Published:
12 December 2005
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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2005.0977 -- iDefense Security Advisory 12.07.05
Dell TrueMobile 2300 Wireless Broadband Router
Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
12 December 2005
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
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Product: Dell TrueMobile 2300 Wireless Broadband Router
Publisher: iDEFENSE
Impact: Administrator Compromise
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2005-3661
Original Bulletin: http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=348
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Dell TrueMobile 2300 Wireless Broadband Router Authentication Bypass
Vulnerability
iDefense Security Advisory 12.07.05
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=348&type=vulnerabilities
December 7, 2005
I. BACKGROUND
The Dell TrueMobile 2300 Wireless Broadband Router is an 802.11b/g
wireless access point, wired ethernet switch and internet router. More
information can be found at the following URL:
http://support.dell.com/support/edocs/network/p57205/en/intro/index.htm
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of a design error in Dell Inc.'s TrueMobile 2300
Wireless Router may allow an attacker to reset the authentication
credentials.
The Dell TrueMobile 2300 is a wireless router and access point. By
requesting the following url from the router, it is possible to obtain
a page containing a form which allows you to reset the authentication
credentials. (The IP is typically 192.168.2.1, and [ROUTER IP] should
be replace by the router's actual address.)
http://[ROUTER IP]/apply.cgi?Page=adv_password.asp&action=ClearLog
Although dialog boxes for entering the username and password appear,
pressing cancel will not prevent this exploit from working.
III. ANALYSIS
Exploitation could allow remote attackers to associate with the
internal side of the router to change any configuration settings,
including uploading of new firmware.
The precise cause of the error is unknown. Although there is GPL
source code available for this product, the firmware's source code
version has not been kept up to date with the binary version. As a
result, it does not directly allow the cause of the vulnerability to
be determined.
Based on analysis of the affected binary, /usr/sbin/httpd, and the
previous version of the source code it appears the cause is a logic
error involving the 'ClearLog' string being checked without first
ascertaining that the page was one where that made sense. Although
the binary appears to be largely the same code as the available source
code, there are many differences. In the binary version, the
authentication is not performed in the same order as in the source
version. It is likely that the determination of which pages to check
is now done on the basis of the 'action' variable, rather than the
previous method of using the page name.
IV. DETECTION
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the
following Dell TrueMobile 2300 firmware versions:
• 3.0.0.8, dated 07/24/2003
• 5.1.1.6, dated 1/31/2004
Previous versions of this may also be affected, however it is not
clear in which version the vulnerability was introduced.
V. WORKAROUND
In order to mitigate exposure to this vulnerability from remote
attackers, employ encryption on your wireless interface, or disable it
if it is not required. The exact settings to use are dependant on your
wireless security policy. This workaround does not prevent exploitation
from the local network via wired interfaces.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
"The vendor is no longer selling this product and has replaced it with
newer models that do not exhibit the defect. Therefore, a patch will not
be released to address this issue."
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2005-3661 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
11/17/2005 Initial vendor notification
11/18/2005 Initial vendor response
12/07/2005 Public disclosure
IX. CREDIT
TNull is credited with the discovery of this vulnerability.
Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.iDefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp
Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.iDefense.com
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright © 2005 iDefense, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@iDefense.com for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.
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