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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2020.0627
ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-049-02)
21 February 2020
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
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Product: GE Ultrasound products
Publisher: ICS-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Unauthorised Access -- Console/Physical
Resolution: Mitigation
CVE Names: CVE-2020-6977
Original Bulletin:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-20-049-02
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ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-049-02)
GE Ultrasound products
Original release date: February 18, 2020
Legal Notice
All information products included in https://us-cert.gov/ics are provided"as
is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained
within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in
this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by
the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information
about TLP, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/ .
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
o CVSS v3 6.8
o ATTENTION: Low skill level to exploit
o Vendor: GE
o Equipment: Ultrasound Products
o Vulnerability: Protection Mechanism Failure
2. RISK EVALUATION
The affected GE Healthcare ultrasound devices utilize a method of software
application implementation called "Kiosk Mode." This Kiosk Mode is vulnerable
to local breakouts, which could allow an attacker with physical access to gain
access to the operating system of affected devices.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of GE ultrasound products are affected:
o Vivid products, all versions
o LOGIQ, all versions, not including LOGIQ 100 Pro
o Voluson, all versions
o Versana Essential, all versions
o Invenia ABUS Scan station, all versions
o Venue, all versions, not including Venue 40 R1-3 and Venue 50 R4-5
3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
3.2.1 PROTECTIONS MECHANISM FAILURE CWE-693
A restricted desktop environment escape vulnerability exists in the Kiosk Mode
functionality of affected devices. Specially crafted inputs can allow the user
to escape the restricted environment, resulting in access to the underlying
operating system.
CVE-2020-6977 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:H/I:H/A:H ).
3.3 BACKGROUND
o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
o COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: United States
3.4 RESEARCHER
This vulnerability was first reported to GE Healthcare by researchers Marc Ruef
and Rocco Gagliardi of scip AG. Additional reports were provided to GE
Healthcare by Michael Aguilar of Secureworks and Jonathan Bouman of
Protozoan.nl.
4. MITIGATIONS
GE Healthcare recommends organizations restrict physical access to devices by
unauthorized individuals. Additionally, where available, GE recommends users
enable the "system lock" password in the Administration GUI menu if possible.
This will require a password to be entered before the system can be accessed.
The 'system lock' would limit non-authenticated users from accessing the
application.
GE recommends that users with questions reach out to a GE service
representative and users with an active support account visit https://
securityupdate.gehealthcare.com (login required).
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:
o Ensure there is physical protections in place to prevent the devices from
any unauthorized access.
o Encourage security awareness throughout the hospital staff to ensure
clinical staff will report any unauthorized person trying to login or
otherwise tamper with a medical device.
o Educate employees on social engineering, both online and in-person/on-site.
This is often used to gain confidence to unauthorized resources.
o Where additional information is needed, refer to existing cybersecurity in
medical device guidance issued by the FDA.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov . Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. This
vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:
Email: CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by
choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.
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