.3 | |Medium |6.4 CVE-2017-5715|CPU, BIOS,| |GTM, Link +------+----------+----------+(CVE-2017-5753)|5.3 CVE-2017-5753|and kernel| |Controller, | |11.6.1 - | |Medium |6.4 CVE-2017-5754| | |PEM, | |11.6.3 |11.6.3.1^2|(CVE-2017-5754)| | | |WebAccelerator,|11.x |11.5.1 - |11.5.6^2 | | | | |WebSafe) | |11.5.5 | | | | | | | |11.2.1 | | | | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | | | |Medium | | | | | | | |(CVE-2017-5715)|6.4 CVE-2017-5715| | |Enterprise |3.x |3.1.1 |None |Medium |5.3 CVE-2017-5753|CPU, BIOS,| |Manager | | | |(CVE-2017-5753)|6.4 CVE-2017-5754|and kernel| | | | | |Medium | | | | | | | |(CVE-2017-5754)| | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | | | |Medium | | | |BIG-IQ (Cloud, | | | |(CVE-2017-5715)|6.4 CVE-2017-5715| | |Device, |4.x |4.5.0 |None |Medium |5.3 CVE-2017-5753|CPU, BIOS,| |Security, ADC) | | | |(CVE-2017-5753)|6.4 CVE-2017-5754|and kernel| | | | | |Medium | | | | | | | |(CVE-2017-5754)| | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | |6.x |6.0.0 |6.0.1^2 |Medium | | | |BIG-IQ +------+----------+----------+(CVE-2017-5715)|6.4 CVE-2017-5715| | |Centralized |5.x |5.0.0 - |None |Medium |5.3 CVE-2017-5753|CPU, BIOS,| |Management | |5.4.0 | |(CVE-2017-5753)|6.4 CVE-2017-5754|and kernel| | +------+----------+----------+Medium | | | | |4.x |4.6.0 |None |(CVE-2017-5754)| | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | | | |Medium | | | |BIG-IQ Cloud | | | |(CVE-2017-5715)|6.4 CVE-2017-5715| | |and |1.x |1.0.0 |None |Medium |5.3 CVE-2017-5753|CPU, BIOS,| |Orchestration | | | |(CVE-2017-5753)|6.4 CVE-2017-5754|and kernel| | | | | |Medium | | | | | | | |(CVE-2017-5754)| | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | |2.3.0 | |Medium | | | | | |2.2.0 | |(CVE-2017-5715)|6.4 CVE-2017-5715| | |F5 iWorkflow |2.x |2.1.0 |None |Medium |5.3 CVE-2017-5753|CPU, BIOS,| | | |2.0.1 - | |(CVE-2017-5753)|6.4 CVE-2017-5754|and kernel| | | |2.0.2 | |Medium | | | | | | | |(CVE-2017-5754)| | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ |LineRate |2.x |2.6.0 |None |Medium |** |CPU, BIOS,| | | | | | | |and kernel| +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ | | | |Security | | | | | | | |bulletin | | | | | | | |build 93 | | | | | |5.x |5.0.0 - |(5.1.0) |Medium |6.7 | | | | |5.1.0 |Security |(CVE-2017-5715)|(CVE-2017-5715) | | | | | |bulletin |High |8.2 |CPU, BIOS,| |Traffix SDC | | |build 32 |(CVE-2017-5753)|(CVE-2017-5753) |and kernel| | | | |(5.0.0) |High |7.9 | | | +------+----------+----------+(CVE-2017-5754)|(CVE-2017-5754) | | | | | |Security | | | | | |4.x |4.0.0 - |bulletin | | | | | | |4.4.0 |build 14 | | | | | | | |(4.4.0) | | | | +---------------+------+----------+----------+---------------+-----------------+----------+ ^1 The CVSSv3 score link takes you to a resource outside of AskF5, and it is possible that the document may be removed without our knowledge. ^2 Notes about fixes for CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1) and CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown): Important: F5 does not plan to release an official fix for CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2) that is based on Intel's microcode updates. The rationale for this decision is based on significant performance degradation when enabling Intel's microcode fixes in our platforms. During testing of the microcode fix, F5 has observed from 10 percent to more than 50 percent performance degradation for many workloads. However, F5 is reviewing the use of "retpolines" to mitigate the CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre Variant 2) vulnerability in a future BIG-IP release. The use of "retpoline" fixes requires a new compiler toolchain, which makes them unsuitable candidates for backport. Important: Only CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown) is fixed in BIG-IQ. o Performance impact: - CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre Variant 1) F5 does not anticipate a performance impact as a result of the fix for CVE-2017-5753 Spectre Variant 1. - CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown) In most scenarios, the fix for Meltdown has a negligible performance impact. F5 recommends testing the performance impact before deploying the fix in a production environment, or testing the fix during a maintenance window with consideration to the possible