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Mandatory Data Breach Notification Scheme

Mandatory Data Breach Notification Scheme MANDATORY DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION SCHEME How it affects you   Introduction It’s official! The Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, established by the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017, will be officially enforced from the 22nd of February 2018.   What is it? It is a legal obligation to notify individuals whose personal information is involved in a data breach that is likely to result in serious harm.   Does my organisation need to comply? When do I need to report a data breach and how?        IF your organisation is described in “Entities covered by the NDB scheme”        AND        2. Your organisation collects, retains, handles and transmits ‘personal information’        AND        3. Your organisation has been subjected to an eligible data breach [4], and there are no applicable exceptions to notification obligations       THEN You need to complete assessing the suspected data breach within 30 calendar days of becoming aware of the suspected breach. A suggested three-step assessment procedure contains the following stages:        a. Initiate: decide whether an assessment is necessary and identify which person or group will be responsible for completing it        b. Investigate: quickly gather relevant information about the suspected breach including, for example, what personal information is affected, who may have had access to the information and the likely impacts, and        c. Evaluate: make a decision, based on the investigation, about whether the identified breach is an eligible data breach (see Identifying eligible data breaches).        IF           reasonable evidence exists to believe an eligible data breach has occurred,        THEN You need to notify: a. Affected individuals b. The Australian Information Commissioner, by submitting a Notifiable Data Breach statement – Form available at https://www.oaic.gov.au/NDBform/.       2. The following information must be included in an eligible data breach statement:           a. the identity and contact details of the organisation           b. a description of the data breach           c. the kinds of information concerned and;           d. recommendations about the steps individuals should take in response to the data breach.      3. Special conditions for notification exist where the breached data is in the custody of more than one party.    An excellent resource covering this topic is available here.   Additional Resources https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZXzNLlW2vA   Legal AUSCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained on this web site is accurate. However, the decision to use or follow any information or advice referenced here is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The appropriateness of any information or advice for an organisation or individual system should be considered before application in conjunction with the organisation’s local policies and procedures. AUSCERT takes no responsibility for the consequences of applying or following the information or advice on this web site.

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AUSCERT at linux.conf.au 2018

AUSCERT at linux.conf.au 2018 Hi, I’m David, one of the information security analysts here.   Intro AUSCERT sent me to the 2018 linux.conf.au conference with a Fairy Penguin sponsorship. It was my second time attending; the previous year, I’d taken a week’s leave and paid my own way, and was so enamoured that I convinced my new employer to send me along this time. The real strength of the conference, to me, is being surrounded by people much smarter and more experienced than myself. (This is exactly how I pitched it to management.) And the atmosphere is so friendly that knowledge transfers quickly. The organisers put a strong emphasis on inclusion and diversity. One of these is the “Pac-Man rule”: when standing in a circle talking, shape it like Pac-Man and leave space for someone else to join. Speaking of speaking, the #lca2018 hashtag was pretty hectic all week. The Australia/NZ FOSS community is great to be involved with, and I’ve found it pays to follow interesting people using the tag. I also find it’s valuable to connect with people for whom information security is part of their job, but not their core responsibility. Understanding the motivations and needs of people outside the infosec space is important to staying in the loop. Plus, they have some really cool projects.   Recordings to watch All the talks are recorded and published free on YouTube by Next Day Video. I’m enjoying “week two” of the conference – catching up on the talks I couldn’t attend! We’ll also replay some talks at the office over lunch. At AUSCERT, we mix infosec with data analysis, technical communication and lightweight development. Current proposals are Understanding git – even the scary parts, What is the most common street name in Australia?, Is the 370 the worst bus route in Sydney? and the Panel on Meltdown, Spectre and the free-software community. Talks I personally recommend are every single keynote, the Meltdown/Spectre Panel, a home Kubernetes environment, automating WordPress security recovery, Tap On to Reverse Engineering, and Linux system monitoring with the Elastic Stack. Shoutout to Alistair Chapman for his superb lightning talk on things you can do but shouldn’t with Docker.   Notes from the Spectre/Meltdown Panel The speculative execution side-channel vulnerabilities had been leaked three weeks before the conference, so a panel was organised (and jammed into the schedule). It was a fascinating session giving perspectives from several stakeholders at several levels of the stack – hardware, kernel, OS, container, SRE and more kernel. Some interesting stories about responses to the embargo and patches from different parties. FreeBSD weren’t included in the embargo and were left scrambling to patch when it leaked. Small PaaS providers are stuck waiting for patches for their OS. Hardware vulnerabilities are very hard to resist even with containerised services. … but containers will make it easier when you patch. Some discussion of the value of embargoes of vulnerabilities. Give the full session a watch; it’s rare to find so much diverse expertise in one room, talking semi-frankly about this.   Wrapping up The linux.conf.au conference is a very educational week for anyone IT-adjacent, and I’d strongly recommend it. Hope to see you at #lca2019 in Christchurch! David Lord, @dal_geek

