Protect yourself against future threats.
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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2001.354 -- FreeBSD-SA-01:53.ipfw
ipfw `me' on P2P interfaces matches remote address
20 August 2001
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: ipfw
Vendor: FreeBSD
Operating System: FreeBSD 4-STABLE after February 20, 2001 and prior
to the correction date
FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE
Impact: Reduced Security
Access Required: Remote
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FreeBSD-SA-01:53 Security Advisory
FreeBSD, Inc.
Topic: ipfw `me' on P2P interfaces matches remote address
Category: core
Module: ipfw
Announced: 2001-08-17
Credits: Igor M Podlesny <poige@morning.ru>
Affects: FreeBSD 4-STABLE after February 20, 2001 and prior
to the correction date
FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE
Corrected: 2001-07-17 10:50:01 UTC (FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE)
2001-07-18 06:56:23 UTC (RELENG_4_3)
FreeBSD only: YES
I. Background
ipfw is a system facility which allows IP packet filtering,
redirecting, and traffic accounting. ipfw `me' rules are filter rules
that specify a source or destination address of `me', intended to
match any IP address configured on a local interface.
II. Problem Description
A flaw in the implementation of the ipfw `me' rules when used in
conjunction with point-to-point interfaces results in filter rules
which match the remote IP address of the point-to-point interface in
addition to the intended local IP address.
III. Impact
IP datagrams with a source or destination IP address of a remote
point-to-point link may be handled in a way unintended by the system
administrator.
For example, given an interface such as
tun0: flags=8051<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet 1.1.1.1 --> 2.2.2.2 netmask 0xff000000
and this ipfw rule:
00010 allow ip from me to any
packets with a source address of 2.2.2.2 would be allowed to pass when
the administrator may have reasonably expected it not to match this
rule.
IV. Workaround
Do not use ipfw `me' rules. Rewrite any existing `me' rules to use
explicit IP addresses.
V. Solution
One of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 4.3-STABLE or the
RELENG_4_3 security branch after the respective correction dates.
2) FreeBSD 4.x systems prior to the correction date:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD
4.3-RELEASE and 4-STABLE dated prior to the correction date.
Download the patch and the detached PGP signature from the following
locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:53/ipfw.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:53/ipfw.patch.asc
# cd /usr/src
# patch -p < /path/to/patch
# install -c -m 0444 -o root -g wheel /usr/src/sys/netinet/in_var.h /usr/include/netinet/
# cd /usr/src/sbin/ipfw
# make depend && make all install
The following steps will be different depending upon whether your
system has ipfw compiled into the kernel or is using the ipfw KLD. If
the output of `kldstat' includes `ipfw.ko', then you are using the KLD
and should follow the directions listed in (2a) below. Otherwise, if
your kernel configuration file contains the line `options IPFIREWALL',
you should follow the directions listed in (2b) below.
2a) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src/sys/modules/ipfw
# make depend && make all install
2b) Rebuild and reinstall your kernel as described in
http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html
In either case 2a) or 2b), you must reboot your system to load the new
module or kernel.
3) FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems:
An experimental upgrade package is available for users who wish to
provide testing and feedback on the binary upgrade process. This
package may be installed on FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems only, and is
intended for use on systems for which source patching is not practical
or convenient.
If you use the upgrade package, feedback (positive or negative) to
security-officer@FreeBSD.org is requested so we can improve the
process for future advisories.
During the installation procedure, backup copies are made of the
files which are replaced by the package. These backup copies will
be reinstalled if the package is removed, reverting the system to a
pre-patched state.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:53/security-patch-ipfw-01.53.tgz
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:53/security-patch-ipfw-01.53.tgz.asc
Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# pkg_add security-patch-ipfw-01:53.tgz
Restart your system after applying the patch.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the $FreeBSD$ revision numbers of each
file that was corrected, for the supported branches of FreeBSD. The
$FreeBSD$ revision of installed sources can be examined using the
ident(1) command.
[FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE]
Revision Path
1.33.4.1 src/sys/netinet/in_var.h
[RELENG_4_3]
Revision Path
1.33.2.2 src/sys/netinet/in_var.h
VII. References
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/src/sys/netinet/in_var.h#rev1.39>
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