Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2020.0241
Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller Out Of
Band Management IP Tables Bypass Vulnerability
24 January 2020
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC)
Publisher: Cisco Systems
Operating System: Cisco
Impact/Access: Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2020-3139
Original Bulletin:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller Out Of Band Management IP
Tables Bypass Vulnerability
Priority: Medium
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL
First Published: 2020 January 22 16:00 GMT
Version 1.0: Final
Workarounds: No workarounds availableCisco Bug IDs: CSCvs10135
CVE-2020-3139
CWE-20
CVSS Score:
5.3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:X/RL:X/RC:X
Summary
o [CVE-2020-3139_su]
A vulnerability in the out of band (OOB) management interface IP table rule
programming for Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC)
could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass configured deny
entries for specific IP ports. These IP ports would be permitted to the OOB
management interface when, in fact, the packets should be dropped.
The vulnerability is due to the configuration of specific IP table entries
for which there is a programming logic error that results in the IP port
being permitted. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending
traffic to the OOB management interface on the targeted device. A
successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured IP table
rules to drop specific IP port traffic. The attacker has no control over
the configuration of the device itself.
Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There
are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is available at the following link:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/
cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL
[/CVE-2020-3139_su]
Affected Products
o [CVE-2020-3139_ap]
[/CVE-2020-3139_ap]
Vulnerable Products
[CVE-2020-3139_vp]
At the time of publication, this vulnerability affected Cisco APIC releases
prior to the first fixed software Release 4.2(3j).
See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for
the most complete and current information.
[/CVE-2020-3139_vp]
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
[CVE-2020-3139_nv]
Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory
are known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Cisco has confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect Nexus 9000
Series Fabric Switches in Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) mode.
[/CVE-2020-3139_nv]
Details
o [CVE-2020-3139_de]
The result of this vulnerability is that the UI CLI command acidiag run
iptables-list will show that the IP port number is configured for deny but
that configuration setting was not actually properly programmed.
For additional information on how to secure the OOB management interface,
see Securing Management Access .
[/CVE-2020-3139_de]
Workarounds
o [CVE-2020-3139_wa]
There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
[/CVE-2020-3139_wa]
Fixed Software
o [CVE-2020-3139_fs]
When considering software upgrades , customers are advised to regularly
consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the
Cisco Security Advisories and Alerts page , to determine exposure and a
complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded
contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software
configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release.
If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance
providers.
[/CVE-2020-3139_fs]
[CVE-2020-3139_fs]
Fixed Releases
At the time of publication, Cisco APIC Release 4.2(3j) and later contained
the fix for this vulnerability.
See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for
the most complete and current information.
[/CVE-2020-3139_fs]
Exploitation and Public Announcements
o [CVE-2020-3139_ex]
The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of
any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is
described in this advisory.
[/CVE-2020-3139_ex]
Source
o [CVE-2020-3139_vs]
This vulnerability was found during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support
case.
[/CVE-2020-3139_vs]
Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy
o To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and
publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy . This document also
contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security
vulnerability information from Cisco.
URL
o https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/
cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL
Revision History
o +----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+
| Version | Description | Section | Status | Date |
+----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+
| 1.0 | Initial public release. | - | Final | 2020-JAN-22 |
+----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967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=tIDr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----