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Attackers using remote coding execution vulnerabilities to install cryptocurrency miners in vulnerable hosts

Attackers using remote coding execution vulnerabilities to install cryptocurrency miners in vulnerable hosts Introduction Kicking off the New year, AUSCERT received reports of multiple attacks attempting to run exploits against vulnerable hosts in order to install and operate Cryptocurrency miners in them. Similar attacks have been reported around the globe. Sighted attacks so far have targeted hosts running Linux operating systems. The miners are dropped as ELF 64-bit files; these are Monero miners to be precise, and are variants of XMRig. [1] Alienvault released a pulse addressing Monero Miner installation attacks. [2] In one attack scenario, attackers exploited a Remote Code execution vulnerability in the WLS Security sub-component of the Oracle WebLogic Server (WLS) (CVE-2017-10271), to download and install Monero miner software in the target host. Weblogic Server versions vulnerable to this attack are 10.3.6.0.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.1.0 and 12.2.1.2.0. This vulnerability was addressed in Oracle CPU [3].  Two articles from nsfocusglobal and morihi-soc (translation required) provide some analyses into these attacks. [4,5]. AUSCERT performed its own analysis based on reports from multiple members. Indicators derived from that investigation have also been included in the list of indicators provided at the end of this blog. A new python-based cryptominer botnet has also been recently exposed. It uses a JBOSS vulnerability (CVE-2017-12149) to run remote code exploits against vulnerable Linux hosts to fetch base64 encoded python scripts and execute them.  These scripts in turn connect to remote Command and Control servers to fetch additional python scripts. Interestingly, this botnet appears to be using pastebin resources as C&C servers. [6]   Basic characteristics of an attack 1. Attackers launch a remote code execution exploit targeting one of the following vulnerabilities in the target host:     a. WebLogic server Remote Code Execution vulnerability. (CVE-2017-10271)    b. JBoss Remote Code Execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-7504, CVE-2017-12149: used by a new python-based crypto miner)    c. Apache Struts Jakarta Multipart parser Remote Code Execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) 2. The exploit request includes the payload to fetch the cryptominer from a remote url create a crontab entry to make it run persistently and execute via the local shell depending on the operating system (e.g. cmd.exe for Windows and /bin/bash/ for Linux systems). 3. Additional Shell scripts are fetched from remote servers. These scripts have the function of:     a. Killing competing processes that consume large CPU loads (>20%)    b. Kill competing xmrig cryptocurrency mining processes    c. Create crontab entries and/or rc.local files to ensure the miner is executed at regular intervals or on system reboot    d. Modify file permissions to allow the miner to be executed by users with any privilege level    e. Generate log files     f. Communicate the miner’s execution progress to a remote HQ.    g. Determine the CPU type and number of CPU cores in a host and then branching to fetch an appropriate miner. 4.  The miner regularly communicates execution progress to a remote mining pool (or hq). Actual miner files carry different names based on the attack. AUSCERT has currently sighted miners as 64-bit ELF files with the following names:    a. fs-manager    b. sourplum    c. kworker    d. kworker_na Factors differentiating miners 1. Maximum CPU threshold.2. Dependence on an external config file. Some miner require an external config file (example, kworker.conf or config.json) to execute correctly. The config file typically contains:    a. The username and password to access the remote mining pool     b. URL of the remote mining pool    c. Mining algorithm used (e.g. Cryptonight)     d. the “nice” level of the mining process3. Homing to different HQs or mining pools Mitigation Recommendations 1. Patch systems against commonly targeted vulnerabilities for this type of attack. 2. Set ACLs and Firewalls to block outbound and inbound access to and from known Bitcoin mining pool IPs (unless your organisational policy allows the use of computing resources for bitcoin mining!). 3. Set IDS/IPS to detect requests and responses to and from payload delivery and network activity URLs. 4. Block resolution of domains known to be C&C and mining pools for cryptocurrency miners (e.g. via DNS firewalls). 5. Check Host files systems for dropped files (representing crypto miners) and corresponding hashes (e.g. using a Host-based IDS like OSSEC). See Indicators section below for a list of indicators of compromise. References 1. https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig 2. https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/5a4e1c4993199b299f90a212/?utm_medium=InProduct&utm_source=OTX&utm_content=Email&utm_campaign=new_pulse_from_subscribed 3. http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuoct2017-3236626.html. 4. https://blog.nsfocusglobal.com/threats/vulnerability-analysis/technical-analysis-and-solution-of-weblogic-server-wls-component-vulnerability/ 5. http://www.morihi-soc.net/?p=910 6. https://f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/malware/new-python-based-crypto-miner-botnet-flying-under-the-radar   Indicators Network-based indicators Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/1.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://221.229.204.177:8888 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/xmrig Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/?info=l30 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/ Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/?info=l69 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/w/default Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/xmr64.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/?info=w0 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/1.sh Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/w/default/auto-upgrade.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/w/default?info=w0 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://www.luoxkexp.com:8520/php.