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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2006.0633 -- [Win][Appliance]
Compression Plus and Tumbleweed EMF Stack Overflow Security Advisory
5 September 2006
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Product: Compression Plus
Drag and Zip, Power File, and Power File Gold
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
Original Bulletin: http://www.mnin.org/advisories/2006_cp5_tweed.pdf
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Compression Plus and Tumbleweed EMF
Stack Overflow Security Advisory
The Compression Plus library is designed to handle de/compression of popular
archiving formats such as ARC, ARK, PAK, ARJ, CAB, GZ, LBR, TAR, TAZ, TGZ, Z,
ZIP, and ZOO. The code fails to properly validate input while processing
specially crafted ZOO files, which results in a stack-based buffer overflow.
Software products that implement the Compression Plus library are vulnerable to
local or remote code execution, depending on the nature of the calling process.
Due to the modular nature and availability of the Compression Plus code, any
programs which load the library and call its ZOO-processing exports are
affected by this vulnerability. Exploits have been tested successfully on the
following products; however the list is not exhaustive.
Software Title Version(s) Vendor & Product URL Perspective
Compression Plus All versions BeCubed Software N/A
Tumbleweed EMF All versions Tumbleweed Communications Remote
PowerDesk Pro All versions VCOM/Ontrack Local
Drag and Zip, Power All versions Canyon Software Local
File, and Power
Arbitrary code can be executed on vulnerable systems with a privilege level
equal to the calling process, which by default is SYSTEM on Tumbleweed EMF
servers. For all others, an attackers code will run with the privileges of the
current logged-in user.
Credit and Contact
Michael Ligh email@example.com
Greg Sinclair firstname.lastname@example.org
Amanda Wright email@example.com
There are several factors of this vulnerability that not only increase the
simplicity of exploiting affected software, but make it more difficult for a
defender to detect or trace the attack. As a result, exploitation can be
conducted with high reliability and with little chance of IDS or IPS
An attacker can supply up to 32KB of custom shell code or any combination of
shell code plus binary data (e.g. an additional trojan program) to be executed
on the target. There are no limitations involving NULL bytes in the payload.
Furthermore, control over EIP can be gained without hard coding addresses on
the stack or using NOP instruction sleds.
The specially crafted ZOO files retain compliance with legitimate ZOO file
format, so IDS signatures based on protocol anomalies or specific header values
will not be sufficient for detection. Email attachment and HTTP/FTP download
filtering based on file extension is also not applicable, because the
vulnerability is not extension-specific.
The traceability of an attackers actions can be influenced by routing malicious
ZOO files through a series of open SMTP proxies. With the exception of
Tumbleweed EMF, which does not require any user interaction to successfully
exploit, an attacker would need to convince recipients to open/decompress the
ZOO file from within a vulnerable program.
This vulnerability exists because the nNumberOfBytesToRead parameter to
ReadFile() is obtained from user-supplied data and there is no check to see if
its length exceeds the size of the destination buffer. A value as high as 7FFFh
can be passed to ReadFile(), however one must only specify 39Ch bytes to
overwrite the functions return pointer on the stack. The following code from a
Compression Plus library is shown below to illustrate the vulnerability.
.text:1040A71B movsx eax, word ptr [ebp+ZooHeader+24h]
.text:1040A71F push eax ; nNumberOfBytesToRead
.text:1040A720 lea eax, [ebp+var_394]
.text:1040A726 push eax ; lpBuffer
.text:1040A727 push [ebp+ZooHeader+88h]
.text:1040A72A call _ReadFileWrapper
The code should verify that the user-supplied dword at ZooHeader+24h is not
larger than the number of bytes reserved for the destination buffer. BeCubed
Software has released an updated Compression Plus DLL that complies with this
remediation technique. The fix can be obtained from
http://www.becubed.com/support.htm. In addition, the Tumbleweed Hotfix can be
obtained from https://kb1.tumbelweed.com/article.asp?article=4175&p=2.
Jul 12, 2006 Began research and testing
Jul 25, 2006 Advisory drafted
Jul 26, 2006 Primary vendor (BeCubed) contacted
Aug 01, 2006 Primary vendor released a fixed DLL
Aug 01, 2006 Secondary vendor(s) contacted
Aug 22, 2006 Tumbleweed releases Hotfix for EMF 6.2.2
The scared Scooby Doo image was taken from:
The code snippet was extracted from the disassembly pane of IDA Pro:
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License. To
view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/
or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San
Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
Attribution should be provided both in the form of a link or reference to
http://www.mnin.org and a copy of the researchers names listed under the Credit
and Contact section of this document.
All other trademarks and copyrights referenced in this document are the
property of their respective owners.
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