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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2008.0476 -- [Linux][Solaris]
A Security Vulnerability in Sun Ray Kiosk Mode 4.0 May Allow
Escalation of Privileges
9 May 2008
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Product: Ray Server Software 4.0
Publisher: Sun Microsystems
Operating System: Solaris
Impact: Root Compromise
CVE Names: CVE-2008-2112
Comment: This advisory references vulnerabilities in products which run on
platforms other than Solaris. It is recommended that administrators
running Sun Ray Server check for an updated version of the software
for their operating system.
Revision History: May 9 2008: Added CVE
May 8 2008: Initial Release
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Solution Type: Sun Alert
Solution 236944 : A Security Vulnerability in Sun Ray Kiosk Mode
4.0 May Allow Escalation of Privileges
Bug ID: 6612948
Sun Ray Server Software 4.0
Date of Resolved Release: 06-May-2008
SA Document Body
A Security Vulnerability in Sun Ray Kiosk Mode 4.0 May Allow Escalation of
A security vulnerability in the Sun Ray Kiosk Mode software included
with Sun Ray Server Software (SRSS) 4.0 may allow a local or remote
user with Sun Ray administration privileges to execute arbitrary
commands with root privileges.
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for Solaris 10) without patch
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for Solaris 10) without patch
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for RHEL AS 4, SLES 9) without patch
1. Sun Ray Server Software 3.1.1, Sun Ray Server Software 3.1 and
earlier releases of Sun Ray Server Software are not affected.
2. This issue only affects systems which have the Sun Ray Server
Software installed and Sun Ray Kiosk Mode configured and enabled.
Kiosk mode is enabled if the -k <type> option is present in the
current policy, where <type> may be 'pseudo', 'card' or 'both'.
Example output, if kiosk mode is enabled for non-smartcard sessions:
# Current Policy:
-a -z both -k pseudo -g
To determine if kiosk mode is enabled for individual tokens,
regardless of global policy, the utuser(1M) command can be run.
Example output if kiosk mode is enabled for an individual smartcard:
$ /opt/SUNWut/sbin/utuser -L -s kiosk
Token ID Server Port User Name Session Type Other Info
- ------------ -------- -------- ------------ ----------
Payflex.500d9b5c00130200 0 User Name kiosk
1 token total
3. Exploiting this issue requires Sun Ray administration privileges.
The shared 'admin' account is used by default for administering Sun
If the PAM configuration for the utadmingui service has been modified
to use UNIX accounts, the following command may be used to list
authorized Sun Ray administrator accounts:
4. Access to the Sun Ray Web Administration GUI is necessary in order
to exploit this issue. The following command may be run to check if
the Sun Ray Web Administration GUI is enabled:
# /opt/SUNWut/lib/utwebadmin status
Sun Ray Web Administration is running (pid 1392)
To detect whether the Sun Ray Web Administration GUI permits remote
access, the following command can be run:
$ grep remote.access
# use ".*" to enable remote access from any host.
There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate the described
issue has been exploited.
To detect an ongoing attempt to exploit the described issue, inspect
the output of the following command for unexpected kiosk-related
# /opt/SUNWut/sbin/utkiosk -e session
Presence of arbitrary code execution constructs in the output of this
command may indicate that this issue is being exploited.
To work around the described issue, either temporarily disable the Sun
Ray Web Administration GUI or temporarily disable Sun Ray Kiosk Mode.
To reduce network exposure for this vulnerability, configure the Sun
Ray Web Administration GUI to accept connections only from the local
To disable the Sun Ray Web Administration GUI, the following command
can be run:
# /opt/SUNWut/sbin/utconfig -uw
To disable Sun Ray Kiosk Mode, use the following procedure in the Sun
Ray Web Administration GUI:
1. Select the Advanced/System Policy tab.
2. Uncheck both 'Kiosk Mode' check boxes (if they are checked).
3. Click Save to save your changes.
4. Select the Servers tab.
5. Select all listed servers.
6. Click Cold Restart to restart Sun Ray services.
WARNING: This will terminate all current Sun Ray sessions
To reconfigure the Sun Ray Web Administration GUI with the option to
allow access only from the local host, run the following command:
# /opt/SUNWut/sbin/utconfig -w
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for Solaris 10) with patch 128165-01
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for Solaris 10) with patch 128166-01
* Sun Ray Server Software 4.0 (for RHEL AS 4, SLES 9) with patch
128167-01 or later
For more information on Security Sun Alerts, see Technical
Instruction ID 213557.
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
Copyright 2000-2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved
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