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/auto-upgrade Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com:8888/samba.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/xmr86.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/fuckpig.jar Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://www.luoxkexp.com:8520/ Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/?info=w9 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/w/default?info=w9 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com/xmr64.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/112.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://27.148.157.89:8899/jiba Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/w/others Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/setup-watch Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/?info=l60 Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/l/default Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr86.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com:8899/xmr64.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://72.11.140.178/files/l/others Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://luoxkexp.com:8899/1.exe Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://letoscribe.ru/includes/libraries/files.tar.gz Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://letoscribe.ru/includes/libraries/getsetup.php?p=wl Monero miner setup file delivery url Payload delivery url http://45.77.106.29/selectv2.sh Sourplum and related scripts delivery url Payload delivery url http://45.77.106.29/sourplum Sourplum and related scripts delivery url Payload delivery url http://45.77.106.29/lowerv2.sh Sourplum and related scripts delivery url Payload delivery url http://45.77.106.29/rootv2.sh Shell script delivery url Payload delivery url http://181.214.87.240/res/logo.jpg Shell script delivery url Payload delivery url http://5.188.87.12/langs/kworker_na Monero miner delivery url Payload delivery url http://181.214.87.240/res/kworker.conf Monero miner config file delivery url Network activity url http://letoscribe.ru/includes/libraries/notify.php?p=wl Monero Miner reports execution progress to HQ at this URL Network activity url http://104.223.37.150:8090 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://pastebin.com/raw/yDnzKz72 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://k.zsw8.cc:8080 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://i.zsw8.cc:8080 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://pastebin.com/raw/rWjyEGDq Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://208.92.90.51 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity url http://208.92.90.51:443 Known C&C for python-based crypto miner Network activity domain minergate.com Known C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool domain Network activity domain minexmr.com Known C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool domain Network activity domain letoscribe.ru Known Monero Miner HQ domain Network activity domain pool-proxy.com Mining pool domain Network activity domain fee.xmrig.com Domains contacted by fs-manager Network activity domain nicehash.com Domains contacted by fs-manager Network activity domain data.rel.ro Domains contacted by fs-manager Network activity domain dkuug.dk kworker miner attempts to communicate with this domain Network activity domain i.zsw8.cc C&C Domain for python-based crypto miner Network activity domain k.zsw8.cc C&C Domain for python-based crypto miner Network activity hostname pool.supportxmr.com Known mining pool host Network activity hostname pool.cortins.tk Known mining pool host Network activity ip-dst 104.25.208.15 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 94.130.143.162 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 72.11.140.178 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 88.99.142.163 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 78.46.91.134 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 104.25.209.15 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 136.243.102.154 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 136.243.102.167 C&C address pool and Bitcoin mining pool IP Network activity ip-dst 148.251.133.246 Mining pool (HQ) IP Network activity ip-dst 104.223.37.150 C&C IP Network activity ip-dst 208.92.90.51 C&C IP Payload delivery ip-src 45.77.106.29 Payload delivery ip-src 181.214.87.240   Host-based indicators Artifacts dropped sha256 7153ac617df7aa6f911e361b1f0c8188ca5c142c6aaa8faa2a59b55e0b823c1c Ref: XMRig variant fs-manager Artifacts dropped sha256 9359f7e7b1dd0f4ce4a2c52fe611c981a3dd7a17f935862e3ce9acb5f2df8ced Ref: kworker Artifacts dropped sha256 f4864b3793c93de50b953e9751dc22e03fa0333ae6856d8d153be9018da6d911 Ref: kworker_na Artifacts dropped sha256 d47d2aa3c640e1563ba294a140ab3ccd22f987d5c5794c223ca8557b68c25e0d Python-based crypto miner Artifacts dropped sha256 bcf306bf3c905567ac1a5012be94fe642cac6116192cea6486730341b32b38a4 Artifacts dropped sha256 0c5e960ca2a37cf383a7457bcc82e66d5b94164b12dfca1f21501211d9aca3c9 Artifacts dropped sha256 b3aba7582de82a0229b4d4caf73bc50cc18eb98109a0e251447dfb47afabc597 Payload delivery md5 0dc34402be603f563bfb25e7c476a0b4 Payload delivery md5 6455ffef458df6d24dd4df37f3d6df73 Payload delivery md5 9eadc40299864089e8a0959d04b02b39 Payload delivery md5 e1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051 Payload delivery sha1 deeb65dbf4ac5d1d0db6ac4467282f62049a3620 Payload delivery sha1 777af085e72a4a19b6971f24c1167989335af508 Payload delivery sha1 4f41da624726daf16e1c0034e8a6a99c790be61e Payload delivery sha1 9be68990dd7b071b192b89b0e384f290cce2b2db Payload delivery sha256 0b2bd245ce62787101bc56b1eeda9f74e0f87b72781c8f50a1eff185a2a98391 Payload delivery sha256 182812097daabfc3fe52dd485bb0a0f566ddf47f23b9d9f72c2df01a1a4faf84 Payload delivery sha256 43f78c1c1b078f29fd5eb75759aa7b1459aa3f1679bbaabc1e67c362620650fb Payload delivery sha256 370109b73fa9dceea9e2b34b466d0d2560025efcc78616387d84732cbe82b6bd Payload delivery sha256 36524172afa85a131bf0075c7ff20dcbfb8a94c4e981300fb33ef56ed912678c Payload delivery sha256 348c7dd59ea1b4e88585863dd788621f1101202d32df67eb0015761d25946420 Payload delivery sha256 198e090e86863fb5015e380dc159c5634cc2a598e93b20dd9695e1649bb062ad Payload delivery sha256 d47d2aa3c640e1563ba294a140ab3ccd22f987d5c5794c223ca8557b68c25e0d  