impact on your specific environment. If you encounter unacceptable performance issues in testing and choose to disable the Meltdown fix, you can do so by typing the following command: tmsh modify sys db kernel.pti value disable Note: This database variable change is applied without requirement for a reboot. Important: If you choose to disable the Meltdown fix, the system will be vulnerable to the Meltdown vulnerability. However, in order to take advantage of this vulnerability, the attacker must already possess the ability to run arbitrary code on the system. For non-vCMP systems, good access controls and keeping your system up-to-date with security fixes will mitigate this risk. For vCMP systems with multiple tenants, F5 recommends that you leave the Meltdown fix enabled. o Virtual F5 products/vCMP guests: The Meltdown and Spectre Variant 1 fixes block the ability for those exploits to be executed on the patched OS. If the exploit allows cross-VM boundary information leaks, then a fixed VM is still vulnerable to attacks from a non-fixed VM or the host. Therefore, it is important to apply fixes to both guest VMs and the host that runs them. o Known issues: Due to a known issue with the Meltdown fix on BIG-IP platforms equipped with an AMD processor, the system may spontaneously reboot. Refer to the table in the Impact section for information about which BIG-IP platforms have an AMD processor. F5 Product Development has assigned ID 719711 to this issue. To work around the issue, you can disable the Meltdown fix (BIG-IP platforms with an AMD processor are not vulnerable to Meltdown per the table in the Impact section). To do so, perform the following procedure: Note: Performing the procedure to disable kernel page-table isolation does not disable the Spectre Variant 1 fix. 1. Log in to the BIG-IP command line. 2. Disable the kernel page-table isolation (PTI) database key by typing the following command: tmsh modify sys db kernel.pti value disable 3. Reboot the BIG-IP system by typing the following command: reboot Note: A reboot is required for this workaround. Important: This command will interrupt traffic while the BIG-IP system either fails over to a peer system or completes the reboot process. Security Advisory Recommended Actions If you are running a version listed in the Versions known to be vulnerable column, you can eliminate this vulnerability by upgrading to a version listed in the Fixes introduced in column. If the table lists only an older version than what you are currently running, or does not list a non-vulnerable version, then no upgrade candidate currently exists. Mitigation BIG-IP The only roles on a BIG-IP system that can exploit these vulnerabilities are the Administrator, Resource Administrator, Manager, and iRules Manager roles. To mitigate against all three vulnerabilities, ensure that you limit access to these roles to only trusted employees. To mitigate the Spectre Variant 2 vulnerability in multi-tenancy vCMP configurations, ensure that all guests are set to at least two Cores Per Guest. Traffix SDC Fixes for CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753, and CVE-2017-5754 are available from F5 via the following security bulletins for Traffix SDC 5.1.0, 5.0.0, and 4.4.0: o 5.1.0 - security bulletin build 93 o 5.0.0 - security bulletin build 32 o 4.4.0 - security bulletin build 14 For more information, contact your Traffix SDC Technical Support representative. Supplemental Information o https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/2018/01/ reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html Note: This link takes you to a resource outside of AskF5. The third party could remove the document without our knowledge. o https://meltdownattack.com/ Note: This link takes you to a resource outside of AskF5. The third party could remove the document without our knowledge. o K51812227: Understanding Security Advisory versioning o K9970: Subscribing to email notifications regarding F5 products o K9957: Creating a custom RSS feed to view new and updated documents o K4602: Overview of the F5 security vulnerability response policy o K4918: Overview of the F5 critical issue hotfix policy o K9502: BIG-IP hotfix and point release matrix - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. 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