AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                   ESB-2001.354 -- FreeBSD-SA-01:53.ipfw
            ipfw `me' on P2P interfaces matches remote address
                              20 August 2001


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:                ipfw
Vendor:                 FreeBSD
Operating System:       FreeBSD 4-STABLE after February 20, 2001 and prior
                        to the correction date
                        FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE
Impact:                 Reduced Security
Access Required:        Remote

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FreeBSD-SA-01:53                                           Security Advisory
                                                                FreeBSD, Inc.

Topic:          ipfw `me' on P2P interfaces matches remote address

Category:       core
Module:         ipfw
Announced:      2001-08-17
Credits:        Igor M Podlesny <poige@morning.ru>
Affects:        FreeBSD 4-STABLE after February 20, 2001 and prior
                to the correction date
                FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE
Corrected:      2001-07-17 10:50:01 UTC (FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE)
                2001-07-18 06:56:23 UTC (RELENG_4_3)
FreeBSD only:   YES

I.   Background

ipfw is a system facility which allows IP packet filtering,
redirecting, and traffic accounting.  ipfw `me' rules are filter rules
that specify a source or destination address of `me', intended to
match any IP address configured on a local interface.

II.  Problem Description

A flaw in the implementation of the ipfw `me' rules when used in
conjunction with point-to-point interfaces results in filter rules
which match the remote IP address of the point-to-point interface in
addition to the intended local IP address.

III. Impact

IP datagrams with a source or destination IP address of a remote
point-to-point link may be handled in a way unintended by the system

For example, given an interface such as

  tun0: flags=8051<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
          inet --> netmask 0xff000000

and this ipfw rule:

  00010 allow ip from me to any

packets with a source address of would be allowed to pass when
the administrator may have reasonably expected it not to match this

IV.  Workaround

Do not use ipfw `me' rules.  Rewrite any existing `me' rules to use
explicit IP addresses.

V.   Solution

One of the following:

1) Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 4.3-STABLE or the
RELENG_4_3 security branch after the respective correction dates.

2) FreeBSD 4.x systems prior to the correction date:

The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD
4.3-RELEASE and 4-STABLE dated prior to the correction date.

Download the patch and the detached PGP signature from the following
locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility.

# fetch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:53/ipfw.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:53/ipfw.patch.asc

# cd /usr/src
# patch -p < /path/to/patch
# install -c -m 0444 -o root -g wheel /usr/src/sys/netinet/in_var.h /usr/include/netinet/
# cd /usr/src/sbin/ipfw
# make depend && make all install

The following steps will be different depending upon whether your
system has ipfw compiled into the kernel or is using the ipfw KLD.  If
the output of `kldstat' includes `ipfw.ko', then you are using the KLD
and should follow the directions listed in (2a) below.  Otherwise, if
your kernel configuration file contains the line `options IPFIREWALL',
you should follow the directions listed in (2b) below.

2a) Execute the following commands as root:

# cd /usr/src/sys/modules/ipfw
# make depend && make all install

2b) Rebuild and reinstall your kernel as described in

In either case 2a) or 2b), you must reboot your system to load the new
module or kernel.

3) FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems:

An experimental upgrade package is available for users who wish to
provide testing and feedback on the binary upgrade process.  This
package may be installed on FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems only, and is
intended for use on systems for which source patching is not practical
or convenient.

If you use the upgrade package, feedback (positive or negative) to
security-officer@FreeBSD.org is requested so we can improve the
process for future advisories.

During the installation procedure, backup copies are made of the
files which are replaced by the package.  These backup copies will
be reinstalled if the package is removed, reverting the system to a
pre-patched state.

# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:53/security-patch-ipfw-01.53.tgz
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:53/security-patch-ipfw-01.53.tgz.asc

Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

# pkg_add security-patch-ipfw-01:53.tgz

Restart your system after applying the patch.

VI.   Correction details

The following list contains the $FreeBSD$ revision numbers of each
file that was corrected, for the supported branches of FreeBSD.  The
$FreeBSD$ revision of installed sources can be examined using the
ident(1) command.

[FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE]

  Revision  Path  src/sys/netinet/in_var.h


  Revision  Path  src/sys/netinet/in_var.h

VII.  References

Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org


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