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Breach compilation notifications

Breach compilation notifications On Tuesday 19th, AUSCERT notified a large number of members whose credentials had been found online. This is a regular service AUSCERT provides, but in this case it is a special event based on a large credential compilation. It contains 1.4 billion credentials. Original source.   FAQ How do I open this file? Suppose the file you’ve received is named me@mydomain.com.zip.asc. This is an encrypted zip file. You will need PGP software to decrypt the file, e.g. GPG. GPG4Win GUI: Open the file in Kleopatra and enter the decryption passphrase. If Kleopatra tells you “error retrieving audit log: decryption failed”, instead open a command prompt and follow the below instructions. GPG command-line: gpg me@mydomain.zip.asc and enter the decryption passphrase. This will create me@mydomain.com.zip. (note no “asc”) Then unzip the file. It contains one or more text files with the credentials we’ve found.   Where do I get the decryption passphrase? Access AUSCERT: Symmetric key decryption details and log in with your member account.   We can’t log in to the member portal. If you know your AUSCERT privileged contact/s in your organisation, please contact them for access. Otherwise, please contact auscert@auscert.org.au to begin regaining access. If you have two-factor authentication set up, recall that this is through a One-Time Password app and not an SMS.   Why does Windows say they’re COM or audio files? Individual files are named by the domain they correspond to. Some files end with ‘.com’, which Windows interprets as a command file, or ‘.au’, which Windows interprets as an audio file. We’ll send files with the ‘.txt’ extension in future. Please open all files in a text editor, such as WordPad or Notepad++.   Where did you get this data? AUSCERT found these credentials in a large collection online, which aggregates other data breaches. It is likely that your users’ credentials were stolen in other breaches such as LinkedIn (for instance, Have I Been Pwned lists famous breaches). Original source.   Have we been breached? It’s hard to say. The majority of the data will have come from attacks on other companies’ databases in the past. Some may be from phishing attacks directly against your users. With a data set this large, individual small attacks can be compiled into what looks like one more substantial attack. It is unlikely, but possible, that your organisation’s database is the source of these credentials. If any of these credentials were reused on internal company systems, and are still active, then there is the potential for them to be abused.   What do we do now? AUSCERT recommends ensuring these credentials are no longer valid within your organisation. Consider contacting users to advise they should change their password anywhere it’s still in use.

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APCERT 2017 AGM and Conference: A Window into the CERT community

