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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2017.2905
             Key Reinstallation Attacks against TropOS Devices
                             15 November 2017

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           TropOS
Publisher:         ABB
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Access Privileged Data         -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Provide Misleading Information -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Mitigation
CVE Names:         CVE-2017-13077 CVE-2017-13078 CVE-2017-13079
                   CVE-2017-13080 CVE-2017-13081 CVE-2017-13082
                   CVE-2017-13084 CVE-2017-13086 CVE-2017-13087
                   CVE-2017-13088  

Reference:         ESB-2017.2599
                   ESB-2017.2600
                   ESB-2017.2601.3

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-318-02

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Advisory (ICSA-17-318-02)

ABB TropOS

Original release date: November 14, 2017

Legal Notice

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For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------


CVSS v3 6.8

Vendor: ABB

Equipment: TropOS

Vulnerabilities: Security Features

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

ABB reports that the key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) potentially affect all
TropOS broadband mesh routers and bridges operating on Mesh OS release 8.5.2 or
prior.

IMPACT

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to
decrypt, replay, and forge some frames on a WPA2 encrypted network.

MITIGATION

ABB is working on remedial actions for all affected products.

ABB has released an advisory (1KHW02890) on their alerts and notification page:

http://search-ext.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=1KHW02890&Action=
Launch

This advisory will be updated when firmware, including remedial measures, is
available.

The TropOS mesh wireless interfaces are not vulnerable. Wired client interfaces
(Ethernet, Serial) are not vulnerable. An attacker must be in physical
proximity of the Wi-Fi access point and connected client to be successful. If
the communication across the Wi-Fi link is encrypted at Layer 3 (e.g., SSH,
SSL, HTTPS, or SNMPv3 encrypted), privacy is maintained during an otherwise
successful attack. If possible, encrypt communication across the Wi-Fi link at
Layer 3 using SSH, SSL, HTTPS, or SNMPv3. There is no complete workaround which
allows protected Wi-Fi access to the TropOS Mesh.

ABB users with a current Complete Software Care or Complete Software + Hardware
Care subscription are advised to contact ABB Wireless support on phone +1(408)
331 6800, ext. 4, or email tropos.support@nam.abb.com.

NCCIC/ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the
risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:

  * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems,
    and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
  * Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
    isolate them from the business network.
  * When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
    Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should
    be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN
    is only as secure as the connected devices.

ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
in the ICS?CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber
Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, that is available for download
from the ICS-CERT web site.

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

These vulnerabilities have been publicly disclosed. These vulnerabilities are
exploitable from adjacent networks. High skill level is needed to exploit.

VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

SECURITY FEATURES CWE-254

An industry-wide vulnerability exists in the WPA2 key management algorithm
devices that use IEEE 802.11w, including the TropOS broadband mesh routers
listed above. The vulnerability may allow an attacker to decrypt, replay, and
forge some frames on a WPA2 encrypted network.

The following CVEs have been assigned to this group of vulnerabilities:

CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the four-way handshake,

CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the four-way handshake,

CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the four-way
handshake,

CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the group key handshake,

CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the group key
handshake,

CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted fast BSS transition reassociation
request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it,

CVE-2017-13084: reinstallation of the STK key in the PeerKey handshake,

CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the tunneled direct-link setup (TDLS) PeerKey
(TPK) key in the TDLS handshake,

CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a
wireless network management (WNM) sleep mode response frame, and

CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when
processing a wireless network management (WNM) sleep mode response frame.

A CVSS v3 base score of 6.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

RESEARCHER

Mathy Vanhoef, of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, discovered
this vulnerability.

BACKGROUND

Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Critical Manufacturing, Energy

Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide

Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland


Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
International Callers: (208) 526-0900

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov

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