Published:
17 May 2001
Protect yourself against future threats.
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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2001.206 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-027
Flaws in Web Server Certificate Validation Could Enable Spoofing
18 May 2001
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Internet Explorer 5.01
Internet Explorer 5.5
Vendor: Microsoft
Impact: Provide Misleading Information
Access Required: Remote
Ref: ESB-2001.131
ESB-2000.101
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Title: Flaws in Web Server Certificate Validation Could
Enable Spoofing
Date: 16 May 2001
Software: Internet Explorer
Impact: Spoofing of trusted web site
Bulletin: MS01-027
Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-027.asp.
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Issue:
======
A patch is available to eliminate two newly discovered
vulnerabilities
affecting Internet Explorer, both of which could enable an attacker
to
spoof trusted web sites. The first vulnerability involves how digital
certificates from web servers are validated. When CRL checking for
such
certificates is enabled, it could be possible for any or all of the
following checks to no longer be performed:
- Verification that the certificate has not expired
- Verification that the server name matches the name on the
certificate
- Verification that the issuer of the certificate is trusted
The second vulnerability could enable a web page to display the URL
from a different web site in the IE address bar. This spoofing could
occur within a valid SSL session with the impersonated site. Both
vulnerabilities could be used to convince a user that the attacker's
web site was actually a different one - one that the user presumably
trusts and would provide sensitive information to. However, as
discussed in the Mitigating Factors section below, there would be
significant hurdles to exploiting either vulnerability.
In addition to eliminating the two new vulnerabilities, the patch
also
eliminates two new variants of a previously discussed vulnerability,
the "Frame Domain Verification" vulnerability, which originally was
discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-033. Like the original
version, these new variants vulnerability could enable a malicious
web
site operator to open two browser windows, one in the web site's
domain
and the other on the user's local file system, and to pass
information
from the latter to the former. This could enable the web site
operator
to read any file on the user's local computer that could be opened in
a
browser window.
The patch also incorporates the functionality of the patch provided
in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-020
(http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-020.asp).
Mitigating Factors:
====================
Server certificate validation vulnerability:
- The vulnerability only affects how certificates from web
servers are validated. It does not affect how code-signing
certificates or any other type of certificate are validated.
- The specific checks that might be bypassed vary with both
the user and the actions she may have taken during the
current browsing session. An attacker could not predict with
any degree of certainty which checks might be bypassed in a
particular case.
- The vulnerability does not provide any way to force users
to the attacker's web site. It is likely that this
vulnerability could only be exploited in conjunction with a
successful DNS poisoning or similar attack.
Web page spoofing vulnerability:
- Like the vulnerability above, this vulnerability would not
provide any way to force users to the attacker's web site,
and DNS poisoning or other measures would likely be required
to exploit it.
- Any hyperlinks within the page would correctly show the target.
As a result, the attacker would need to point these to bona
fide locations on the spoofed web site, with the result that
the attacker would likely only be able to spoof a single web
page, rather than an entire site.
New variants of "Frame Domain Verification" vulnerability:
- The vulnerability could only be used to read - not add, delete
or change - files.
- The attacker would need to know the exact name and location of
every file he wished to read.
- The vulnerability could only be used to read file types that
can be opened within a browser window - for example, .htm,
.txt or .doc files, but not .exe or .xls files.
Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
Security Bulletin
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-027.asp
for information on obtaining this patch.
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THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED
"AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT
SHALL
MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
LOSS
OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION
OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES.
SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR
CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY
NOT
APPLY.
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