APCERT 2017 AGM and Conference: A Window into the CERT community Introduction This year’s APCERT Annual General Meeting and conference has just concluded, being hosted by CERT-In in New Delhi, India. Each year AUSCERT sends a representative to the APCERT conference to collaborate and cooperate with the rest of the APCERT community. This year, I was lucky enough to be selected to attend. APCERT is a community of CERT and CSIRT organisations located in the Asia-Pacific area. Originally formed in 2003, its membership has now grown to 30 organisations representing 21 economies, as well as a number of supporting partner organisations. APCERT’s goals include information sharing and cooperation between its members and the public. Arriving in New Delhi This was my first visit to India, and although I had some knowledge of Indian culture and life, I was amazed to experience it first-hand. I arrived one day before the conference began, and spent the day shopping and taking in the local sights. The bustling streets, chaotic traffic, and the sheer scale of the country are a sight to see, and offer a sharp contrast to the quiet suburban life I am used to back in Brisbane. Delhi itself is a massive city, with a population that rivals that of all of Australia. The conference itself was hosted at the Ashok hotel, in Chanakyapuri, New Delhi. This five-star hotel is located in the heart of a diplomatic and government district, close to many foreign embassies, and as a result is very accommodating to foreign guests. The APCERT Community When the conference registration opened on Sunday morning, I began meeting delegates from other APCERT members. I noticed immediately that everyone was friendly, relaxed, and very welcoming. The APCERT community is small and close-knit, and for some long-time members, the conferences are just as much of a catch-up session as they are a business trip. Apparently some of AUSCERT’s staff are quite famous in the APCERT community, as I received quite a few queries regarding some of my colleagues! All of the APCERT members are working towards the same goal – to protect their economies or industry sectors from new and existing cyber threats. As we are largely government-funded or non-profit organisations, there is no pressure to create profits or sell products, and the focus is entirely on providing the best possible service to our jurisdictions. Some of the teams that participate in APCERT are quite small and do not have the resources to analyse all new threats, so collaboration amongst teams is extremely beneficial. In addition to the welcoming atmosphere among APCERT members, the hospitality and kindness shown by CERT-In was second-to-none. This year was the first time they had hosted the APCERT conference, but the experience was extremely smooth and well-thought out. During the afternoon of the first day, we were taken on a guided tour of local sights by the CERT-In staff, before being presented with a welcome dinner. Having helped run the AUSCERT conference in the past, I know how difficult and stressful it can be to run such an event, and I commend CERT-In on their performance. Conference Proceedings and Talks The conference began with updates from the various working groups within APCERT. This is a great way to share progress with other members, and some of the work presented by teams this year was extremely impressive. One such example is the TSUBAME project, which collects network traffic data from passive “sensors” situated in many networks across the Asia-Pacific region, and compiles that data into statistics that can be used to observe trends in network scans across the internet. Other talks focused on issues such as automated malware analysis, in particular the need for non-commercial options that can be used with potentially sensitive information. A talk given by Wen-Ling Lo from TWCERT/CC brought up an excellent point: many people use services such as VirusTotal or VirScan to check suspicious email attachments, but if the attachment is legitimate and contains confidential information, uploading it to a commercial company’s services could result in an information leak. TWCERT/CC are currently developing a tool that can be used by businesses and governments in Taiwan to examine files without fear that samples will be sent to external or commercial companies. AUSCERT is very impressed with their efforts and will be