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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2008.0444 -- [Appliance] Motorola Surfboard cable modem cross-site request forgery vulnerability 30 April 2008 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Motorola Surfboard cable mode Publisher: US-CERT Operating System: Network Appliance Impact: Cross-site Request Forgery Access: Remote/Unauthenticated CVE Names: CVE-2008-2002 Original Bulletin: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/643049 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Vulnerability Note VU#643049 Motorola Surfboard cable modem cross-site request forgery vulnerability Overview Motorola Surfboard cable modems may contain a cross-site request forgery vulnerability that allows an attacker to cause an affected modem to reboot or reload its configuration. I. Description Cable modems are designed to deliver broadband Internet access via unused bandwidth on a cable television network. Some models of Motorola Surfboard cable modems have a web interface that can be used to view log files, check signal levels, restart the modem, and reload the modem's configuration. This web interface listens on a private (RFC 1918) IP address, and can not be accessed via the Internet. Users conntected to the modem's LAN interface access the interface via a web browser. Because the interface uses no authentication, other than binding to a private IP address, the Motorola Surfboard may be vulnerable to various cross-site request forgery (XSRF) vulnerabilities. Note that to exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to convince a user to visit a specially crafted web page or open an HTML formatted email. II. Impact A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to take any action that an authorized user can including restarting the cable modem, or forcing it to reload its configuration file. While a cable modem is rebooting systems that rely on the affected modem will have limited ability to access the Internet. III. Solution We are currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem. Restrict access Restricting access to the Surfboard's web interface by using proxy filtering rules, router access control lists or firewall rules will mitigate this vulnerability. To effectively block access, the rules must prevent users on the LAN side of the cable modem from connecting to the web interface's IP address (usually 192.168.100.1). Systems Affected Vendor Status Date Updated Motorola, Inc. Vulnerable 29-Apr-2008 References http://www.rooksecurity.com/blog/?p=4 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918 http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSRF http://www.visolve.com/squid/squid24s1/access_controls.php Credit Thanks to the Rook Security blog for information that was used in this report. This document was written by Ryan Giobbi. Other Information Date Public 17/04/2008 Date First Published 29/04/2008 14:10:15 Date Last Updated 29/04/2008 CERT Advisory CVE Name US-CERT Technical Alerts Metric 13.50 Document Revision 15 - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. 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Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQCVAwUBSBfvWCh9+71yA2DNAQIjeQQAjPH69tPDnWMKUqTZM64Y56+JbzlWd0wD jw/+Aa/NUW+DjVGhTX4+DVQp4wN8veuQSF/yIdzsgEXY5Z1EFHpioZ0N4k868+p2 O6pScPZpf6s+wKCYVVQvsEGgrBauput8gdyclJCCOcmuOZOpqXwezMbh2EjTAgJU 8br5j+IFJzo= =FYyH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----