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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2008.0568 -- [Solaris]
A Security Vulnerability in samba(7) Domain logons may allow
execution of Arbitrary code with Root privileges
13 June 2008
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: samba
Publisher: Sun Microsystems
Operating System: Solaris
Impact: Root Compromise
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2007-6015
Ref: AL-2007.0126
Original Bulletin:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/printfriendly.do?assetkey=1-66-238251-1
Revision History: June 13 2008: Resolution released
June 2 2008: Initial Release
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Solution Type: Sun Alert
Solution 238251 : A Security Vulnerability in samba(7) Domain
logons may allow execution of Arbitrary code with Root privileges
Bug ID: 6640253
Product Solaris 9 Operating System,
Solaris 10 Operating System,
SAMBA 3.0.0,
SAMBA 3.0.27
Date of Workaround Release: 30-May-2008
Date of Resolved Release: 11-Jun-2008
SA Document Body
A Security Vulnerability in samba(7) Domain logons may allow execution of
Arbitrary code with Root privileges
1. Impact
A stack-based buffer overflow security vulnerability exists in the
send_mailslot function in nmbd(8) in Samba 3.0.0 through 3.0.27a when
the "domain logons" option is enabled. This vulnerability may allow a
remote unprivileged user the ability to execute arbitrary code as
"root" user via a GETDC mailslot request composed of a long GETDC
string following an offset username in a SAMLOGON logon request.
More info on this issue can be found in the following document:
CVE-2007-6015 at
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-6015
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 9 without patch 114684-11
* Solaris 10 without patch 119757-10
x86 Platform
* Solaris 9 without patch 114685-11
* Solaris 10 without patch 119758-10
with the following versions of Samba software:
* Samba 3.0.0 through 3.0.27a
Note: Solaris 8 does not include the Samba software and is therefore
not affected by this issue.
To determine the version of Samba installed on a system, the following
command can be run:
% /usr/sfw/sbin/smbd -V
Version 3.0.4
This issue only affects systems configured as Samba servers that have
enabled the netlogon service for Windows 9X network logons.
To determine if a system is configured as a Samba server, the
following command can be run to check for processes related to Samba:
% ps -ef | grep mbd
root 317 1 0 May 26 ? 0:01 /usr/sfw/sbin/smbd -D
root 325 317 0 May 26 ? 0:00 /usr/sfw/sbin/smbd -D
root 314 1 0 May 26 ? 0:27 /usr/sfw/sbin/nmbd -D
root 28369 17382 0 23:17:46 pts/2 0:00 grep mbd
If the output shows "smbd" or "nmbd" running as a daemon (with the -D
parameter), the system is configured as a Samba server.
To determine if the Samba server has enabled the netlogon service for
Windows 9X network logons, the following steps may be employed:
1. Verify that the process "/usr/sfw/sbin/nmbd -D" is running. This
may be done using the ps(1) command as shown above.
2. Verify that the "domain logons" configuration parameter is set to
"yes" to provide the netlogon service for Windows 9X network logons.
This may be verified looking into the /etc/sfw/smb.conf file.
For more details, please see the Samba documentation at:
http://us1.samba.org/samba/docs/man/manpages-3/smb.conf.5.html#DOMA
INLOGONS
3. Symptoms
There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate the described
vulnerability has been exploited to run arbitrary code.
4. Workaround
To work around the described issue, the netlogon service for Windows
9X network logons may be stopped. This can be achieved by modifying
the "domain logons" entry in the /etc/sfw/smb.conf file to "no". The
Samba server must be restarted after making this modification for the
changes to take effect. This may be done using the following command
(as 'root' user):
On Solaris 9:
# /etc/init.d/samba stop
# /etc/init.d/samba start
On Solaris 10:
# svcadm disable wins
# svcadm enable wins
5. Resolution
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 9 with patch 114684-11 or later
* Solaris 10 with patch 119757-10 or later
x86 Platform
* Solaris 9 with patch 114685-11 or later
* Solaris 10 with patch 119758-10 or later
For more information on Security Sun Alerts, see Technical
Instruction ID 213557.
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
agreements.
Copyright 2000-2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved
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