tracking their progress closely. Not all talks were technical, though, and an unexpectedly impactful presentation by Nurul Husna of MyCERT, the national CERT for Malaysia, described the governance and management workflows required to operate a CERT efficiently. As a technical person, it was refreshing to see a presentation on governance that made sense and showed real value. There is a real need for efficient management of resources at CERTs, due to the quick turnaround time required in order to serve our jurisdictions effectively. Additionally, some external speakers were invited to give talks at the conference. Some highlights included a talk by Akamai representative Amol Mathur on attacks that target API services directly, bypassing many of the protections that are built into front-end applications, and an overview on using machine learning to analyse malware samples by Rajesh Nikam of Quick Heal. As malware campaigns grow in both size and number, we need to move away from manual analysis in order to process as many samples as possible, making use of technologies such as machine learning to automate the process. On the final day of the conference, attendance was opened to external members of the IT industry, and the National Minister for IT & Electronics gave an address to the audience. During the conference I began to see just how large and important the IT industry in India is. With a population of over 1 billion people, internet-based solutions are essential to interacting with the government and businesses, and ensuring these interactions are protected and non-fraudulent is a problem at the forefront of the industry. The conference also served as a focus point for the local government to draw attention to emerging threats, especially as they begin to move towards more digital payment solutions. The full schedule for the APCERT Annual General Meeting and Conference may be found here: https://apcert2017.in/schedule.html The APCERT AGM Another important part of the conference is the Annual General Meeting, or AGM. At the AGM, proposals for changes and amendments to APCERT frameworks and guidelines are put forward and voted upon by members. Proposals for new working groups are also heard, and lastly, the membership of the steering committee and leadership positions are voted upon. This year, CERT-In was accepted as a new member of the steering committee, and after recognising the hard work of JPCERT/CC, MyCERT, and CERT Australia in their positions as Secretariat, Deputy Chair, and Chair respectively, the members of APCERT voted to re-appoint them to their previous positions. AUSCERT would like to thank the steering committee and leadership positions for their hard work in the past year, and congratulate them on their continued appointments. We also welcome CERT-In to the steering committee and look forward to their input in the future! Closing Remarks Attending the APCERT conference and AGM was an eye-opening experience. In the fast-moving world of Information Security, we are facing attacks in greater numbers and greater complexity. It can be difficult to sift through the vast amounts of information distributed throughout the internet, trying to find advice that is truthful, accurate, and relevant to your organisation. CERT and CSIRT organisations offer an increasingly important role in these times, distributing threat intelligence efficiently and with the goal of national/sectorial security in mind. As well, the challenges faced by each CERT are often similar, and there is great value in being able to speak freely with other organisations that share your goals. I would like to thank all of the members, partners, and guests at the conference, for welcoming me to the APCERT community. I’ve made many new friends over the last week, and hearing other analysts describe their experiences, challenges and achievements has re-invigorated my love for information security. I hope AUSCERT can continue to provide value to other APCERT members and look forward to some new collaborations in the future.I would also like to offer a special thank-you to the staff of CERT-In, for being such hospitable hosts. My first stay in India was a great experience, and I hope to return in the future.   Anthony Vaccaroanthony@auscert.org.au

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AUSCERT in Korea for the 2017 APISC/TRANSITS Security Training Course

