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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2015.0824
                   Ecava IntegraXor DLL Vulnerabilities
                               1 April 2015

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Ecava IntegraXor
Publisher:         US-CERT
Operating System:  Windows
Impact/Access:     Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Existing Account
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2015-0990  

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-090-02

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Advisory (ICSA-15-090-02)

Ecava IntegraXor DLL Vulnerabilities

Original release date: March 31, 2015

Legal Notice

All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information 
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, 
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For 
more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.

OVERVIEW

Security researcher Praveen Darshanam has identified two DLL loading 
vulnerabilities in Ecavas IntegraXor SCADA Server. Ecava has produced a patch
that mitigates these vulnerabilities. Praveen Darshanam has tested the patch 
to validate that it resolves the vulnerabilities.

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following SCADA Servers are affected:

    IntegraXor SCADA Server prior to Version 4.2.4488

IMPACT

Loading and executing an insecure DLL is equivalent to running malicious code
at the privilege level of the application that uses the DLL.

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to
each organization. NCCIC/ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the 
impact of these vulnerabilities based on their operational environment, 
architecture, and product implementation.

BACKGROUND

Ecava Sdn Bhd (Ecava) is a Malaysia-based software development company that 
provides the IntegraXor SCADA product. Ecava specializes in factory and 
process automation solutions.

The affected product, IntegraXor, is a suite of tools used to create and run a
web-based human-machine interface for a SCADA system. According to Ecava, 
IntegraXor is deployed across several sectors including Critical 
Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater Systems, and others. Ecava 
estimates that this product is used in 38 countries, with the largest 
installations based in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, 
Poland, Canada, and Estonia.

VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION

VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

UNCONTROLLED SEARCH PATH ELEMENT[a]

An attacker could rename a malicious DLL to meet the criteria of the 
applications, and the applications would not verify the DLL is correct. The 
attacker needs to have administrative access to the default install location 
in order to plant the insecure DLL. Once loaded by either application, the DLL
could run malicious code at the privilege level of the application.

CVE-2015-0990[b] has been assigned to these vulnerabilities. A CVSS v2 base 
score of 6.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 
(AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C).[c]

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

EXPLOITABILITY

These vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely without user interaction. 
These exploits are only triggered when a local user runs the vulnerable 
application after loading the malicious DLL file.

EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT

No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.

DIFFICULTY

Crafting a working exploit for these vulnerabilities would be difficult. 
Social engineering is required to convince the user to load the malicious DLL
file. Additional user interaction is needed to load the malformed file. This 
decreases the likelihood of a successful exploit.

MITIGATION

Ecava recommends users download and install the patch at the following 
location:

http://www.integraxor.com/download/rc.msi?4.2.4488

ICS-CERT recommends that users take the following measures to protect 
themselves from social engineering attacks:

    Do not click web links or open unsolicited attachments in email messages.

    Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams[d] for more information on 
    avoiding email scams.

    Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks[e] for more 
    information on social engineering attacks

In addition, ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive 
measures to protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.

    Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, 
    and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.

    Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and 
    isolate them from the business network.

    When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and 
should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that 
VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended 
practices on the ICS-CERT web page at: 
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices. Several recommended
practices are available for reading and download, including Improving 
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. 
ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk 
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly 
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, 
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation 
Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site 
(http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their 
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for 
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

a. CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element, 
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html, web site last accessed March 
31, 2015.

b. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-0990, 
NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE web site report. This web site will
be active sometime after publication of this advisory.

c. CVSS Calculator, 
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:L/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C, web
site last accessed March 31, 2015.

d. Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams, 
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/emailscams_0905.pdf, web site last 
accessed March 31, 2015.

e. National Cyber Alert System Cyber Security Tip ST04-014, 
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-014.html, web site last accessed March 
31, 2015.

Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov

Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585

International Callers: (208) 526-0900

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting: 
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov

ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can 
help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this 
product.

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