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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2015.1915
Siemens RuggedCom ROS and ROX-based Devices TLS POODLE Vulnerability
22 July 2015
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Siemens RuggedCom ROS and ROX devices
Publisher: US-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Access Privileged Data -- Remote with User Interaction
Unauthorised Access -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2015-5537
Original Bulletin:
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-03
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Advisory (ICSA-15-202-03)
Siemens RuggedCom ROS and ROX-based Devices TLS POODLE Vulnerability
Original release date: July 21, 2015
Legal Notice
All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service,
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For
more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
OVERVIEW
Siemens has reported to NCCIC/ICS-CERT that a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption (POODLE) vulnerability exists
in the web interface of Siemens RuggedCom ROS and ROX-based devices. Siemens
has produced a firmware update to mitigate this vulnerability.
This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following Siemens RuggedCom ROS versions are affected:
RuggedCom devices with ROS: All firmware versions prior to v4.2.0
RuggedCom devices with ROX: All firmware versions prior to v2.6.3
IMPACT
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow attackers to hijack an
active web session and access administrative functions on the devices without
proper authorization or allow unprivileged users to perform privilege
escalation.
Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to
each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture,
and product implementation.
BACKGROUND
Siemens is an international company headquartered in Munich, Germany.
The affected products, Siemens RuggedCom ROS and ROX-based devices, are used
to connect devices that operate in harsh environments such as electric utility
substations and traffic control cabinets. According to Siemens, RuggedCom ROS
and ROX-based devices are deployed across several sectors including Energy,
Healthcare and Public Health, and Transportation Systems. Siemens estimates
that these products are used worldwide.
VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION
VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
CYRPTOGRAPHIC ISSUES [a]
The web interface (Port 443/TCP) of the affected devices is vulnerable to a
padding oracle attack (also known as TLS POODLE). A remote attacker in a
privileged network position could possibly recover parts of the plain text if
unsuspecting users are misled to click on a malicious link.
CVE-2015-5537 [b] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base
score of 4.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N). [c]
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
EXPLOITABILITY
Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow remote attackers to recover
parts of the plaintext of an encrypted connection under certain circumstances.
This vulnerability can be staged remotely but cannot be exploited without user
interaction. The exploit is only triggered when a local user voluntarily
interacts with the attack mechanism.
EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
DIFFICULTY
Crafting a working exploit for this vulnerability would be difficult. Social
engineering is required to convince the user to accept the malformed file.
Additional user interaction is needed to load the malformed file. This
decreases the likelihood of a successful exploit.
MITIGATION
Siemens has produced a firmware update v4.2.0 for ROS-based devices, which
fixes the vulnerability.
The firmware updates for the affected products can be obtained online at:
http://www.siemens.com/automation/support-request
Call a local hotline center:
http://www.automation.siemens.com/
Asset owners and operators should contact Siemens customer support to acquire
the update.
For more information on this vulnerability and detailed instructions, please
see Siemens Security Advisory SSA-396873 at the following location:
http://www.siemens.com/innovation/pool/de/forschungsfelder/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-396873.pdf
ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems,
and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
isolate them from the business network.
When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and
should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that
VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT web page at:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices. Several recommended
practices are available for reading and download, including Improving
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available in the ICSCERT Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site
(http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
In addition, ICS-CERT recommends that users take the following measures to
protect themselves from social engineering attacks:
Do not click web links or open unsolicited attachments in email messages.
Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams [d] for more information on
avoiding email scams.
Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks [e] for more
information on social engineering attacks.
a. CWE-310: Cryptographic Issues,
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/310.html, web site last accessed July
21, 2015.
b. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-5537,
NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE web site report. This web site will
be active sometime after publication of this advisory.
c. CVSS Calculator,
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N, web
site last accessed July 21, 2015.
d. Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams,
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/emailscams_0905.pdf, web site last
accessed July 21, 2015.
e. National Cyber Alert System Cyber Security Tip ST04-014,
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-014.html, web site last accessed July 21,
2015.
Contact Information
For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:
Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
International Callers: (208) 526-0900
For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov
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