AUSCERT in Korea for the 2017 APISC/TRANSITS Security Training Course AUSCERT participated in the APISC Security Training Course [1], organised by KrCERT/CC [2], operated by the Korea Internet & Security Agency [3] in the last week of July 2017.  AUSCERT sent a team member to join three (3) other instructors to facilitate the TRANSITS I [4] material to twenty-one (21) recipients CERT/CSIRT from across the globe. Along with the instruction of TRANSITS I material, there were also other CERT/CSIRT exercises and economy reports of CERT/CSIRT operations, that helped share experience in organising and operating CERT/CSIRT.  AUSCERT is honored to have been part of the APISC Security Training Course organised by KrCERT. [1] APISC Security Training Course – Asia Pacific Internet Security Conference Security Training Course. A yearly CERT capacity building initiative from South Korea that is run in conjunction to a yearly conference that bears the same name APISC.  [2] KrCERT/CC – Korean Computer Emergency Response Team / Coordination Centre. KrCERT/CC, created in 2010 and operates as the National CERT for South Korea. KrCERT is managed by KISA. https://www.krcert.or.kr/krcert/intro.do [3] KISA – Korean Internet & Security Agency. KISA sponsored by the South Korean Ministry of Science and ICT, commenced operation in 2009 and is responsible for the private sector of the Internet in South Korea. http://www.kisa.or.kr/eng/main.jsp [4] TRANSITS I. TRANSITS I course, created in 2001 is maintained by members of European CERTs with modules that deal with the Organization, Operation Legal and Technical aspect of CERT/CSIRT operation. https://www.terena.org/activities/transits/transits-i/

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How to check if your site is vulnerable to a POODLE attack

How to check if your site is vulnerable to a POODLE attack How to check if your site is vulnerable to a POODLE attack Following the introduction of AUSCERT’s new Member Security Incident Notifications (MSINs), some members have asked us how they can confirm the accuracy of the POODLE reports. This is the incident type with the highest occurrence rate among AUSCERT members. The Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption or POODLE attack can lead to decryption of HTTPS connections between clients and servers by exploiting a weakness in SSL 3.0 with cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode ciphers enabled. While we’re confident that our data sources are high quality, you can use the methods below to manually check your publicly facing services for poodle exposure if you wish. If you believe the information we have provided in the report is incorrect then please let us know. Manual methods for testing poodle exposure Qualys SSL Labs test Note that as at 23 September 2015, the information contained in the SSL Labs report requires careful analysis to interpret correctly. The “Summary” section may indicate “This server uses SSL 3, which is obsolete and insecure” when a poodle attack is possible. Later in the report a line entry may indicate “poodle (SSLv3): No, mitigated” if the service supports a secure protocol upgrade.  However, since this relies upon the client correctly negotiating one of the secure protocols, the service should still be considered vulnerable to poodle attacks. OpenSSL and nmap Use the command-line OpenSSL client and an nmap scan to attempt connection using SSL 3.0 and enumerate available ciphers.  The OpenSSL command just checks if SSLv3 is enabled; nmap returns all possible ciphers with SSL v3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 or TLS1.2. OpenSSL can be used to check each individual cipher but it would take more time. ~$ openssl s_client -ssl3 -connect your.domain.here:443 A successful connection indicates that SSL 3.0 is enabled and that a poodle attack is possible. ~$ nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 your.domain.here A server should be considered vulnerable to a poodle attack if CBC ciphers are offered while using SSLv3.  Please note that CBC ciphers, AES128-SHA and AES256-SHA, often don’t mention CBC in their names, but their presence does indicate a poodle vulnerable service. If no CBC ciphers are offered then it wouldn’t be vulnerable to a poodle attack (but most other ciphers are vulnerable to different attacks like RC4:BEAST). As you’ll already be aware, there is currently no fix for the vulnerability SSL 3.0 itself therefore disabling SSL 3.0 support is the most viable solution currently available. This means that even with up-to-date patches applied, it is possible to fail a poodle vulnerability scan if SSL 3.0 is still enabled. References and additional information https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-290A https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest https://www.tinfoilsecurity.com/blog/how-to-fix-poodle-and-why-you-are-probably-still-vulnerable

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Phone scams targeting a variety of organisations in the Health industry

