Hash: SHA1

             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                Schneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Module
                             19 December 2011


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:           Schneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Module
Publisher:         US-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Administrator Compromise        -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Modify Arbitrary Files          -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Denial of Service               -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Website Defacement              -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Access Confidential Data        -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Mitigation
CVE Names:         CVE-2011-4859  

Original Bulletin: 

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------


Schneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Module Multiple Vulnerabilities

December 12, 2011



On December 12, 2011, independent security researcher Rubn Santamarta publicly
announced details of multiple vulnerabilities affecting the Schneider Electric
Quantum Ethernet Module. Prior to publication, Mr. Santamarta notified ICS-CERT
of the vulnerabilities. ICS-CERT is coordinating mitigations with Mr.
Santamarta and Schneider Electric. Schneider has produced a fix for two of the
reported vulnerabilities and is continuing to develop additional mitigations. 

Multiple hardcoded credentials are revealed in Mr. Santamartas report that
enable access to the following services:
* Telnet port - May allow remote attackers the ability to view the operation of
  the modules firmware, cause a denial of service, modify the memory of the
  module, and execute arbitrary code.
* Windriver Debug port - Used for development; may allow remote attackers to
  view the operation of the modules firmware, cause a denial of service, modify
  the memory of the module, and execute arbitrary code.
* FTP service - May allow an attacker to modify the module website, download and
  run custom firmware, and modify the http passwords.

ICS-CERT is currently coordinating with Schneider Electric to develop
mitigations. Additional information regarding the impact and mitigations will
be issued as it becomes available. Please report any issues affecting control
systems in critical infrastructure environments to ICS-CERT.



140NOE77101 Firmware Version 4.9 and all previous versions.
140NOE77111 Firmware Version 5.0 and all previous versions.
140NOE77100 Firmware Version V3.4 and all previous versions.
140NOE77110 Firmware Version V3.3 and all previous versions.
140CPU65150 Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.
140CPU65160 Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.
140CPU65260 Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.


TSXETY4103 Firmware Version V5.0 and all previous versions.
TSXETY5103 Firmware Version V5.0 and all previous versions.
TSXP571634M Firmware Version V4.9 and all previous versions.
TSXP572634M Firmware Version V4.9 and all previous versions.
TSXP573634M Firmware Version V4.9 and all previous versions.
TSXP574634M Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.
TSXP575634M Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.
TSXP576634M Firmware Version V3.5 and all previous versions.


BMXNOE0100 Firmware Version V2.3 and all previous versions.
BMXNOE0110 Firmware Version V4.65 and all previous versions.
BMXP342020 Firmware Version V2.2 and all previous versions. a
BMXP342030 Firmware Version V2.2 and all previous versions. a


STBNIC2212 Firmware Version V2.10 and all previous versions.
STBNIP2311 Firmware Version V3.01 and all previous versions.
STBNIP2212 Firmware Version V2.73 and all previous versions.


Schneider Electric has created a fix for the Telnet and Windriver debug port
vulnerabilities for the BMXNOE0100 and 140NOE77101 modules, which will be
published on the Schneider website. This fix removes the Telnet and Windriver
services from the modules. Organizations need to evaluate the impact of
removing these services prior to applying this fix. ICS-CERT will provide
additional information as mitigations become available for other identified
vulnerabilities. ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to
minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Control system
  devices should not directly face the Internet. b
* Locate control system networks and devices behind firewalls, and isolate
  them from the business network.
* If remote access is required, employ secure methods, such as Virtual Private
  Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected

ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to taking defensive measures. The Control Systems Security
Program (CSSP) also provides a recommended practices section for control
systems on the US-CERT website. Several recommended practices are available
for reading or download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. c

Organizations that observe any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.


ICS-CERT Operations Center 1-877-776-7585 ics-cert@dhs.gov
For CSSP Information and Incident Reporting: www.ics-cert.org


What is an ICS-CERT Alert? An ICS-CERT Alert is intended to provide timely
notification to critical infrastructure owners and operators concerning threats
or activity with the potential to impact critical infrastructure computing

When is vulnerability attribution provided to researchers? Attribution for
vulnerability discovery is always provided to the vulnerability reporter unless
the reporter declines attribution. ICS-CERT encourages researchers to
coordinate vulnerability details before public release. The public release of
vulnerability details prior to the development of proper mitigations may put
industrial control systems and the public at avoidable risk.

a. These products are only affected by the FTP and hard-coded credential
  website last accessed December 12, 2011
c. Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) Recommended Practices,
  website last accessed December 12, 2011.

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:


Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967