Phone scams targeting a variety of organisations in the Health industry AUSCERT has recently received numerous reports of phone scams targeting a variety of organisations in the Health industry. The exact nature of the unsolicited calls varies but has included conference and event invites, training sessions, and attempts to confirm personal details of the callee or others in the organisation.  The callers have claimed to be associated with varied groups including GE Healthcare (who have been alerted to this), NEOH and the called organisation itself. Organisations should also be aware that fraudsters claiming to be from various GE businesses (including public reports of criminals using the name of GE Healthcare) often commit recruitment fraud and may do so as part of this activity. While phone scams such as these are ever present this recent spate of reports we have received specifically from the Health industry suggests the current need for increased awareness amongst Health industry organisatons. AUSCERT encourages members to review their current security awareness of their staff in relation to phone scams and consider alerting staff to this current activity. Guidelines for staff would include what steps to take when receiving unsolicited calls, the type of information that can and can not be provided, and any reporting guidelines. AUSCERT recommends staff are encouraged to report unsolicited or suspicious calls so that organisations can monitor for concerted attacks. AUSCERT has received reports of numerous calls to the same organisation (and individual) over a very short period of time. Information on what to do should also be provided for staff that have been defrauded or provided personal or organisational information. Useful resources include: https://www.scamwatch.gov.au/ https://www.staysmartonline.gov.au/ http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/ftw/Businesses/Scams/Business_scams To help gauge how wide spread this activity is AUSCERT would appreciate any feedback from organisations that have been targeted.  

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DDoS Mitigation

DDoS Mitigation Denial of service (DoS) attacks have hit the news in Australia, yet again. But what is a DoS attack? A DoS attack is designed to deny access to a computing resource from its intended users. A distributed DoS (or DDoS) attack is conducted by numerous (could be in the tens of thousands) computers against a single host or network. It’s not possible to prevent DDoS attacks, we can only be prepared to mitigate them. Types of DDoS attacks An attacker may use a stateless protocol like ICMP or UDP with spoofed source addresses, but it is also common for an attack to be carried out with legitimate network traffic (like HTTP GET requests). In the latter case it can be difficult to block malicious traffic without impacting legitimate traffic. A DDoS is commonly directed at a web site, with a sufficiently large number of requests to overwhelm the capacity of the web server to handle them. In extreme cases, the site’s network equipment may be made unavailable by the volume of traffic they are attempting to filter. Preparing for a DDoS attack There are a number of steps that you can take to prepare for a DDoS attack, including: Ensure that senior management is aware of the impact of a DDoS attack and will support your steps to mitigate one Understand your network – knowing what is normal for your network will enable a threshold of activity that indicates the start of a DDoS Keep your OS up to date and hardened – disable any unneeded services Implement firewall measures on your host – an example for linux Implement application protection, like ModSecurity web application firewall and mod_evasive for Apache – note that a large DDoS attack will quickly overwhelm these measures Run a dedicated network firewall that is able to handle a greater load than the one on the host itself Set up your border router with ACLs to allow only valid traffic into your network eg filter bogons and unused protocols Establish contact details for your upstream network provider so that they may be readily contacted in an emergency. Containing a DDoS attack The scale of the attack will determine the effectiveness of mitigation measures. It may be possible to contain the attack on the affected host itself, or it may require upstream filtering. Implement filtering based on the attack eg blocking UDP packets Consider disabling the targeted application until the attack stops Implement rate limiting for network traffic to the target Contact your ISP for traffic filtering Other resources are available; these are recommended reading – Factsheet Technical measures for the continuity of online services, Mitigation Guidelines for Denial-of-Service Attacks and Network DDoS Incident Response Cheat Sheet List of useful links from the blog + one more 1 https://javapipe.com/iptables-ddos-protection2 https://www.modsecurity.org/3 https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?page_id=442 (andhttps://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-protect-against-dos-and-ddos-with-mod_evasive-for-apache-on-centos-7)4 https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-technical-measures-for-the-continuity-of-online-services.html5 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cybr-ctr/2012/tr12-001-en.aspx6 https://zeltser.com/ddos-incident-cheat-sheet/

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